

THE LIVING AGE

Founded by E. Littell

In 1844



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The World Over

WARS CONTINUE UNABATED, in Europe and the Orient, but peace feelers are unquestionably being made. It is of the utmost importance to the Germans now to make peace at a time when they are in almost complete control of Europe. In their opinion, as was made plain enough in the extraordinary odyssey of Rudolf Hess, Britain has no chance of landing again any force anywhere on the Continent, and in the views of German military leaders even the expanding R.A.F. attacks cannot do sufficient damage to industrial installations to make a British victory possible. That being the case, the Germans argue, why should not England make the best peace terms now available?

The Germans, even the Nazis, have never had a flair for diplomacy. For one or another reason, their statesmanship has never been based consistently on international realities. There evidently is a belief current in the Wilhelmstrasse that the present British Government would entertain peace talks if it were not for an intransigent and stubborn Churchill. But President James B. Conant of Harvard, it would appear, gave a precise and accurate summation of the situation in England when, on his recent return from London, he said over the radio:

"On returning to this country I have been amazed by one point of view which I have heard frequently expressed. Some intelligent people seem to believe that this war may be ended by a negotiated peace. This is to say, that Hitler and the British may sit down at a council table and make an adjustment which will end the war. The idea to anyone who has lately been to England seems bitterly fantastic.

"We are living in a dark and uncertain hour of human history. Prophecy, as never before, is a risky business. Nevertheless I venture

one prediction. No British Government that could possibly come to power will make peace with Hitler. No British Government could consider a compromise peace. Because the people of Great Britain know that such a peace would mean the eventual enslavement of every man, woman and child upon their Island. . . . There is no mood for compromise in Britain."

Whatever reasons Hitler may have had for sending his deputy Hess to the enemy camp, that act failed to create any demoralization or confusion in the minds of a majority of the British people. The Germans may think that a compromise peace is only a few weeks away, but no one thinks so in England. If the cables mean anything, Hitler cannot make any proposals that the British would take seriously.

MEANWHILE, THERE WAS A strong peace drive in the Far East. In mid-May Japan apparently had made an abrupt about-face in its policy toward seeking a solution to end hostilities in China.

While Japanese armies were relentlessly advancing in the eastern Kwangtung Province in a drive to crush Chiang Kai-shek, the *Japan Times and Advertiser*, generally regarded as the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, only a week before had suggested a reduction in the scale of hostilities in China to promote peaceful conditions there, and came out with the later suggestion that the Government of China at Chungking "do a peaceful deed for the Chinese people" by surrendering or making terms with the régime of Wang Ching-wei at Nanking.

The paper, meantime, indicated that this new move was logical because "with unabated vigor and determination the Japanese Army, Navy and Air forces are pressing home final blows against hostile influences in China. . . . Chungking is indeed reeling under a series of shattering attacks and nowhere are there any evidences of any effective counter-measures or even adequate resistance." The daily added that it was a significant thing that at no point were Chiang Kai-shek's ill-supplied legions able to resist and that the recent action of the American Government to set aside more vessels to carry supplies to China probably might be "merely empty gestures, because at no point on the China coast could any foreign vessel penetrate the Japanese blockade."

Thus, the paper felt, Chiang would be kinder to his people if he quit now instead of battling on hopelessly.

To this newest peace offer, Chiang Kai-shek replied that it was an indication that Japan was at last weak and exhausted and that now, if ever, was the time for China to hurl the invaders out once and for all.

But even as Tokyo was putting out its assorted varieties of olive branches in China, the war drums were beating in the Dutch East Indies where, according to the Tokyo *Asahi Shimbun*, in a report from Batavia on

May 12, it was declared that measures of a "hostile" nature had assumed considerable proportions. The paper's correspondent wired that in order to cover increasing costs of armaments the population was now paying a special war tax each month amounting to one day's earnings. Everywhere on the island, he added, important military and office buildings were being camouflaged against any possible air raids and many shelters were being built everywhere throughout the Indies.

And recruiting continued despite the fact that the Army and Navy already had been greatly enlarged. Precautionary measures were also being taken in the economic field, with imports of every description and exports of food placed under a stringent license system.

THE FALANGISTS OF SPAIN ARE proclaiming a new race and citizenship theory, which does not square with a major doctrine of the chief European partners of the Axis, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. It will be recalled that these countries vigorously argue in their propaganda that once an Italian (or an Aryan German), always an Italian or a German, etc., no matter whether that national has become a citizen of another state or has disavowed the political faiths of the régime of his native country. Thus, Germany and Italy both lay claim to the allegiance and blind loyalty of their emigrants, and there is indisputable evidence that by the force of this argument these Axis partners have built up such fifth columns as they possess abroad. (Incidentally, in Germany today the question whether a national who has obtained foreign citizenship remains a German and is subject to the obligations of citizenship in the Reich, lies with the discretion of the courts; on the other hand, Italy decrees by law that Italians abroad down to the third male generation, regardless of citizenship elsewhere, must serve in the army and are subject to the laws of Italy—that is, if they can be caught.)

Franco's Spain, however, does not string along with these Axis ideas of the immutability of citizenship. Recently the Franco Government promulgated a decree by which all leaders of the defeated Loyalist régime were deprived of citizenship, those in Spanish jails as well as those who escaped abroad. *Cara al Sol*, the New York organ of the Spanish (Falangist) Library of Information in the United States, explains it in the following statesman-like language:

"It is the natural right of every society to expel from its midst those members who are unworthy of or detrimental to it. Even ordinary private clubs exercise that right. How, then, may this right of expulsion be questioned in the case of a state?"

This is an ingenuous and a convenient theory. Moreover, it is ironic to reflect that could this practice have been adopted by the democratic régimes before totalitarianism obtained a strangle-hold in Europe, the world

might have been spared the bloodshed and destruction of the past twenty months. But it is a line of reasoning too callow for most adults. By its exercise in this country, for example, this Administration overnight could disenfranchise all registered members of the Republican party, confiscate their property and, presumably, remain in office forever. But it is a presumption only, like that of the divine right of kings; in the end, recorded history invariably shows, the disinherited recoil to unseat kings, totalitarian or otherwise.

AFTER HAVING KEPT OUT OF the war this long, it is unlikely that Eire will get into it until and unless her neutrality is violated by an invasion of the British Isles. American disapprobation of this stand may make the Irish uncomfortable, but nothing would be more calculated to get their backs up than for President Roosevelt officially to request that they grant bases to the British, as has been often suggested.

In the London *New Statesman and Nation*, Elizabeth Bowen—who is generally thought of as an English novelist but who was actually born in County Cork—describes the present strange state of suspension in which the Irish live:

“More adjusted than she had realized to modern tempo, Eire finds it hard to go back to the old. . . . It is in Eire’s power, in the long-term sense, to justify her neutrality: she well may. But, temporarily, some of the measures she takes to guard it are having a rather dwarfing effect. The Censorship is an outstanding example. There is freedom of public speech, but not freedom of reporting. No home criticism of Eire’s neutrality, or suggestion that this ever could or should be abandoned, is allowed mention by the press. No award or honor to any Irishman serving with H. M. Forces is allowed to be mentioned—in newspapers—so that, virtually, the hero’s country is debarred from its natural pride in him. (The exodus of young Irishmen to enlist, across the Border or across the Channel has not been stopped: it is officially ignored. The numerous Irishmen serving with the Army, Navy or Air Force may re-enter Eire on leave, in civilian clothes.) Leading articles on the course of the war have to affect a cautious colorlessness—one may deplore no outrage and praise no victory. . . . The general affect is—the sense of a ban on *feeling*, in a country in which feeling naturally runs high. And, more serious, there is an inhibition of judgment that cannot be good for human development. No fact (with regard to Europe) is withheld, but facts are denied moral context. In the cinemas, the omission of all war scenes from the newreels gives one the feeling of an invented world—one may watch social functions (not connected with the war effort), trotting-races in the sunny Dominions, and one may still watch America drill and the American warplanes take the sky. No film drama

featuring or hingeing on the present war (or even, I understand, the 1914 war) may be shown. And, inevitably, *The Dictator* is not on view."

Miss Bowen denies the charge that the Irish are growing fat while the English starve. Eire could never live luxuriously as a self-contained economic unit, and her agricultural production has been so affected by drought and a severe epidemic of hoof-and-mouth disease that there are acute shortages of many foods. Tea, even more important to the Irish than to the English, is to be closely rationed. She says also that the number and power of Germans in Eire have been greatly exaggerated. German influences, she feels, are largely cultural and even the extreme groups "who might expect gain for Eire from a severe limitation of Britain's power do not seem to welcome the idea of the concomitant—extension of Axis power to the Irish shore."

FEW AMERICANS FIND BRITISH humor funny. The English are funnier, we think, when they are unconscious of it—but this objective taste is shared among the English themselves only by such minority journals as *The New Statesman and Nation* whose acid quotations from the contemporary British press are no more typical of the general view than similar columns in our own *Nation* and *New Republic*. It is said that the English think *Punch* is funny because they recognize its jokes—of the He-said-She-said variety—from their childhood. So *Punch* goes on through the present crisis reviving well-remembered little stories from the First World War and in the midst of bombs celebrates its centenary. To quote *Bulletins From Britain* of the New York British Library of Information:

"To think of a *Punch*-less England would be almost as absurd as to think of an England denied its Spring landscapes with their scudding white clouds, [etc.]. The centenary of *Punch* is not, therefore, like the centenary of any other periodical. *Punch* is so embedded in the English character that it has assumed a kind of symbolic quality—a symbol that possesses the miraculous power of renewing itself week by week. Precisely how it came to have this quality no one would presume to guess. Englishmen wisely accept it—once more like their weather—simply as a thing that is, a marvel to be wondered at or, when it falls below a certain standard and becomes unaccountably dull, a convenient subject for complaint."

The origin of *Punch* is a subject of controversy, but its first advertising prospectus set the tone which has survived for a hundred years: the new publication was to be "A New Work of Wit and Whim, embellished with Cuts and Caricatures, to be called PUNCH; or, The London Charivari. . . . This *Guffawgraph* is intended to form a refuge for destitute wit—an asylum for the thousands of orphan jokes—the superannuated Joe Millers—the millions of perishing puns, which are now wandering about without so much as a shelf to rest upon." Terminal art decoration was a cut "showing six

human-headed dogs standing on their hind legs with long curling tails appearing below their jackets or through their frock-coats; this is inscribed 'Funny Dogs With Comic Tales.' ”

An early contributor to *Punch* was W. M. Thackeray, George Du Maurier contributed drawings over thirty-six years; its present editorial staff now includes A. P. Herbert, M. P., who currently disputes honors as British Radio Propagandist I with J. B. Priestley.

A typical *Punch* joke is reputed to have originated with the second number—an editor's reply to the lady who says, "Well, you know, I do *not* think *Punch* is as good as it *used* to be," which is, "No, Madam, it never was!"

AFTER MONTHS OF NEWSPAPER and magazine controversy in London over the suitability of playing and producing Wagner in England, the anti-Wagnerites appear to be winning out or, at least, to be out-howling the opposition which holds to the creed that art knows no frontiers. In this country we had a dose of anti-everything-German in the last war. We condemned all German literature, art and science as part of the satanic works of the Hun, and we virtually had a "burning of the books" in every community. To be scrupulously patriotic, even in matters of gastronomy, we re-baptized sauerkraut as Liberty Cabbage and an unpleasant childhood disease became Liberty Measles. Hysteria and thick-headedness could not go further.

Some of Wagner's English berators, however, express detestation of the German composer not so much because of his nationality, nor for any critical distaste for his music, as because of Hitler's often expressed admiration for Wagner, and because a connection is seen between his works and the hocus-pocus of Nazi "mysticism." Edward Lockspeiser, writing in the *World Review* (London), clothes the argument in this fashion:

"Everyone knows that Wagner is Hitler's darling. And straightaway I am going to express the hope that the war will bring not only the destruction of the artistic reputation of Wagner but all that he stands for. What more formidable service could Wagner have rendered the Nazi ideals than to place this mountebank [Hitler] on a pedestal?"

THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world; so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the conditions and changes of foreign countries."

If you must have onions and soap,
you can get them—but at a price

Black Bourse in Hungry France

By ANDREY SEDYH

Novoye Russkoye Slovo, Liberal, Anti-Soviet Daily, New York

IN FRANCE today there exists the “black bourse” where foreign currencies are quoted over moist café tables. Dealers on the black bourse speak in a language of their own.

“I’m trading ‘softs’ for ‘hards.’”

The “soft” are paper dollars; the “hard” are gold coins.

“How much are the ‘greens’ today?”

The greens—as you may have guessed—are also dollars.

The black bourse is a tight, closed world of professional dealers in currencies. A far greater evil is the “black market,” where are bought and sold goods and products that are either rationed or that cannot be obtained at all in stores.

The French Government has taken draconic measures to combat the dealers in the black market, but the evil is as unavoidable as it is tragic. No sooner does the Government fix the price of some merchandise, than it promptly disappears from the market and be-

gins to be sold under cover instead.

They fix the price of onions, and onions disappear. They set the price of chestnuts, and there isn’t a single chestnut to be found and no one knows where they went. Eggs, poultry, rabbits, all vanish, and then come profitable days for speculators. “Some one in gray” mysteriously announces:

“You can get chickens, 60 francs the kilo.”

“But the official price is 40 francs?”

The man looks at you with commiseration. “The merchant is taking a risk, and that risk must be paid for.”

That happens to be true. The merchant risks a lot. His store may be closed up, he may have to pay a fine, even go to prison. But do not think that only storekeepers work on the black market. There are many lovers of easy profits busy there. Some wide-awake persons have bought in advance cases of soap, bags of coffee, entire storehouses of canned goods and are

now selling them at double the price to hungry buyers.

In Paris and the provinces, agents of the black market were found to possess enormous stores of soap, canned goods, macaroni and honey—all deficit products. The papers have printed some of the prices of the black market. Customers paid up to 200 francs for a kilo (2.2 pounds) of ham, 150 to 200 francs for a kilo of butter and similar prices for other products.

It is necessary to say that the French franc has retained to a considerable extent its value inside the country and the cost of living has risen comparatively little in the past few months, so that these prices are really atrocious compared with those officially set.

THE black market's innumerable agents are hard to catch. There's the farmer disposing of a piece of cheese or a dozen of eggs under cover. Then there's the barber telling a client, with a mysterious air, that he has a few pieces of genuine Marseilles soap left—some people pay up to 50 francs for a pound of Marseilles soap. And there's the restaurant waiter selling sugar at 65 francs per kilo, while the official price of sugar is 7 francs.

The transportation of products from one *département* to another is forbidden to private citizens. On entering each town, travellers have to pass the inspection of officials who have the right to inspect baggage, open boxes and pry into bags.

Sometimes this leads to surprising incidents.

A lady was riding on a bicycle with a hat box over the handle bars. By

some devilish instinct the "customs" official felt something out of the way and ordered her to open the box.

"But there's only my hat there, and I'm in a hurry."

In spite of her protests she had to open it. In the hat box were a pound of butter, eggs and other farm products, all of course obtained without a ration card.

An unusual case took place near Paris.

The owner of an undertaking establishment decided to go with a friend on a food hunt in the relatively well-provided region of Montargis. The two departed in the funeral hearse harnessed to two black horses. In the villages they bought everything, without considering the price: butter, eggs, chickens, even a small live pig.

Everything was packed into the hearse. The black curtains were drawn up and the mournful vehicle set out at a slow, dignified pace back to the city. Passersby took off their hats when they saw the sad cortège without a single mourner following behind.

They might have reached home safely if the pig hadn't started a fight with the hens and begun to squeal. The driver urged on the horses, and the hearse galloped madly forward with the shrill squeals of the "deceased" rending the air. Policemen stopped the hearse, and the episode ended on a sour note. The food was confiscated and the undertaker charged with the illegal transportation of perishable goods.

A day does not pass without the arrest of a new gang caught flooding the black market with illegal merchandise.

In Marseilles, 50,000 pieces of toilet soap were discovered, in Toulouse enormous supplies of canned goods, in Paris tons of coffee and cases of condensed milk and dried fruit.

The ingenuity of the men of the black market knows no bounds. If the goods they want cannot be obtained under cover, they have recourse to another method: they print fake ration cards for meat, cheese and fats.

The task of the "counterfeiters" is simple. Ration cards are distributed for three-months periods, so that there is ample time to imitate them. The cards are vari-colored leaflets that can be easily printed in any small shop.

In Paris several scoundrels working in connivance with printers have already been arrested. The fake ration cards were printed in great quantities and disposed of at moderate prices by a varied assortment of *types*—garçons

from the cafés and restaurants, race-track touts and some unemployed. Often, those who bought the coupons did not know they were counterfeit.

"There's an old man here who can't eat meat. He is willing to sell his coupons for fifty francs. Would you like some?"

The meat that is sold is for the most part frozen and strictly rationed. According to regulations, three to four days—and often longer—are completely meatless. So why not take advantage of the old man's offer?

As you see, the men of the black market are very resourceful and imaginative. But it is all done with a secret fear, a hidden tremor. Suppose I get caught?

The power of court-martial over hoarders and speculators has not yet been applied. But it exists. And it may be remembered one of these days.

Bitter Reminder

Turning out old junk a day or two ago, I came on the admirable booklet, authorized by the French War Office, describing, and demonstrating the impregnability of, the Maginot Line. It was published in December 1939, and I well remember the impression it made. Its chance re-emergence tempts to no cynical reflections—but it may provoke some salutary ones. No more can we be lulled into a sense of security by defensive works, or the certainty of American help, or even the present predominance of our Air Force and our Navy. For all these we may be thankful, but if we have not realized that we are fighting an enemy against whom no effort can ever be remitted and no vigilance for a moment relaxed, our fate will inevitably be the fate of the men whom M. Maginot's incalculably costly structure was designed to protect.

—"Janus" in *The Spectator*, London

Immediate petition to Britain for admission into the U.S. is advanced as the one way to hasten victory

A Short Cut to Union Now

THE ROAD TO JOINT SOVEREIGNTY

By RUBIN GOTESKY

THE British Empire, the greatest empire in world history, greater than the Roman Empire, greater than the domain of Genghis Khan or of Alexander, now hangs precariously from a military precipice. The victory in the Balkans has made Hitler master over virtually all continental Europe. Tomorrow he may be master over Asia Minor and Africa; and the Mediterranean which for over a hundred years has been more or less a British inland sea may become the total property of the totalitarian countries. Even today, Germany and Russia are sparing over the proper division of anticipated totalitarian spoils. From Tokyo, Walter Duranty reports to *The New York Times* that future discussions between Russia and Germany will concern, among other things, the setting-up of "some arrangement of triple control—German, Russian and Turkish—

of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."

For the British Empire, the present situation is too serious to be discussed in terms of story-book ethics. It is not a question any longer of dying gloriously on the field of battle. However little there is of democracy in the world today, that little must be preserved. It can only be preserved if totalitarianism is destroyed. The destruction of totalitarianism, however, is only possible through an economic and political union of the great democracies of the world. This is the obvious, indisputable fact. Great Britain, therefore, must be absolutely clear on what to propose to the American people. It must propose a plan which will expedite this union in the shortest possible time, in fact, within the current year.

There is only one such plan. It is not *Union Now*, which bristles with

too many legal and constitutional difficulties to be overcome within the required time. It is a plan which is simple at the outset, relatively easy to propose to the people of the United States, and has all the happy consequences which *Union Now* desires. The British Empire must petition Congress immediately for admission as a State or a group of States into the Union—precisely, for example, as did Texas in 1845.

Appeasers have proposed that Great Britain should sue for peace. Even if it wanted to, it couldn't. Peace would mean the loss of everything, for Hitler's terms would be capitulation. Hitler would only make peace on condition that the British Empire, or as many of the Dominions as would follow the lead of Great Britain, becomes a province of the Third Reich.

The alternative to peace, that of continuing the war, seems pretty grim. As compared with Germany, English equipment is inferior, nor can Britain replace worn military equipment as fast as the Germans can. Economically, Britain must depend upon the United States for the "steel" of warfare; and authorities are everywhere agreed that really adequate defense aid, which would place Britain on a par with Germany, will not be forthcoming for approximately one year. Hanson Baldwin recently declared in *The New York Times*:

"Britain, according to her leaders, does not look to the possibility of wresting the initiative from Germany this year. She is counting upon time and American aid to counterbalance German superiority of strength and

enable eventual victory to be achieved, it is hoped, principally by the attrition of the blockade, the assault of bombs and the aid of the conquered people.

"British strategy this year must, therefore, be essentially defensive—since Britain is yet inferior in strength to the Axis. Britain must do her best to hold her ground and to prevent further Axis progress in any theater, hoping in the meantime to recruit her strength with that of the United States."

TODAY even a defensive battle appears grim. The attempt to hold her ground in the Near East will bring Great Britain in conflict, as has already occurred in Iraq and Palestine, with the small nations of the Near East that for good reasons hate her. To defend herself, or even to stand her ground, she'll have to battle both the Germans and the native people—a tremendously difficult job considering her present weakness in matériel and in industry. The sad part of the situation is that English Tory elements and even the Labor party have refused to propose or carry through any policy of granting independence to mandate territories. Such a policy, formulated in treaties advantageous to these territories, small nations and colonies would win them over to the side of Britain. By such a policy, the tragedy of an Iraq might never have occurred.

The prospect, however, looks even more grim because Hitler will try with every means at his disposal to finish off the British Empire by the end of the year 1941. And that this is very possible must not be forgotten. Ro-

mantic attitudes may win fair ladies but they do not win battles. Hitler knows that 1941 is the year of his greatest opportunity. If he fails to subdue England in this year, he knows he faces a prolonged war with the advantage against him. After 1941, the United States will be ready to support England adequately; and at full productive strength, the United States is the most powerful nation in the world. Moreover, should we enter the war, we will enter fresh, with a tremendous untouched, unbombed productive plant and with a population undrained or exhausted psychologically by nearly three years of warfare and bombardment.

Great Britain, nevertheless, must continue the war, grim though its prospects appear to be. She cannot capitulate; she must be conquered. Yet how to be able to continue the war until the United States can really come to her aid, is the essential crux of her problem. Even adequate material aid may not be sufficient. Such aid becomes internationally important for the course of the war only if it is tied together by political bonds of a serious and permanent political ties to come, even secret agreements are not enough, for these, in moments of serious stress, are easily repudiated. Even the close economic bonds recently established between the United States and Canada, which give promise of more intimate and permanent nature. Treaties or are not sufficient. Even if Canada should become a part of the United States, this, which may possibly happen soon, will not help Great Britain in case she loses the war.

These political ties, therefore, must be sufficiently close and of so permanent a nature that they devolve a real responsibility upon America for prosecuting and continuing the war against totalitarianism. If such bonds were established, Great Britain, even if invaded and conquered, could exact more advantageous terms for itself than it could alone. For one thing, they exclude the possibility of creating a British Vichy government, helpless and a docile vassal of Germany. Germany would have to deal in all peace negotiations with a fresh and extremely powerful industrial giant, the United States—assuming that peace were at all the issue. And it would be Hitler who would sue for peace in order to give his exhausted people and newly conquered empire an interval of rest for recuperating their strength.

THE establishment of such permanent political ties would also make some millions of Americans realize certain facts which they do not yet completely realize. First, these ties would make them understand that the course of the war affects them vitally—economically and socially. A victorious Hitler means a tremendous economic burden upon themselves and the generations to follow. Part of that burden is already laid on our shoulders. In addition, a victorious Hitler may force upon us a long series of indecisive, economically exhausting wars. Secondly, these ties would destroy their illusory sense of security and of social isolation from the rest of the world just because we happen to sleep

between two great oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific.

BOTH in England and America to-day, there are more and more people who are beginning to realize this need for a more permanent political union. In England on April 13 of this year, a resolution was passed by a group in Devon, proposing Union between the United States and Great Britain. Clarence Streit, who has been for several years the leader in America behind such a movement, has been proposing in books and page-long advertisements the immediate establishment of a federative union. Quite correctly, he sees that union between the Empire and the United States would produce a cohesion of effort, an economic solidarity and a spiritual unity which could conquer totalitarianism. Moreover, a federative union would have effects going far beyond the limits of the present war. It would be the political basis for destroying those national animosities productive of war; and, experimentally, it would establish the first world economic system in which the tasks of production would be delegated according to the resources and capacities of given geographic areas. Tariff walls, embargoes, bilateral treaties—all the new devices and methods which governments have used to advantage their own productive plants and to disadvantage those of other governments—would disappear. It would be an important step closer to an economic order producing wealth to satisfy the physical and cultural needs of all people.

The essential idea of *Union Now* is

excellent but, in the present critical situation, it bristles with too many difficulties. Great Britain needs a plan which will produce in the shortest possible time such solid political ties as are desired in *Union Now*. The establishment of such ties is not a matter of slow evolution to be achieved in the full fruition of eternity; it is a vital matter which must be accomplished within the year.

The difficulties which might be raised either by the Dominions or by given social classes or groups against *Union Now* are not insuperable. They can be overcome within the required time, but these unfortunately are not the real difficulties. For a short time, the Tory element in England might put up stout opposition and resistance. It has always looked upon America as its great economic rival. It has not liked the penetration of American business and finance into Canada. Nearly 50 per cent of Canada is owned or controlled by Americans. To unite with the United States is to open more markets to American capital. Why do this? Why should it give up its hard-won gains and profits to Americans? But these arguments dissolve into smoke, when faced by the only other alternative of becoming a part of the Third Reich. If this occurs, there is nothing.

Dominions like New Zealand and Australia might also object, for they have young industries which they want to protect against competition. They also have social institutions—some of them quite advanced—which they don't want to have knocked down by American reactionaries. Their psychology, too, is that of a frontier people:

they want to be left alone to plant and produce as they please. They might, therefore, think that a federative union would place too many legal restraints upon the free exercise of their will. But here again fear of Hitler would subdue them ultimately into acquiescence.


In any case, this terrible fear of becoming a province of the Third Reich would ultimately overcome any objection that might arise in the minds of various classes and groups in the British Empire. The colonies and mandate territories, too, might welcome the idea of union because it would raise their hopes of freeing themselves from British domination.

The real difficulties are here in America. Here are hurdles which *Union Now* cannot jump. These hurdles are not economic, historical or social, although these play a consider-

able role. The real difficulties are *constitutional*.

It is true that Americans are suspicious of the English. These suspicions have been fostered and fed by organizations like the Daughters of the American Revolution, the American Legion, the Hearst papers, etc. Textbooks written by objective historians and educators have been in the past attacked by such organizations for pro-British bias and removed from our school systems. Today, isolationists are to a degree successfully exploiting these traditional suspicions to sabotage aid to Britain.

Our suspicions and dislike of the British are further fed by our still-extant feeling of cultural inferiority, our feeling that the British are better educated, better mannered, better informed. Even today, at a time when America has actually awakened to a realization culturally of its own cre-



—Answers, London

ative powers, this feeling of inferiority to England and Europe persists. Colleges still give fundamental emphasis to courses in English literature rather than to courses in American. In large part this tendency has been overcome, but it still persists.

AGAIN, there is the factor of economic competition and our fear of the shrewdness of English business men and diplomats. As one important American business man put it, "Even if the English were to grant us free trade in their Empire, we'd lose out. They're so shrewd they'd take our businesses away from us. That's why we need to remain free in order to protect ourselves from these damned English." Economic rivalry, the cleverness and shrewdness of English businessmen and diplomats and the provincial English snobbishness have combined to make Americans resent the English.

But these difficulties are as nothing compared with the constitutional. The proposal of a federative union is immediately blocked by the legal objection that such a proposal, if carried out, would make the Constitution subordinate to a superior constitution. As the Constitution is the highest organic law of the United States, it cannot be superseded by any higher legal authority. Such supersession is tantamount to revolution.

Clarence Streit has tried to overcome this objection by dependence upon that section of the Constitution which reads:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution or prohibited by it to the States, are re-

served to the States respectively or to the People."

He believes, therefore, that the people or the States have the right to carry through any changes not expressly delegated or prohibited by the Constitution. Unfortunately there are no instances in American history in which such changes have been made by such means. Moreover, the people in mass have neither the organization nor the means to proceed in any fashion. Lastly, the meaning of the word "powers" is so ambiguous that its proper interpretation is indeterminable. Thus the people are, for practical purposes, bereft of the power to act independently of the forms prescribed by the Constitution. It is true, of course, that the People might act extralegally; but extralegal action only takes place during a serious crisis like a revolution.

To turn to such means as are prescribed by the Constitution is to meet even greater difficulties, in terms of shortage of time. Our Constitution permits only two ways of amending it. One is that an amendment be proposed by "two-thirds of both houses" of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the State legislatures or of the States, each in convention. The other is that an amendment can be proposed to the States for ratification in either of the above two ways, whenever two-thirds of the States ask Congress to call a constitutional convention; and the convention passes such an amendment. This latter method is practically so difficult that it has never once been tried in the history of the United States. As for the first method, the difficulties practically are so great that only twen-

ty-one of several thousand amendments proposed have been passed in Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the legislatures. Of the twenty-six amendments passed by Congress, five have never been ratified; and the period of time consumed in the passage of an amendment is approximately three years. In terms therefore of the little time at the disposal of the democracies, this average period might as well be all eternity.

IT IS possible, of course, that an amendment may be passed in much less time. But the minimum possible time, with luck, is at least one year. Getting two-thirds of the votes of both Congressional houses is always a difficult job and usually consumes much time. But even if this were accomplished swiftly, the amendment would not yet be law. It would still need to be ratified by three-fourths of the States.

There are forty-eight States in the Union; and an amendment to become part of our Constitution has to be ratified by thirty-six of them. In those cases in which the State legislatures do the ratifying, both houses must approve. The failure to get a majority in one house is sufficient to count that State against the amendment. If appeasers, isolationists and Anti-Unionists wish to prevent an amendment from being ratified, they need to control only thirteen houses in thirteen States. If they wish to defer ratification indefinitely, they need to control only a sufficient number of votes in order to table the amendment for an indefinite period.

Ratification consumes even more time in the cases of those States which require special State conventions. It takes considerable time to organize a convention, get delegates elected and a vote taken. No matter how rosy the view taken, the actual time consumed will be at least a year.

There is only one way which is sufficiently simple and speedy to accomplish the object of *Union Now*. And it must be used immediately by Great Britain. Great Britain must petition Congress to be admitted as a State into the United States. This way there are only two legal obstacles to overcome: Congress and the President. Since the President and a majority of Congress are in favor of aiding Britain, these obstacles are not really serious. Only a majority in both houses and the signature of the President are required in order to admit the British Empire into the Union.

Obviously, the quick accomplishment of the admission of the British Empire into the United States as a State or a group of States does not mean that certain economic and even legal problems will be immediately solved. There will still be the problem of integrating the Empire economy with that of the United States; and admittedly this is a huge problem. There will also be the problem of integrating the constitutions of the various dominions and colonies with that of the United States. Again, there will be the problem of defining the statuses of the colonies. Shall India for example be granted, the status of a State or group of States in the Union? But if we can judge the relative ease with which

Canada and the United States recently solved the economic problem, these questions, difficult and important though they are, will find both reasonable and seasonable solutions.

How to determine representation for the various parts of the British Empire is politically but not constitutionally an important problem. Politically, it is important only for purposes of integrating the people of the British Empire with American ideals and traditions. Practically, it can be resolved by a series of agreements in which certain parts of the British Empire are immediately admitted as States, others having, for the time being, the status of territories, until Congress and the American people feel that a sufficient rapprochement of ideals and traditions has occurred to warrant admission into the union. The rapidity with which events and changes in psychology and points-of-view occur, seems a sufficient warrant that this process of rapprochement will not take a very long time.

Constitutionally, there is no problem. The Constitution does not define how large the territory of a State or the size of its population must be. It does provide that every State shall have two Senators. Such parts of the British Empire as are admitted as States will be entitled to two Senators. The number of such new Senators can not create any problem, for they will not be large enough to constitute a majority of the Senate. As for the number of representatives to the House of Representatives, these are determinable by an act of Congress. They involve no

constitutional difficulties of any kind. The enormous population of the British Empire creates here only a technical problem.

This proposal may strike Americans as startling or over simple. Yet it is the simplest, the speediest and the best solution to the problem of aiding Britain in every conceivable way. Upon carrying through this proposal hinges the fate of democracy in both hemispheres. No one can be foolish enough to believe that a Hitler victory will not have serious repercussions in America, economically and morally. The very foundations of our faith in democratic principles may be uprooted; and we, too, may see the establishment of totalitarianism in America. Certainly the South American countries which have been walking the plank between democracy and totalitarianism will jump the whole way toward totalitarianism. These countries, which are infested with Nazi agents, will become the bases of Nazi-totalitarian action.

NOW is the time for Churchill to act. If this idea has ever lurked hidden away in the back of his mind, as has been suggested to this writer, now is the time to propose it. The British Empire cannot wait until it is too late. It must not make the same mistake it made in the case of France. Secretly, at the zero hour, when France was already defeated and begging for peace, Churchill proposed a union of the two empires. The British Empire ought not to wait until it, too, is writhing agonized on the rack of defeat to petition for statehood in the United

States. Nor must it petition for statehood secretly. It must petition now, boldly, openly, so that Congress and the American people may have time to

grow accustomed to the idea and accept it enthusiastically and in sufficient time to come to the complete defense of democracy.

ADMISSION OF BRITAIN A REACTIONARY MOVE

By SIDNEY HERTZBERG

CRUCIAL problems invite startling solutions. But it is hard to take seriously the assertion that "the fate of democracy in both hemispheres" hangs on the admission of the British Empire into the Union "as a State or a group of States."

In essence, the proposal in the foregoing article is that the United States take over full legal responsibility for the war and the peace. With the British Empire part of the Union, it could no more carry on a war of its own than could Indiana. It is based on the assumption that there is no longer any question as to whether the United States is to join a shooting war. The assumption is not warranted by what is known of the desires of most Americans; but it is probably fully supported by the inevitabilities of a foreign policy which has been sold to Americans by the simple device of denying or glossing over these inevitabilities.

However, our present (May 10, 1941) foreign policy, though a compound of legal fictions, could in the event of a British defeat leave us free to withdraw into our hemisphere, where a rational domestic and hemisphere economy and a compact military establishment might prove to be

the weapons with which totalitarianism can be met and overcome. The significance of the statehood proposal is that it would eliminate this possibility; it would destroy whatever freedom of action we might still have; it would make sure that we were left holding the bag by giving us the bag now.

Convinced of the desirability of some form of union with Britain, Mr. Gotesky is concerned chiefly with the practical superiority of the statehood plan: one, the speed with which he thinks it would be adopted and, two, its simplicity.

It would be accepted quickly, he believes, because there are "only two legal obstacles to overcome: Congress and the President." The phraseology is significant. Those who want the United States to join the war have long been impatient with Congress and have tried to avoid the need for its acquiescence—as in the destroyers-for-bases deal. This impatience becomes patronizing in the case of the people themselves. Adoption of the proposal, Mr. Gotesky remarks, "would also make some millions of Americans realize certain facts which they do not yet completely realize." Some day the American people, who express themselves collectively through Congress and the President,

may become aware of the fact that they were regarded a legal obstacle to becoming cannon fodder. They might resent it. "Since the President and a majority of Congress are in favor of aiding Britain, these obstacles are not really serious," Mr. Gotesky says. It is fantastic to assume that a desire to aid Britain means a willingness to declare war and pump the blood and wealth of America into the British Empire.

The statehood plan is "simple" only if its implications are overlooked. It raises vast economic problems that are complicated by conflicts within the United States and the British Empire. The political problem is almost impossible. The total population of the British Empire is more than 500,000,000. If it entered the Union as a separate State it would be entitled to two Senators and some 1,700 Representatives in Congress. If it were broken into separate States, India alone would have more than 1,000 Representatives. If the entire British Empire became a single State, it is assumed that all the men and women in it would have equal political rights. If the colonial system were to continue, Washington would presumably administer the Empire.

The imagination would be staggered by a mere statement of all the problems that would require solution. Yet the virtue of the proposal is held to be its simplicity and its susceptibility of accomplishment "within the year." From the standpoint of Britain's immediate military situation, its adoption would be a hindrance rather than a help. In the beginning it would confuse matters enormously. Under his present powers, the President can do as

much to prevent a British collapse as he could with Britain in the Union. But such help, says Mr. Gotesky, would become "internationally important" if the plan were adopted. Its international importance would lie in the fact that it would not be aid simply to prevent a British collapse, but would mean the formal taking over of the war and the British Empire by the United States.

A REALISTIC look at the American scene and the British Empire is all that is needed to dispel the notion that British statehood is either simple or acceptable to any substantial group of Americans. The desirability of this plan or of any plan for Anglo-American union now is another matter. This writer believes that federation is necessary and inevitable, at first perhaps on a hemisphere and continental basis and in the distant future on a world scale. But union now with Britain in any form is simply union for war; it is not the kind of union on which a rational world economy can be built; it will hinder the United States in making its obvious contribution to such a world economy: rationalizing the economy of the Western Hemisphere.

"The destruction of totalitarianism," writes Mr. Gotesky, "is only possible through an economic and political union of the great democracies of the world." This writer believes that totalitarianism can be destroyed only by the emergence of a democratic dynamic by which the common men of all nations can make common cause for the common good. Those who favor

union now habitually attack their opponents for not understanding the revolutionary nature of the totalitarian surge. Yet these same men proffer nothing more than a mechanical reshuffling of Anglo-American political and economic arrangements as the antidote to this revolution. A dynamic for democracy must come from within the democracies; once it does, the democracies will get together on a sound and lasting basis. But union now, by itself, cannot supply that dynamic any more than the League of Nations could impose peace on nations in which there was no peace.

Union now simply means one conglomeration of conflicting economic,

political and social forces, instead of two. It means union for war—when democracy is at its worst and most vulnerable, not at its best and most secure. It means uniting and freezing economic systems whose inadequacies are the fertilizer for fascism.

The proposal that Britain join the Union is not simply defeatist. Defeatism today is hardly distinguishable from realism. The proposal is also reactionary since it is based on the counsel that the best that American democracy can offer desperate humanity is more of the British Empire and more war. American democracy can do better—provided it does not bite off more than it can chew.

New Publications of Suppressed Nations

While before the present war the foreign-language publications represented mainly either the emigrants or political opponents of the governments of their countries, now several publications abroad are the official organs of the governments themselves, in exile. Thus in New York appears *Knickerbocker Weekly* bearing the subtitle *Free Netherland*, published by the Netherlands Publishing Corp. It carries articles and illustrations by the most famous Dutch authors and artists, such as Adriaan Barnouw, Van Blankenstein, Hendrik Willem van Loon, and gives an excellent survey of Holland's struggle for its freedom at home, in the colonies and on the high seas.

A similar publication, though probably not supported by Belgian government funds is the semi-monthly *Belgium*.

With Polish government funds abroad are published in New York *Free Europe* and *A News Bulletin on Eastern European Affairs*. These publications bring amazing news from Poland, the activities of the Nazis and the revolutionary acts of the Poles there.

—*Neue Volkzeitung*, New York

Hitler's Private Rabbit Warren

ALTHOUGH Hitler protests loudly that the R.A.F. aims only at innocent German civilians and historic German buildings, apparently he is taking no chances that one of their bombs might go astray and hit his brand-new Reichschancellery while it contains the Commander-in-Chief of the Germany Army and Führer of the Reich. According to *Die Burger* of Capetown, South Africa, the imposing Chancellery, which was constructed under conditions of great secrecy, has a number of subterranean floors, protected by thick steel plates, for use as air-raid shelters. There are rumors, reported by *Die Burger*, that some of the underground rooms can be switched from one end of the building to another by pressing a button and that Hitler, in the same way, can instantly transport himself, complete with office, from above to below ground, in case of alarm. The Chancellery also has a number of underground entrances which connect it with some of Berlin's main traffic arteries, so that a car may enter an innocent-looking gate somewhere along the Unter den Linden and a few minutes later halt on one of the Chancellery's subterranean auto paths. This rabbit warren construction, the details of which are known by only a few persons, is intended to make escape possible from any attempt to blockade the inmates.

Cavalcade of London quotes "a

Swiss diplomatist arrived some weeks back in the United States" on further details of Hitler's de luxe air-raid shelter. According to this source, it extends eighty feet below the ground and was designed by Dr. Hans von Todt, who constructed the Siegfried Line. It contains twenty-six rooms, including reception and bedrooms for guests. When the Swiss diplomat was being shown around he inquired the purpose of having two kitchens and was told that one was used exclusively for cooking Hitler's vegetarian meals (perhaps an adaptation of the Jewish dietary rules). Before the shelter was built, an exact model was constructed beneath a steel and concrete building in the Ruhr and the building then subjected to heavy bombing by the *Luftwaffe*. When the Führer declared himself satisfied with the results of the test, Todt proceeded with the Reichschancellery job.

There have been no reports that so far the Chancellery has been hit, though bombs have fallen near it.



—Kladderatsch, Berlin

Now that the Paris fashion industry is Nazi-controlled, various capitals are scrambling for world leadership

Adolf Hitler: Grand Couturier

By CLARISSA WOLCOTT

THE FALL of France and the German occupation of Paris have given rise to premature assertions by various enthusiasts that Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Buenos Aires or New York would become overnight the fashion capital of the world. Each city has claimed this future leadership. But a fashion capital is not created by proclamation. Nor should too much be expected of the Germans' dictate that henceforth French fashions "must not express the frivolous but must reflect the ideals of domestic love, maternity, the kitchen and purification." In other words, there is little likelihood that the Frenchwoman of chic, whatever the difficulties today of her country's *haut couture*, will appear in a Mother Hubbard embroidered with swastikas.

The dislocation of France's second most important industry, employing from one to three million workers in the production of everything which

goes into women's clothes, as well as cosmetics, perfumes, jewelry and accessories of all kinds, has had a direct effect on New York's largest industry. The two have been interlocked, and the eventual results will affect the lives of many workers—from the well-known and established designers of clothes in both countries to the French artisan who puts a wealth of creative impulse and a tremendous artistic heritage into the creation of a new button.

Paris has been the style center of the world for about 300 years. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, Louis XIV initiated the policy of government encouragement and subsidy of the development of artistic textiles. His minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, is quoted as saying, "French fashions are to France what the mines of Peru are to Spain." Louis XV and Louis XVI continued to encourage the industry, and in their time Paris became the leading fashion-producing city. Dur-

ing the Revolution and the period of the Directorate, its prestige declined temporarily, but when Napoleon became Emperor he gave the industry new impetus. After his defeat, there was a time when London, Berlin and Vienna made great efforts to take the lead, but with the accession of Napoleon III and the beautiful Eugénie, who was dressed exclusively by the Englishman Worth, Paris leadership was again assured.

From 1870 to 1940, Paris continued to maintain itself as the fashion capital of the world, in spite of many attempts of other cities to wrest away that rank. London has made claims. Although the English have produced excellent sport clothes, their products were never a real threat to the French. Before the World War the United States made some effort to break away from Paris influence, but without perceptible result. The name of Paris seemed to exert such magic that sometimes styles which originated elsewhere were taken to Paris to be launched. During the World War, Vienna again made a bid for the lead by launching a series of promotional campaigns to attract buyers from neutral countries, and a Viennese style show was staged in Switzerland. The French industry countered with a similar show, and Parisian prestige remained as strong as ever. Nevertheless, Vienna has always exerted a certain amount of influence on accessories, such as umbrellas, handbags, and jewelry, but not on more important items of dress. In 1924, Mussolini attempted to promote Italian-designed clothes for Italian women. But even the peculiar powers of

his dictatorship were unable to make the campaign effective.

The factors which have maintained Paris supremacy have been both social and economic. Geographically, of course, the French capital is on the main route to and from the resorts of Italy, the French Riviera and Switzerland. A constant stream of travellers, with "conspicuous leisure" and means for "conspicuous consumption" of luxury goods, passed through it year after year. It was the center of wealth and often of political power, with frequent important social functions which gave French designers a constant audience. As an art center, with rich sources of historical material available in its museums and libraries, and political and social awareness of its importance in every phase of living, it attracted and encouraged the best in all forms of modern art.

THE textile mills of France supplied the dressmaking establishments of Paris with their excellent products and worked in close co-operation with them. Fine cotton goods were produced at Tarare, Rouen, St. Quentin, Lille, Havre, Amiens and Epinal; woolens and worsteds from the Tourcoing and Roubaix districts; silks and velvets from Lyons; machine-made laces from Calais, Coudray and St. Gall; ribbons from Lyons and St. Etienne. Trimmings and accessories of all sorts of the carefully hand-wrought variety were made in France. In addition to the resources of France, Paris could command the best of the products of Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and England. As a natural conse-

quence of style leadership in the apparel field, the French cosmetic and perfume industries reached a high development.

There was a continual stimulation of demand from the constant presence of a group of women to whom smartness of dress with quality and workmanship was as necessary a consideration as originality of design. They regarded the matter of dress as an important business and stimulated the growth of the dressmaking end of the industry in Paris to formidable proportions and to a high degree of organization.

It is estimated that in Paris alone there were more than 80,000 dressmaking establishments. Most of these were small but about 200 employed

500 or more workers, and about twenty-five employed more than a thousand. Perhaps fifteen of these large establishments at a given time merited the dignity of the label, *haute couture*, which by tacit agreement belongs to the great fashion creators of the trade. Until recently, these houses formed the organization of the *Chambre Syndicale de la Couture*, which regulated the relationship of the industry to the Government and adjusted the relations of the members to one another. The supremacy of the French *couturiers* in initiating style and executing designs, was based on the freedom of their designers and the training of their workers.

Protected by French law which makes using "the spirit of the origi-



—France, London

nal" a violation of copyright, and subsidized by the textile industries and the Government, the "*Couture*" was the advertising and promoting branch of the industry. French designers, with their ability to give the public what it wanted, whether faced with the problem of dressing a Maharanee, an English duchess, or a South American matron, were unique in their field. A profound knowledge of the history of costume and art, free imagination, and unparalleled ingenuity, identified them with clothes which have never been equalled anywhere. They were able to spend time and money in experimentation—the dyeing of new shades of fabric, or an ingenious bit of trimming, even when they were without advance orders. Their product was so individual that an experienced buyer could tell at a glance whether a dress was the creation of Paquin, Callot Soeurs or Lelong. The detail was as distinctive as if the dress were signed—Vionnet, in fact, used to "sign" her collection by a wax tab bearing the imprint of her thumb.

The workers were given long and careful training. Mostly women and girls, they learned at an early age, at home, the use of scissors and needle. Beginning to work at the age of thirteen or fourteen under an apprenticeship system, the French *midinettes* attended classes in trade schools supported by the Government and the *Chambre Syndicale*. They were given a thorough knowledge of the histories of textiles and art, and the elements of design. Their importance to the industry was thoroughly recognized and is the main reason why the French

couturiers are for the most part remaining in Paris in spite of the severest difficulties raised by the Germans. These skilled workers or artisans, are unhappy out of France, when they go abroad most of them are unable to do their work properly. One of the functions of the *Chambre Syndicale* was the regulation of wages and hours and the maintenance of stable labor conditions. It is significant that when the Blum laws, limiting the working week to forty hours, went into effect, the dress industry, which is subject to slack periods and seasonal rushes, evaded them by reporting working hours over a year's period. This met with no objections from the organized workers.

WHEN it was obvious that the German invasion of Paris was inevitable, leading houses of the industry moved to Biarritz. Removed from their home organizations, however, they were helpless, and the majority returned to Paris. A few had London branches from which they conducted a business suited to the British trade, like Paquin. Balenciaga went to Spain, where he creates his designs, but they are carried out in his London shop. Mainbocher has opened in New York where he conducts his business for the benefit of the small, select clientele which used to buy clothes in Paris in normal times. To date, the only report of an important French designer's acceptance of the German invitation to dress Nazi "first ladies" of Berlin is that of Chanel. If she has actually gone to Germany it may be because she was having difficulties in Paris and hopes

to capitalize on a situation which would be no better if she had remained at home.

Complying with the pointed suggestion of Germany that they continue their business and give employment, there have been the regular spring showings in Paris of small collections of spring styles. It is reported that Göring in mufti, but carrying his jewelled marshal's baton, was crowded out of the house of Molyneux by the large attendance of German officers, and went to the establishment of Paquin where he placed an order for twenty gowns for his wife. Some of the new lines have humor. Balenciaga has designed a barrel skirt, wide and curving over the hips and narrow at the knees which has a murderous effect on women whose figures express "the ideals of domestic love" and "the kitchen."

The real plight of the industry lies in the fact that it is forced to use certain fabrics. New clothes are being made from old ones, and curtains and drapery fabrics are turned into dresses. Blanketing and felts are also being used. Hats of Agnès spring collection are trimmed with wood shavings, colored and gilded.

The German invasion of northern France proved devastating to the textile mills. From reports available, it seems that the Nazis stripped many of them of patterns, stock and equipment. It is believed that much of this was carried off to Germany, possibly to Leipzig, indicating an intention to manufacture materials there. In October, Pétain signed a decree placing all of France's fashion-producing indus-

tries under a National Economy Committee, with Robert Carmichael having supervisory power over all commercial activity. The *Chambre Syndicale* was disbanded, although Lelong, who was its president, was retained as head of the *couture* division of the Committee.

Some of the textile firms have reopened and are functioning as best they can with raw materials curtailed and their export trade subject to German control. There are still some reserves in France; the famous firm of Rodier, which specializes in the production of the highest grade silk fabrics, reports itself operating at its usual capacity with a generous reserve of stock.

The destiny of the French fashion industry is a matter of conjecture and entirely dependent on the duration and eventual outcome of the war. There are, however, some indications of Germany's plans. The French are forced to pay 400,000,000 francs a day under the terms of their armistice to meet the costs of the German Army of Occupation. The actual costs amount to about 125,000,000 francs daily. With the balance Germany is buying control of many French industries. If the parallel of the occupation of Poland affords any clue, French textile workers who cannot be reabsorbed into the industry will be forced to return to the land.

THERE is no evidence that Hitler intends to attempt to force French designers to create styles which will have no export value. The chances are that he realizes that by degrees he is

acquiring a valuable property and, having failed to lure French *couture* to Berlin, will encourage it and play his role of *grand couturier* behind the scenes, having bound the economy of France inextricably to that of Germany. Whether Paris can again become the fashion center of the world depends on how long the industry can hold itself together with what is left of reserve stocks and available raw materials, until the war is over and the export trade is restored. It will also be necessary for the Germans to see that Paris continues to attract the rich and fashionable who are the inspiration, the advertisement and the customers of the French industry.

The only city which may now be regarded as a possible successor to Paris, which has any convincing claims to style leadership of the world, is New York. In spite of a Latin atmosphere, a large and prosperous leisure class, and its fortunate location in a country which is neither at war nor subject to war economy, Buenos Aires has always been utterly dependent upon Paris. It has no industrial organization suitable to the production of a large volume of apparel goods. Hollywood, always loud in its proclamations of style leadership, is subject to the demands of the motion-picture industry. Its designers are limited in their use of color by the necessity of reproduction in black and white, and in line to limitations of the motion-picture camera.

New York has a well-developed industry which until now has been geared to mass production. Few New York women are "beautifully" dressed,

but more are well dressed than in any other city in the world. The styles which originated in Paris as gowns for a particular class were translated by New York into practical and inexpensive clothes for the average woman who is content to be in the fashion rather than a style innovator herself. The industry in Paris and in New York has been built on two different economic philosophies.

THE immediate reaction in America has been one of extreme and untempered patriotism. Mayor LaGuardia has without qualification or reservation proclaimed that New York is the fashion capital of the world. Schiaparelli, who lectured at Lord & Taylor's on the relative claims of Paris and New York, was dealt with harshly by the newspapers. After a wave of thoughtless criticism of France for capitulating, her speech provoked some violent comments. A prominent manufacture of expensive coats announced to the world at large that "Paris was made famous as a fashion center by New York, and New York can now make herself famous."

The violence of the controversy has somewhat subsided, and a more thoughtful and constructive attitude is taking its place. For some years, New York has been a leading style center for sport clothes and has been responsible for the marketing of many new textiles with interesting possibilities in clothes design, such as the acetates and rayons. That it can readjust its industrial point of view to include the quality versus quantity product, which was French *couture*, is an unanswered

question. We have many and good designers but their talents have never been fully developed. They have not felt fully protected from style piracy, and they are hindered by the exigencies of mass production.

The most important step taken toward making New York the future fashion capital of the world is the new three-year agreement, signed in February, between the dress manufacturers and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. For the first time, capital and labor are united in an effort to stabilize their business and to develop new markets for their product.

The Joint Dress Board, composed of four New York unions feeling a need for diagnosis of its ills, conducted a six months' survey of the industry. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union agreed to add \$100,000 to a fund of \$1,000,000 raised by five employers associations, since organized as the New York Dress Institute. It was proposed that a further \$400,000 be collected from other groups, such as real-estate and bank-

ing interests to which the welfare of the industry is of particular interest.

This fund is to be used for two purposes: first, to stabilize the industry by increased efficiency and, second, to promote sales. To this end an advertising agency has been retained to launch an "institutional" campaign. The hope is that New York will capture the entire market in the Western Hemisphere, reaching the enormous South American fashion clientele which hitherto have not been enthusiastic patrons of the New York ready-to-wear industry.

The future of the fashion industries in both France and the United States must remain obscure until the war is over, and the social revolution which is under way everywhere in the world has assumed a definite form. Fashion has its roots in social psychology. It originates in the dominating class of society and moves downward layer by layer. It flourishes where economic resources are suited to it. At present, it reflects the conflict and confusion which have been apparent since 1918.

Needless Qualms

Some qualms have been felt as to whether "The Tree of Liberty," a film of the American War of Independence, ought to be shown in this country at this time. There has already been postponement, and the first of several private showings took place not long after Christmas. The qualms are needless and the postponement was unnecessary. We were all told at school what fools the English were to lose Virginia, in or around 1770, and there can be no earthly harm in a Hollywood film telling us the same thing in the nicest and most picturesque way possible.

—*Manchester Guardian*

Moscow is hostile to the Persian dictator, who may prefer Britain

Iran Again a Pawn in the War

By NIKOLAUS BASSECHES

Die Weltwoche, Liberal Weekly, Zurich

IF MOSCOW is so disposed, the inhabitants of Teheran, the capital of Iran (Persia), may go without bread. If the Soviet Union so decides, the dried fruit, the lambskins and the small amount of cotton produced in Iran will rot in the warehouses. For the only customer is Russia. Even where there is a European market for these goods, the Russian monopoly of transport out of Iran effectively closes the door to outside markets.

Reza Shah Pahlevi established his dictatorship in 1926 by means of the support of the merchants of northern Persia, and the latter in turn are dependent on Moscow. Since his advent to power, the British have recognized that Iran's independence is advantageous to them and that it is well to have a strong state between India and the Soviets. Britain recognized cancellation of the "capitulations" to foreign powers, and withdrew her warships from the Persian Gulf. In past years, Lon-

don showed a disposition to make concessions to Teheran with respect to the oil rights in the south of the country.

These British moves, calculated to increase British influence in Iran, have irritated the Soviet Union. The Kremlin had supported Reza Shah, but he failed to create the republic that Moscow had expected. For one thing, their puppet placed himself upon the Peacock Throne and, for another, he failed to bring about the agrarian revolt, or at least reforms, that the Soviet Union had expected. True, Reza Shah broke the political power of the princes—but the princes remained the owners of the soil. The peasant only receives one-fifth of the product of his labor. The remaining four-fifths are absorbed by the landowner, the owner of the water-supply and the merchant who lends the peasant his seed and farm implements. The agrarian reforms desired by Moscow came to nothing. And to the further dismay and annoyance

of the Soviet Union, British-Iran relations began to show an awkward improvement. When this became apparent, some ten years ago, the Soviet Union began to combat British influence in Iran and, although it was not generally known, she did so with the assistance of a third power, Germany. As far back as 1929, Moscow began to support the aspirations of Germany in Iran. Russia's transport monopoly out of the country was relaxed to favor German trade and a joint Russian-German company, *Russtransit*, was organized to facilitate the expedition of German goods to Teheran.

Under the Russian-Persian treaty of 1921, the Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its troops from Iran on condition that the Teheran Government did not tolerate the presence of other foreign troops on its soil. But Moscow reserved the right, while relinquishing all rights that had accrued to the Tsarist régime, to occupy Iran militarily if that country's territory were employed for purposes hostile to the U.S.S.R. Recently Molotov made references to that stipulation when British planes appeared over Baku, some 250 miles from the Iran frontier.

Today the Soviet Union wishes to extend its influence beyond Teheran;

it wants to overreach as far as the Persian Gulf. Planning against the time of a redistribution of the world's colonies, the Kremlin entertains a grandiose plan of clutching all Asia by pincers extending from Vladivostok on the Pacific to the Persian Gulf in the southwest of Asia.

WHO in present-day Russia can grow enthusiastic over such vast proposals? In Tsarist Russia, the great landowners and the wealthy merchants had time in which to spin such fabulous plans. But the Bolsheviks are not indifferent to dreams of this magnitude, even though the Soviet bureaucracy today consists mostly of mediocre members of the lower middle class who arrived in power after the liquidation of the original Bolshevik revolutionaries. Their preoccupations now are intrigues to get promotion and titles. The explanation of this enthusiasm for expansion must lie in the Stalinist thesis that the Russians are the people chosen to liberate the world and Stalin is the "leader of all peoples." Such vagaries are all that give impetus to these dreams.

(*A biographical sketch of Reza Shah Pahlevi appears in this issue on page 338.*)

Commercial Note

Pierre Laval, already rich, grows richer on the German occupation. Printed matter attacking Vichy, which he prepares for the Nazis, is being done by the office of the newspaper Laval owns.

—*Daily Sketch*, London

Although they have spent millions on propaganda, public opinion below the Rio Grande has been little affected

The Nazi Fiasco in Latin America

By CARL CROW

GERMANY'S propaganda machine in South America is big and expensive. It puts forth enormous effort in every country, supplying free news service to newspapers, free pictures and articles for magazines, and daily broadcasts for radio listeners. The net result is trivial; the rivers of money are poured out with practically no effect on Latin-American public opinion; the whole long campaign is a failure.

This is a flat statement, and it contradicts the general impression created in the United States by accounts of German activity. I shall explain why I am so positive.

I am an old war propagandist myself. During the first World War I had charge of United States propaganda in the Far East. I tried to do in China just what the Germans are trying to do in South America—create friendship for ourselves and hatred for our en-

emies. I worked with the British and French, so that I had opportunity to learn their methods. I worked against the Germans and learned their ways, too. Also I had to float counter-propaganda against the Japanese, ostensibly our loyal allies but actually busy trying to disrupt Chinese-American relations. It was fascinating work.

As a veteran in the game, therefore, I was prepared to look over the new German propaganda machine with professional eye, admire its technique, and pick up pointers which might prove useful if the United States should get into this present war. I examined the workings and tried to measure the effect of German propaganda in Rio, São Paulo, Santos, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Valparaíso, Lima and Bogotá. I discovered no important new techniques, but learned several things not to do.

I went about my investigation thor-

oughly. Employing local assistants, I plowed through the leading newspapers and marked the news items and articles, classifying them by their origin—United States, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan. We measured the number of inches in each subdivision. We multiplied the number of inches by the number of readers, to arrive at what is called “reader coverage” in the advertising business.

We checked nine newspapers in Rio de Janeiro for a period of time which we judged to be fairly representative. Here are the results: 80 per cent of all news from abroad was from the United States, from New York bureaus of the Associated Press, United Press and International News Service, impartial news service for which the Latin-American newspapers pay large sums of money. Eleven per cent was from Reuter's, the British news agency. Seven per cent was from German, Italian and Japanese news agencies, this figure including all the propaganda material we could discern.

Small as the percentage is, it exaggerates German propaganda accomplishments. Only two newspapers in Rio publish the Trans-Ocean reports (the German radio news service.) One of these is the veteran *Jornal do Brasil*, which prides itself on its impartial and neutral policy. It clearly states the origin of the German reports and slashes out paragraphs which are pure propaganda. The other user is the *Meia Dia* (*Mid-Day*), frankly a German organ. It was in debt when the war started, suddenly became prosperous with no increase either in circulation or advertising. Its circulation once was

15,000; American advertisers say it is lower since it was taken over by the Germans, but we used 15,000 in making our estimate of coverage. Its influence in Brazil is probably something less than the influence of the *Daily Worker* in the United States.

It does serve a useful purpose, making it possible for German propaganda at home to quote favorable sentiments as expressed by “a powerful Brazilian daily.” Lord Haw Haw thus quoted the editorial in *Meia Dia* approving the signing of the Axis Pact by Germany, Italy and Japan; in fact he quoted the editorial several hours before it appeared.

AFTER completing our analysis of newspapers we went to work on the magazines, of which Rio has a great number. Most of them look startlingly familiar, for the good reason that their contents are lifted from American magazines—by arrangement or otherwise. Nick Carter still lives in a monthly pulp. So does Jack London in a magazine of a little better class. *El Detective* was publishing the “Seventh Adventure of Cactus Jack.” Fiction and fashion (all from the United States) are the preoccupation of these periodicals, though they do publish news pictures. German propaganda, either in text or in pictures, was even scarcer than in the newspapers. Again, 80 per cent of contents originated in the United States; nearly all the rest was of local interest.

I went through the same laborious checking process in São Paulo and Santos, in Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Valparaiso and Lima. The

result was the same, with small variation. In Bogotá, I found a neutral observer, a former journalist, who had kept similar records for an entire year. His figures on Colombian newspapers corresponded almost precisely with those I had arrived at in Rio. This seemed startling at first, but analysis developed the explanation. In every important South American city the leading newspapers refuse to publish German propaganda handouts; and in every city the Germans have established or subsidized one newspaper which more or less openly is their organ.

In São Paulo, with a large German population, there was somewhat more German propaganda published than in Rio. In Montevideo, where they are pretty sore about the German plot to seize their little country, there's about as much German propaganda printed as you'd find in London.

In Buenos Aires, *La Prensa*, one of the world's greatest newspapers, prints more cable news than any other daily anywhere—and all forty columns of it come from the United Press. *La Nación* takes the full Associated Press, with special cables supplied by *The New York Times* and the *London Times*. Two other prosperous and substantial papers, *El Mundo* and *Crítica*, have no space for Nazi news, either. The German organ in Buenos Aires is *El Pampero*, one year old the day I left town. It prints in full the Trans-Ocean, Stefani and Domei news services, and no other.

I was startled and impressed, when I first arrived, by the showing *El Pampero* made. It was on top of every pile

of newspapers on the stands and when it came out each evening the leather-lunged newsboys cried it persistently and almost exclusively. When I asked about this, Argentinians smiled. The newsboy makes 8 centavos on every copy of *El Pampero* he sells, only 4 centavos on other newspapers. Despite this plugging and the wide distribution of free copies, the best *El Pampero* can do is 90,000 circulation, compared to *Crítica's* 400,000.

Everybody in Buenos Aires is eager to tell you that *El Pampero* costs the German embassy about \$11,000 a month. It would cost more except that German business men are compelled to advertise in it. They are the only ones who do. One large advertiser is the famous "4711" line of toilet goods, which I advertised in China for more than a dozen years. When I recall how carefully this fine old Cologne firm used to watch its pfennigs, I can imagine how it feels about advertising in *El Pampero*.

MAGAZINES in Buenos Aires are better than in Brazil, because they are published in Spanish instead of Portuguese and therefore circulate across national boundaries. Buenos Aires is becoming the real center of Spanish-language publishing with the flight of the intelligentsia from Madrid. There is no trace of German propaganda in these periodicals. The Germans have had to establish a monthly, called *Clarinda*, almost incredibly crude and vulgar. It carries coarse caricatures of the "international Jew" and a frank blacklist of dentists, physicians and tradesmen sup-

posed to be unfriendly to the Nazis.

In Santiago the old-established newspapers will not print Trans-Ocean reports. Therefore the German Embassy "persuaded" the publisher of the local German-language daily to issue a Spanish edition called *El Suplemento*. The Nazi chiefs are not prompt about meeting its deficit and the publisher has been heard to describe himself as "the only sucker in South America" because, being a German, he has to pay for Trans-Ocean news service while every other newspaper gets it free.


Radio coverage is not so easy to measure as that of newspapers or magazines. All over Latin America the public radio is much more of an institution than it is with us. People listen in cafés, on the street, even in buses. However, my own inquiries made me believe that relatively few owners of sets listen to short-wave programs—either the German or ours. Radio men tell me their investigations lead to the same conclusion. Evidently the Germans realize this, for in addi-

tion to expensive short-wave broadcasts from Europe they are buying time on local stations and even buying a few second-rate stations outright. We are about to meet this move, not by government effort but by a commercial arrangement whereby important stations in all the principal cities are to re-broadcast programs from the United States.

ANY way you look at it, time on the air for presenting news with a German twist is small. The important stations place too high a value on their prestige to permit themselves to be so used. There is no Brazilian Raymond Gram Swing or Argentinian Kaltenborn commenting on the news. The man at the mike reads the dispatches without offering opinion or interpretation. It was clear to me that our neighbors regarded our news dispatches as much more reliable than those of the belligerents.

There remains word-of-mouth propaganda, impossible for me to explore yet equally impossible for me to take seriously as moulding public opinion in Latin America.

As to German propaganda by mail, I could collect the literature distributed but could find no way to learn how many people get it. It is the familiar kind of publicity—documents showing that the British were about to invade Norway, pictures of German children killed by British bombs, etc. Apparently the mailing lists are large and well selected. It is probably received with more reader attention there than in the United States because South Americans are not so deluged



—Time and Tide, London

with printed matter. There is no evidence that it has been effective in creating public opinion; in fact, feeling generally is against the Nazis. I did not see a single swastika, but every Britisher wears a union jack or some other British emblem.

In all this I draw a distinction between propaganda, which is an effort to influence the public, and the activity of fifth columnists, working on politicians in and out of office. If German propaganda had been more effective, the job of fifth columnists would have been easier. German agents are working under cover in many Latin-American countries, grooming disgruntled leaders of minority parties to seize power or at least to make trouble. To judge their effectiveness is beyond my power. I can say this: there is only one politician in South America who openly favors the Nazi cause.

We are doing nothing officially to combat German propaganda, much of which is directed against us. The German Government is spending several million dollars a year, but the Government at Washington is not spending a cent. We do not need to. Government money could never build up a propaganda machine equal to that developed through the efforts of American news agencies, feature syndicates, publishers and moving-picture producers to supply South America with legitimate news and entertainment.

AMERICAN news agencies, on a purely business basis, are providing the Continent with practically all of its cable news. Their machinery for news coverage is so efficient and com-

plete that most Latin-American countries depend on them for reports even on Latin-American affairs. Small provincial papers manage to pay for a skeletonized U. P. or A. P. report in spite of the fact that the propaganda reports are offered free. Even the German-language newspapers subscribe to the American news services. The American agencies sell an honest and dependable product—news carefully gathered, clearly and concisely written, and as free of prejudice and bias as is humanly possible.

These American news services play an important part in maintaining peace. Tempers flare suddenly and violently whenever one of the perennial disputes crops up. If the news about these highly controversial subjects were written by local correspondents, it would be impossible to avoid partisan reporting that would add to the irritation. The United Press and Associated Press send out neutral and unbiased reports with the result that many a dispute which might easily develop into a major issue has its day in the headlines and then dies out.

The Germans would give millions to have our dominance of the screen. Even before the war Hollywood productions almost monopolized the theaters, despite competition from subsidized German and Italian films. South Americans are proud of their splendid opera houses and boast of their liberal support of European opera companies, but I believe that for every centavo spent on the opera a peso or more has been spent on Hollywood movies. These movies are all in English with titles in Spanish or Portu-

guesse. Thousands of young people have found a new and compelling interest now in the English language. Gangster films never have been especially popular with our Southern neighbors. But when I was in Rio, *Gone With the Wind* had been running for six weeks and looked as if it might keep on for as many months. In Buenos Aires it was equally popular. Maybe the visit of a European opera troupe is of value in establishing what is loosely called "cultural relations" but my choice would be for a long run of movies like *Gone With the Wind*.

WE get our music from Hollywood and so does South America. For every hundred who put on tail coats and a white tie and attend the opera a million hear every Hollywood musical production. I don't know how they could crowd more American music into their programs. Irving Berlin is as well known in Santos as in Sioux City. There is rarely a popular concert that does not present at least one number by Stephen Foster, rarely a police or military review when a stirring Sousa march is not played.

Memories of the pre-war visits of European opera companies are dim as compared to memories of the triumphal "good will tour" made by Toscanini last year. His concerts set a new high in music. Short-wave broadcasts of opera from the Metropolitan have a large following in South America, probably much larger than at home in proportion to the number of radio owners. There is not a month that the "fan letters" received from South American listeners do not exceed

3,000—a hundred a day. Our phonograph records are relatively as popular as are our movie productions. When I was in Barranquilla the record most widely advertised was *God Bless America*, in Spanish.

Last but by no means least, the bulging-muscled Popeye marches through the pages of newspapers in every city. He is better known in Latin America than any of the immortal characters created by Cervantes and Camoens. The marital troubles of Jiggs are familiar to millions to whom Hitler and Mussolini are but names. The redoubtable Maggie throws rolling pins under the name of Ramona. Jiggs, known as Fausto, doesn't go to Dinty Moore's for corned beef and cabbage but to the hacienda of his friend McManus to enjoy rice and beans. More American comic strips are published in Buenos Aires than in any city in the United States. If "Popeye el Marino" should ever challenge Herr Hitler, most Latin Americans would place their bets on him.

I shudder to think what would happen to us if our Government should ever make an appropriation for press propaganda in Latin America. It could not add anything to the completeness of news coverage already provided by American services and might injure their usefulness. Such a fund certainly would be an invitation to blackmail, and publications at present indifferent or friendly would find it convenient to snipe at Uncle Sam—until bought off.

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(Editor's Note: There is no appropriation by the United States Govern-

ment for press propaganda in Latin America, as Mr. Crow points out. It may be noted, however, that this nation has two official bodies whose particular interest is the improvement of relations between the two continents. One is the Division of Cultural Relations with Latin America, headed by Charles A. Thompson, a part of the Department of State, and the other is the group headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller as "Co-Ordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics," a post in the Council of National Defense. To some degree, the existence of these two bodies contradicts Mr. Crow's assertion that "we are doing nothing officially to combat German propaganda [in Latin America]." Parenthetically,

Miss Dorothy Thompson recently advocated Government-sponsored and directed radio broadcasts to Latin America, and criticized the present arrangement by which American broadcasting companies use the judgment of their own staffs in selecting and preparing matter for short-wave broadcast.

Mr. Crowe's statement that "there is only one politician in South America who openly favors the Nazi cause" is subject to debate. Aside from a host of minor pro-Nazi movements in various republics below the Rio Grande, in Chile there is the strong "Nacista" party headed by Gonzales von Marees, and in Brazil the influential and pro-Nazi Integralista party led by Plinio Salgado, 55 per cent of whose members are of German origin.)

The Insect Comedy

Sebastian Haffner's articles are worth following in *Die Zeitung*, the first wartime German newspaper launched in London with the blessing of the Ministry of Information. He recalls that extraordinary episode in Heinrich Mann's 1914 novel, *Der Untertan*, where a patriotic bridegroom addresses his bride, "Before we go further let us remember His Majesty the Kaiser. Our marriage has the higher purpose of providing our Supreme War Lord with soldiers. So forward for Kaiser and Reich!" This piece of satire was greeted in Germany at the time as not altogether in the best of taste. Merely a novelist's phantasy. On the contrary, as Mr. Haffner reminds us, "The Nazi reality of 1941 has quite overshadowed the 1914 satire." Himmler's new official organ, *Waffensieger-Kindersieg* ("Conquest by Arms: Conquest by Children") proclaims that "natural fruitfulness" is a "weapon in a nation's fight for its existence." His latest periodical depicts in word and picture the type of woman suitable for this purpose, and also the type to avoid.

—*Time and Tide*, London

Persons and Personages

THE ATATURK OF PERSIA

By ALBERT MILLER

ALTHOUGH Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran is very much alive, it would not be Persia if many legends had not been woven around him. Some stories tell that he rose to the Peacock Throne from the low status of a soldier's servant, while other tales ask men to believe that he is a direct descendent of the Great Darius.

All these accounts are so much fantasy. Nevertheless, Reza's life vies in color with his personality. His individual history is also the history of modern, independent and—once again—unified Persia. Despite the results he has achieved, Reza must still reckon with two forces which may unseat him: the war, and the Islamitic priesthood of his country. And there are three other encroaching forces from without, the U.S.S.R., Britain and Germany.

From the lips of all Persians today may still be heard the stanzas of their great poets describing the prowess of the soldier-shahs of yore. The truth is that if these rulers were as strong as these epics say, they must have resembled somewhat the present Shah.

He is a broad-shouldered, narrow-waisted giant. As a boy, Reza was regarded as unusually handsome, although he lived in a district where handsome children abound. His olive-tinted face is soft, but his aquiline nose and, above all, his tightly compressed lips are signs of his firmness. Unlike most Orientals, Reza uses gestures sparingly. They are unnecessary to him; his dark eyes are more expressive than his hands.

Only when he joins his comrades-in-arms of his fighting years does Reza unbend. In contrast to the luxury with which the former Shahs surrounded themselves, and for the sake of which Persia was sold piecemeal to foreigners, Reza still leads the frugal, stern life of the soldier.

If ever there was a self-made man who used his talents in the interests of his compatriots, Reza about fits the description. He was born sixty-two years ago, the descendent of a long line of warriors, in a castle near the Caspian Sea. Riding and hunting fascinated him from early youth. He abhorred book learning, but one book interested him; it was an account of the travels of Shah Nasr-ed-Din, in which were pictured the wonders which that Shah had seen in Europe.

Depleted family fortunes forced Reza early in life to seek a profes-

sion. Family tradition and natural inclination turned him toward soldiering. Young Reza set out for Teheran where he hoped that an uncle, an army officer, would help him. But he was deeply disappointed when he learned that the Shah's army existed only on paper. There was just one formation of flesh-and-blood officers and men, the Shah's Cossack brigade, commanded by Tsarist officers.

Reza had to work hard for admission into the brigade, for as a pure-blooded Persian he was unwelcome—these one-hundred-per-centers were said to make unreliable soldiers. But through sheer aptitude and dash he advanced to the rank of a commissioned officer.

During these years, Reza saw his country fall to pieces. Corruption, inefficiency and intrigues were the outstanding characteristics of the régime. Reza was too unimportant to do anything about it. But when, during a punitive expedition, Russian soldiers told him of the overthrow of the Tsar, he saw that the time to act had come. To save the brigade from the consequences of Russia's internal quarrels, he forced the Russian officers to relinquish their commissions—and overnight made himself commander.

Shortly thereafter, Reza and his brigade underwent difficult times. The sums appropriated for the upkeep of his unit disappeared, into the pockets of officials. Even the numerous relatives of the Shah were not ashamed to steal where they could.

Unpaid, underfed, ragged, members of the brigade were forced to fight the army of a rebellious fanatic who had called Soviet troops to his assistance. The brigade was badly beaten. Instead of giving up the fight, Reza turned against the real enemy of his country—corruption in office. He organized his decimated force, and in February 1921 the brigade set out for Teheran.

When the soldiers appeared before the capital, officials tried to negotiate with Reza. But he only looked through them, and shrewdly he negotiated with members of the British Legation who had come along with them. No attempt was made to offer resistance to his entry into the capital.

Once Reza was inside Teheran, he began his long series of reforms which has not yet ended, and for which he has had to fight bitter, sometimes unsuccessful battles with the reactionary priesthood.

Reza's first reform, after becoming Persia's Commander-in-Chief, was to sweep out corruption and to attempt to get back some of the sums filched from the treasury. He showed a mailed fist and drove some nobles to suicide. Persia at this time had two cabinets. One was the Shah's Government,



obstructionist and inactive, the other the cabinet formed by the officers of Reza Khan's fast growing army.

Reza had conquered Teheran, but in the provinces the central government had little power. Provincial governors had collected taxes regularly for years, but just as regularly they had pocketed them. At the head of his troops, Reza set out to collect these taxes and to unify Persia. That campaign took three years.

During this time, Reza learned much of statecraft, and in the end felt himself strong enough to demand more sweeping reforms. But the knowledge of things administrative and political did not come easily to him. In military matters, his decisions always have been made with confidence, but in the political field he sometimes ponders for a long time, so long on occasion that his friends fear he has lost courage.

But nobody dared to object to his arrest of the Premier in 1921. This accomplished, Reza enacted a political farce. He went to the young, dissipated Shah Ahmad and suggested that, in order to restore his health, the ruler make a trip to Paris. Ahmad eagerly followed this "suggestion." Only, he did not regain his health; in 1930 he died in France following an operation. Everybody in the Montmartre cabarets knew this ungainly, sickly play-boy.

Ahmad's place was taken by his brother, who became regent. A movement to transform Persia into a republic, with Reza as its president, began to gain ground. Reza's hero, Kemal Pasha, had succeeded in overthrowing the Turkish dynasty and, above all, had broken the hold of the Moslem priests on Turkey. The Persian priests feared Reza might emulate Kemal. In their view, the republican movement had to be fought tooth and nail. The illiterate masses were aroused against the "godless" Reza. He began to lose ground. The era of reforms was transformed into one of black ecclesiasticism. Mobs stoned Reza's auto; members of parliament who dared to speak in favor of the republic, disappeared mysteriously. Adherents of dissident religious groups suffered the fate of Biblical martyrs.

REZA remained in the background until forced to act. During a religious procession in Teheran, the United States Vice Consul, who had tried to take snapshots, was killed by a fanatical mob. Reza declared martial law. It did not help much. Clergy and parliament banded against him. Reza was forced to punish trusted friends for alleged infringements of the laws of the Koran. The brigade began to doubt the political abilities of its leader.

Shortly thereafter, however, they were convinced that Reza made concessions only when he had something to gain. He had learned that the Sheik of Muhammara, a remote province, was heading a political plot against Reza's régime. Once more the army was set in march. But instead of fighting

the Sheik, Reza negotiated with him and killed the plot by kicking the Sheik upstairs—into the upper chamber of the parliament.

Still, some means had to be found to quiet the opposition of the Moslem priests. Reza made a pilgrimage to a holy place. There he conferred for hours with mullahs and other dignitaries. And there he seems to have buried the idea of a republic, of a separation of Church and State. From that moment on, the fight between the worldly and spiritual powers went underground. Both parties are still resorting to many tricks, however, to sway the masses to their respective sides.

Reza's bloodless victory over the Sheik made such an impression on the country that it was easy for him to persuade parliament to oust the Regent who had played a role in the conspiracy. In October 1925, Reza was made provisional head of the government, and six weeks later he became Shah—Reza Shah Pahlevi. The adoption of this name for the new ruling house, and the subsequent restoration of the old name of *Iran*, are indications of Reza's attempt to combine the new emergence of his fatherland with the great, pre-Islamitic times of the Iranian Empire.

The opposition which Reza had to overcome is shown by the following incident. One day he sent his younger wife, her face only thinly veiled, to the grave of a saint. The priest on duty upbraided her for her transparent veil. The young Empress immediately complained to her husband that the mullah had insulted her. Reza raced in his car to the holy place and whipped the priest in the presence of a multitude of pilgrims.

Another characteristic of the Shah is his abiding curiosity. He wants to see everything for himself. He inspects all the auto highways which criss-cross the country and aid in keeping it unified. He is particularly interested in the air service, his hobby. He wants to see how workers live in the model houses he has had built alongside modern factories. He wants to see how boys' and girls' schools are functioning. Above all, he wants to eradicate all traces of corruption.

But the war has already spread to adjoining Iraq. In the impending fight for the survival of his régime, the Shah may find domestic reforms a dispensable luxury.

PRIME MINISTER, SELF-MADE MODEL

By MARJORIE McFARLAND

WHEN Australia's Prime Minister, Mr. Robert G. Menzies, arrived in London, at the end of February, he received an enthusiastic welcome from both officials and the press. Australian stock was at a high point—the Anzacs were racing across the North African desert, war industries were humming down under—and Menzies himself was the Eng-

lishman's idea of what a Colonial should be, bluff, picturesque and with a quotable turn of phrase for the newspapers.

At home, the Labor Opposition claims that Menzies represents Flinders Lane (the Wall Street of Melbourne), and it tries to make capital out of his caustic, rather arrogant platform manner. Even the London *Times* noted that, "As recently as 1938, though to the detached observer Mr. Menzies' singular gifts seemed to mark him out as the obvious successor to Mr. [Jo-



—Daily Telegraph, London

seph L.] Lyons, both as leader of the United Australia Party and as Prime Minister, students of politics insisted that because of his inability to suffer fools gladly or to compromise on issues of high principle, he could never command sufficient support to attain to either post." But, continued the *Times*, "He confounded the prophets by winning both, and now he comes to London at the height of his prestige. No Australian Prime Minister has run the gauntlet of public criticism so arduously. None has had to master such intricate problems of government. None has had to overcome a Parliamentary deadlock seemingly so insoluble as that which presented itself after the recent General Election. . . . This is not a time when Australia can readily spare the Prime Minister; his brief absence overseas will prove how much she needs him."

Before he left London for America, in early May, Anglo-Australian relations were less amiable. Menzies had been forced to defend himself by radio from half way across the world against Labor criticism of his sending Australian troops into the disastrous Greek defense without first consulting his Advisory War Council (which includes leaders of the Labor party). In turn, it was reported that Menzies himself was very critical of the British General Staff's handling of Near Eastern and Balkan affairs. Just at this point, the death of the Government Whip, J. L. Price, gave the Labor Opposition a majority of one seat in the Australian Parliament. Menzies directed the Acting Prime Minister, A. W. Fadden, to renew an offer to John Curtin, Labor party leader, of half the cabinet posts in a national government, an offer which was again refused. By the time this issue of *The Living Age* is in type, Menzies may be "going to the country," since Curtin has announced his intention of forcing the resignation of the Government if the Boothby by-election for Price's seat goes to Labor.

The Labor attack on Menzies has been somewhat misunderstood in the United States. Labor, as much as any of the other parties, is for all-out contribution of men and materials to the war; its criticism as to the Greek campaign was of what it considered Menzies' high-handed procedure in failing

to consult his Advisory Council before taking such an important step. Though its stand on war policy has been that all effort should be for the defense of Australia and that the Commonwealth should take no part in the war overseas and it is still opposed to compulsory military training, this "isolationism" has been considerably weakened by recent events, so that it is unlikely that it would be an election issue or that Australia's foreign policy would be drastically changed by a Labor victory. Labor's steady refusal to join a national war government does not so much represent an unwillingness to co-operate in the war effort as a long-standing tradition that it must keep itself free from compromise on matters where its basic principles (which approximate Fabian socialism) are involved, and this has not been weakened by the British Labor party's fate after Ramsay MacDonald's "National" Government. Also, its power has been increasing in recent months, and it would naturally prefer to form a government of its own. At the last general election, in September 1940, Menzies was able to keep in office only by forming a coalition with the Country party, which pretty much agrees with his own United Australia party except on matters of tariff—not currently a burning issue. Their combined margin over Labor was small then, and it has since been reduced by by-elections.

Though the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* (published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs) refers to Australia as "the Commonwealth of Pushme-Pullyu at War," to an outsider it is remarkable that Menzies, with his precarious balance of power, has had less difficulty co-ordinating the national resources, including labor, than has Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King, in Canada, with his tremendous Liberal majority. Though there are undoubtedly some labor leaders who would like to make trouble, labor has been so powerful in Australia for more than a generation that it has built up a tradition of respectability and responsibility, and the head of the party, Curtin, is no demagogue but a quiet and thoughtful theoretician who rose to power as a Labor journalist rather than through the rough-and-tumble of union politics.

THE main issue will be the electorate's judgment of Menzies' personal leadership of the country in a time of crisis. He will return from his trip around the world with an "international reputation" but he may find that his home fences have fallen down meanwhile. Aside from the Labor attacks, there may be trouble within his own Coalition Government. Fadden, Minister of Finance, who has been Acting Prime Minister during Menzies absence, is leader of the Country party, and there have been hints that he has taken advantage of his chief's absence to put himself forward as a desirable compromise as head of the Government—his main claim to the post is that a sudden change of leadership might confuse the issues and the Opposition.

Menzies' chief handicap is that—homespun as he may seem to the

English—he is in Australia too much the brilliant, sharp-tongued corporation lawyer to appeal to the masses. Though the external details have provided a journalistic parallel between his career and that of Wendell Willkie, Menzies lacks the “common touch” of his American prototype. One eulogist refutes the charge “widely levelled” against him that he is “arrogant and autocratic”: “Really, his alleged arrogance is merely a strong conviction. And a strong conviction can be a most valuable asset to the leader of a nation in troublous times.” The New York *World Telegram* headlined an interview with: “Menzies Here by Air Today; Virtual Dictator of Australia.” It was probably intended as a compliment but would not be so considered in Australia where democracy is much further to the left than in the United States. (Such New Deal legislation as unemployment insurance has been in effect there since before the first World War, and employer-union relations have long had a recognized legal status. The desirability of these measures is taken for granted by all parties.)

MENZIES first entered politics, in 1928, as the leader of the Australian Bar with a \$100,000-a-year income. He later acquired the political sobriquet of “Honest Bob” and resurrected his humble past: “I am a singularly plain Australian, born in a little town, Jeparit, on the fringes of the Mallee Country of Victoria, educated at a country State School, a Ballarat State School and then by scholarship at a Secondary School, a Public School and the Melbourne University. Apart from having parents of great character, intelligence and fortitude, I was not born to the purple. [His father was a country storekeeper, his grandfather a miner.] I have made my own way, such as it was, and is. And I want you to believe me when I say that I do not hold the achievement of the Prime Ministership an occasion for foolish vanity, but I find in it the acceptance of a responsibility so great that it might well deter much better men than I can ever hope to be.” (Colin Wills in *Bulletins From Britain*, May 7, 1941.) In action, however, humility is not his forte; he has the solid self-esteem of the self-made man who has external proof of his merit.

He first entered the Federal Parliament after the 1934 General Election and was immediately made Attorney General and deputy leader of the United Australia party. He resigned both posts in March 1939 in a dispute over the party’s social-insurance measures, which he considered inadequate. The party leader, Prime Minister J. L. Lyons, died a month later, and Menzies was called in to form a new Government. As noted above, his party lost ground in the first popular test of his leadership, in last September’s elections. One issue, then as now, was the efficiency of the prosecution of the war effort. Another is his policy toward Japan. In London, he made a speech to the Foreign Press Association which caused the Japanese correspondents present to “break into happy laughter.” He remarked: “Nothing

disturbs me more than to encounter that type of unresponsive mind which appears to assume that because Australia—and the British people—were engaged in a deadly war—we should at the same time permit ourselves, willy-nilly, to drift into an atmosphere in relation to Japan which was at least dubious and might quite frankly be dangerous.” The *London News Review* commented: “Political opponents have a name for ‘Honest Bob’ Menzies. They call him the ‘second great appeaser,’ ” and added that “strangely familiar were further phrases of Mr. Menzies: ‘There was no such thing (except in the case of Europe) as the inevitability of conflict. . . . No difficulty that could not be resolved by cultivation of the utmost frankness.’ ” However, Hannen Swaffer, columnist of the Laborite *Daily Herald*, wrote: “Some may call this an Appeasement speech—what our statesmen were saying months ago. It struck me as frank.”

In spite of its political turmoil, Australia, with a population under 7,000,000, has a \$600,000,000 war budget. At present, approximately 600,000 Australians (a proportion equivalent to 12,000,000 Americans) are directly engaged in war production which, on an actuarial basis, is twenty times that at the outbreak of the War. (This includes the largest steel plant in the British Empire.) She has 120,000 troops fighting overseas and is recruiting a home-defense army of 250,000. She has undertaken to provide an air force of 57,000 and is building an airplane industry almost from the ground up in order to equip it. She is also heavily engaged in ship-building of both merchant and war vessels.

THE PERENNIAL GOVERNOR

By PAUL EINZIG

Picture Post, London Topical Weekly

MONTAGU NORMAN remains Governor of the Bank of England, although this year brings him to the statutory retiring age of seventy. In November 1940 the directors of the Bank of England held their usual annual meeting to decide upon the nomination of the Governor and Deputy Governor for the next term. As a rule, little interest is attached to this meeting. It is considered to be a mere formal affair. Now, Mr. Norman's nomination as Governor has been taken for years as a foregone conclusion. Every time he has been re-nominated or re-elected city editors of newspapers have automatically paid him eulogistic tribute; according to legend, in fact, the same congratulatory paragraphs were left in type year after year, and only the dates and the length of the period of Mr. Norman's service were changed as the years went by.

This year, however, the situation has been somewhat different because of Mr. Norman's advance to the age of seventy, which is the statutory age

limit for directors of the Bank. Now, some of the directors have felt for some time that, though Mr. Norman has rendered unquestionably great services to the Bank, there is an overwhelming case in favor of replacing him by someone more adaptable and less unpopular. Others, without holding strong views on the subject, have felt that the age limit should be upheld.

When the directors of the bank met in November, Mr. Norman was duly re-elected for the 1941-42 term, although he will pass the statutory age limit during that period. No application has been made for the extension of that age limit, but that does not necessarily mean that it will not be extended at the eleventh hour.

WE OUGHT to probe more deeply, therefore, into Mr. Norman's apparently unending reign at the Bank of England. In the City of London itself, any criticism of the choice of the Governor's person is still regarded as something like sacrilege. But, with all due respect to the present occupant of the exalted post, we ought to ask ourselves whether it is to the advantage of the country that he should remain Governor during such a critical period.

Mr. Norman's integrity and the prestige he commands both at home and abroad are highly valuable assets, but in themselves they are hardly sufficient to qualify him for life-governorship of the Bank, especially under the present difficult conditions. A critical examination of his other qualities reveals some very grave defects. His knowledge of monetary and central banking technique is by no means what outsiders suppose it to be. Someone, who was in close touch with him over a period of years in connection with foreign exchange operations, once remarked that "Mr. Norman may be a leading expert on the discount market, but he knows very little about foreign exchange." Another person, who often consulted him on matters concerning the discount market, remarked once that "of course, Mr. Norman is a leading authority on foreign exchange, but he has no idea about discounts." The evidence he gave before the Macmillan Committee ten years ago disclosed an amazing lack of grasp of both technical detail and fundamental principles. Indeed, the text of his evidence had to be edited by John Maynard Keynes in order that readers should be able to understand it.

It may be argued that, after all, it is not the Governor's job to be a technical specialist. His duty is to lay down the general policy of the Bank; and to that end he needs broad vision, sound judgment and, above all, an adaptable mind, rather than expert knowledge. But then, is it possible to claim that Mr. Norman's vision and judgment have been so sound during his prolonged tenure of office, or that he showed himself adaptable to changed conditions? To answer this question, let us cast a glance at the major policies for which Mr. Norman was responsible since the date he became Governor of the Bank.

These can be summarized under the following headings:

1. Mr. Norman was largely responsible for the ill-advised return to the Gold Standard in 1925.

2. He was strongly opposed to the Treasury's cheap money policy, and shortly before the outbreak of the war he succeeded in reversing it.

3. He pursued a policy of financial appeasement to Germany until the outbreak of the war.

4. He allowed the City to over-lend to Germany and did not exert his influence to obtain a reduction of the excessive German bank debts.


5. He was strongly opposed to the adoption of effective exchange control during the war.

As for the first of these points, Mr. Norman is held responsible for the monetary policy pursued after the last war, leading to the return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity. In all fairness, it must be pointed out that his responsibility in this matter is shared by practically all statesmen, Treasury officials and economists who had a say in the matter. They all took it for granted that it was Great Britain's duty "to make the pound look the dollar in the face," and most people in Mr. Norman's position would have advised the Government in that sense.

He cannot be blamed exclusively for that major error of judgment, therefore, but the part he played scarcely indicates exceptional vision or soundness of views. Indeed, the return to the gold standard was a major disaster, the consequences of which are not adequately realized. Everybody knows—or should know by this time—the direct and visible results of fixing too high a value for the pound. It meant difficulties for exporters in keeping their markets, for British goods were too expensive. Consequently there was wholesale unemployment. Wages had to be reduced, which again caused industrial unrest. In order to defend the pound, the volume of credit had to be kept down. This meant a shortage of capital and the throttling of new enterprise. The results were an ever-growing difficulty for the Government as it tried to balance the budget and reduce the public debt.

What is not adequately realized is that the ill-advised post-war monetary policy was to some extent responsible for the present war. Why? Because the difficulties of balancing the Budget made the Government think it necessary to enforce rigid economies in national defense expenditure.

The question is: Has Mr. Norman learned a lesson from the failure of his early policy? Does he now fully realize that in existing circumstances the measures called for are totally different from those followed during generations of successful central banking amidst stable and prosperous



conditions prevailing before the last war? That they must be different will be realized by anybody who reflects that we shall have to spend thousands of millions of pounds on the reconstruction of our destroyed cities and that conventional banking ideas would enforce severe retrenchment in an effort to regain what the conventional banker calls "solvency." Unfortunately, there is reason to fear that Mr. Norman's adaptability to changing conditions leaves much to be desired. This was clearly indicated by the attitude he adopted shortly before the outbreak of this war. On August 24, 1939, he caused the bank rate to be raised from 2 per cent to 4 per cent. This was the result of his persistent efforts to induce the Treasury to reverse its policy of cheap money adopted since 1932. Mr. Norman was strongly opposed to that policy from the very outset, and it was carried out by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, against his advice.

FROM time to time Mr. Norman urged the Treasury to authorize an increase of the bank rate, in order to cope with minor troubles arising from over-speculation in commodities such as pepper, shellac or monkey nuts. Mr. Chamberlain remained adamant, however, and the minor crises settled themselves without an increase of the bank rate. Mr. Norman did not give up hope, however, and the confusion that prevailed during the days that preceded the outbreak of this war provided him with an opportunity for persuading Lord Simon, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, to agree to an increase of the bank rate.

Now, why did Mr. Norman consider it natural to raise the bank rate when the outbreak of war appeared to be imminent? Simply because this was done on the eve of the last war! Even then it was a mistake. It caused world-wide panic which could have been avoided. Meanwhile, the importance of the high bank rate as a means for supporting sterling has greatly declined. The increase of the bank rate in the changed circumstances of 1939 accentuated the confusion on the financial markets; it increased the difficulties of transition from peace economy to war economy; it added to the burdens of financing the war; and it landed trade with an additional burden at a moment when it was gravely preoccupied with various war measures. So far from preventing the flight from the pound, it actually accentuated the movement, as it was considered to be a danger signal.

The only way to check the flight from the pound was by the application of exchange restrictions. For obviously, in order to make the best use of the country's limited gold and foreign exchange resources, it was necessary to stop the outflow of capital, British or foreign. But Mr. Norman failed to realize this, and, throughout the early part of the war, fought a tenacious rearguard action against the slow and half-hearted efforts of the Treasury to tighten exchange restrictions. He was afraid that strict exchange control might affect London's chances to recover its position as a world

banking center after the war, and, since he considered himself in the first place the representative of the banking community, he did his utmost to influence Lord Simon against a reinforcement of exchange control. It was not until after Lord Simon's departure from the Treasury that his successor, Sir Kingsley Wood—who is not under Mr. Norman's influence to quite the same extent as his predecessor—adopted measures tending to check the outflow of funds. By that time, however, the Treasury's gold and dollar resources had become depleted to a considerable extent, and, as a result, toward the end of the year the placing of orders for war materials in the United States had to be practically suspended.

Another count on which Mr. Norman is open to criticism is his policy of financial appeasement, which he pursued until the eve of the war. During the twenties, it must be admitted, this policy was strictly in accordance with the traditional balance-of-power policy of Great Britain. After all, during that period Germany was the weaker party on the Continent, and it may have appeared reasonable to assume that her reconstruction was in accordance with the interests of general economic and political stability in Europe. Even then Mr. Norman's bias in favor of Germany led him to allow the development of a thoroughly unsound position in the city. He did nothing to discourage the granting of excessive short-term credits to Germany, as a result of which some £40,000,000 became hopelessly immobilized in 1931, and the greater part of that amount became a dead loss at the outbreak of this war. Nor did he use his influence to induce bankers to follow the example of American, French, Dutch and Swiss banking creditors of Germany, in cutting their losses and drastically reducing their German commitments.

Instead, Mr. Norman threw himself wholeheartedly on the side of the policy of appeasement. He was opposed to forcing Germany to pay her debts by means of adopting Exchange Clearing and earmarking for the benefit of British creditors part of the proceeds of the German export surplus to this country. He came to the rescue of the Reichsbank with a credit toward the end of 1934. He even allowed London banks to open new credits in favor of Germany, in spite of her default on the old ones. It was not until 1937, under the influence of pressure in Parliament, that, acting upon the request of the Treasury, he addressed a circular to the banks requesting them to refrain, if possible, from granting Germany additional credit facilities.

IT IS only fair that, after the outbreak of the War, he ceased to allow himself to be influenced by his pre-war bias in favor of Germany. Nevertheless, without indulging in unnecessary recriminations for the past, we are entitled to ask whether his policy until the eve of the war was an indication of sound judgment, and whether it does not weaken the case

in favor of his retention in a key position during a war against Germany.

What is perhaps much more important is the question whether Mr. Norman's mental make-up qualifies him for the task of being in charge of the Bank of England during the difficult period of post-war reconstruction. It is of the utmost importance to assure the public that the grave mistakes of the period that followed the last war are not going to be repeated this time. The main task will be to make good the destruction of the war and not to concentrate entirely on the financial aspects of the situation. So long as Mr. Norman is entrenched in his impregnable fortress at Threadneedle Street, it is difficult to expect people in this country, or in any other country, to believe that the British post-war monetary policy will differ materially from the one pursued under Mr. Norman's guidance during the twenties.

Perhaps it is possible to hope Mr. Montagu Norman may realize the greatest service he can render to his country in existing circumstances—which is to surrender the seals of his office.

(Editor's Note: The Economist of London has also hinted strongly that it is time for Montagu Norman to retire: "If our monetary policy is to have the elasticity it will need to seize every opportunity offered by a strange and turbulent world, it is essential that its supreme director should be a man whose mind had not set before 1931, when the new monetary era begins.")

Hitler as Best Seller?

In the course of the war of words on the ether, B.B.C. broadcasters to Germany are often able to judge the success of their efforts by Dr. Goebbels' reactions. One instance was told by Lindley Fraser: "A week or two ago they produced little buttonhole badges to be sold in aid of the Winter Relief fund. Each of these badges had a portrait of a famous German on it, Bach, Mozart, Schiller, Wagner, Moltke and so on, and of course last, and also least, Adolf Hitler. We jumped at the chance and immediately started to press the Germans to buy all the others except Hitler. In fact, we ran an election. 'Here,' we said, 'is your first chance to vote in a free election for years. Vote for Mozart, buy Schiller, and so on!' We got Goebbels on the raw that time, for within a few days he was busy announcing that millions of Hitler badges had been bought and that the sellers were unable to get rid of the others."

—*Forces Programme*, London

Newspapers in Turkey

By SHAH-MIR EFFENDI

CONTRARY to a belief general in the United States, the Turkish press is not government-muzzled, in the sense that newspapers are controlled by Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Usually as a matter of conviction, it upholds the general course of the policy of Ankara which wants peace with the outside world, and a strong defensive force at home. Otherwise it is free to express its individual views and criticism.

There exists a Turkish Press Bureau under supervision of Faik Oztrak, the Minister of the Interior, who serves as link between the press and Government. The Bureau publishes a monthly magazine called *Ayin Tarihi*, meaning "Monthly Date." To this bureau editors apply when they wish to ascertain the Government's point of view on some issue, or get a line on its foreign policy. But such application is by no means compulsory.

The Turkish daily paper looks very different from American newspapers. It consists of only four or six pages, about the size of standard-sized papers here, but divided into seven instead of eight columns. The title of the paper is usually printed in red, the rest a uniform black. There are some half-tone illustrations from photographs of people or places figuring in the news. A few papers like *Aksam* ("Evening") publish a strip of political cartoons.

Turkish papers devote their space almost exclusively to political news and opinion. Crimes and scandals are not featured as in the United States. There are daily reviews of sports and occasional *feuilletons* on artistic and literary matters. One or two long novels are run in instalments of about a column. Comic supplements, Sunday editions, "columnists" and reporters in the American and British sense of the word are unknown. The Turkish newspaper is much more closely related to the Continental than to the Anglo-Saxon variety.

In the matter of advertisements also, the Turkish papers are very different from those in America. The full-page illustrated ads of department stores, automobile dealers, weekly magazines, and grocery chain stores are no part of the Turkish press. There are few advertisements of any sort, and those for the most are inserted by motion-picture theaters, or educational courses sponsored by schools and colleges, or are of patent medicines that tell women how to remain beautiful after fifty and men how to regulate their interiors and, finally, savings banks inviting deposits and offering in return not only regular interest, but also "chances" in a lottery.

Turkey has a few editorial writers of eminence. In most cases they are the publishers of their papers. They

are often men of considerable intelligence who enjoy a far-reaching influence. In Turkey, the great majority of the people, both rich and poor, are neither intelligent nor educated. The obtuseness of the Turkish masses did not so much matter as long as they were satisfied to live out their somnolent private lives. But now that the world crisis has stimulated them into thinking of themselves as conceivable shapers of the world's destiny, the need of a guiding and restraining authority is urgent. This authority is, of course, the press.

It is the role of these editorial writers to suggest to the masses where to expend their ready emotions, and to keep their vast, blind power from becoming a menace to the nation. Foremost among the men who possess this authority in Turkey are Huseyin Cahid Yalcin of *Yeni Sabah* ("New Morning"), Yunus Nadi of *Cumhuriyet* ("Republic"), Asim Uz of *Vakit* ("Time"), and Falih Rifki Atay of *Ulus* ("Grandeur"), the official organ of the People's party (which has 399 representatives among a total of 424 in the Kamutay, or Turkish parliament). All four of these editorial writers have been elected to the Kamutay in acknowledgement of their services to the country.

Journalism is not a remunerative career in Turkey, for the newspapers, lacking advertisements, are all poor. To choose this career the aspirant feels an irrepressible passion for it. This may account for the relative excellence of the Turkish press, as compared to the press of certain other continental nations. In 1937 Turkey had only 123

daily papers, most of them published in Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir. There were 140 periodicals, some of them published by foreign interests, as the Italian *Beyoglu*, the German *Tuerkische Post*, the French *Istanbul*, and the Jewish *Journal d'Orient*.

TYPICAL of the "courtly" style of Turkish editorial journalism is an article that appears in *Vatan* ("Fatherland"), dated November 7 last, and prominently featured across the front page. In part it reads as follows:

"Today the Soviet nation celebrates the anniversary of its revolution. To honor and congratulate our neighbor and friend, the Russian people, on this joyous day, is our cherished duty.

"For some time after the Soviet Union was born, she had to march on her road all alone. Then Turkish independence became established, and from that time on the two countries walked side by side as comrades in mutual confidence. They had no other friend or intimate.

"Atatürk and Lenin, with their hands, planted and nurtured the young tree of this friendship. And the two countries, in sincerity and peace, together followed the road which lay in brilliant light before them. But times became darker. Particular effort was made to see the right way—their eyes were searching. But the light had gone out.

"The world, bringing the whirlwind and blackness, tried to confuse and mislead. But as always, so now—the wicked in the end are disappointed.

"The deep friendship of the two young countries has not been troubled.

They continue together. They keep pace together, in spite of accidents and misfortunes.

"On this anniversary of the Soviet revolution, it is a satisfaction to us to proclaim that, despite innumerable bitter attempts at interference and disturbance, the Turkish-Soviet friendship lives on, founded on the rock of a love of justice and of peace."

A sister of the press, the radio, was lately established in Turkey. It is definitely Government-controlled. There is only one broadcasting station, the pow-

erful Government transmitter, heard in all the eastern Mediterranean countries. Its programs are under the direct supervision of Cevdet Kerim Incedayi, the Minister of Communications. Its mission is to explain world events from the point of view of the People's party, to that 4½ per cent of the population that possesses sets.

Besides political news, there are musical and dramatic broadcasts on the Turkish radio, but absolutely no "sponsored" entertainment. Political education is radio's only *raison d'être*.

—Might Be Worse

Mr. Bevin's main point was that if a secondary school boy was good enough to pilot a Spitfire, he was good enough to be eligible for the diplomatic career. In the past, of course, social background and education have been the primary qualifications on which possible candidates have been judged.

It is interesting to note, however, that in Soviet Russia diplomacy so far has proved the one career which has been, in practice if not theory, closed almost entirely to products of the working class. Soviet diplomats have been mainly recruited from the ranks of the former professional classes. The first occasion on which a Russian diplomat met representatives of the Great Powers on an equal footing was at Lausanne. British, French and Italian delegates expected to meet some uncouth peasant; instead they were confronted by Chicherin, a man with a perfect command of languages, a ready wit and ability which enabled him to hold his own against Lord Curzon.

. . . Even the unspeakable Ribbentrop came from a good family and was extensively travelled. I think that, to sum up, any blame to be attached to our diplomacy falls not on the men but the Government.

—*Horse and Hound*, London

So argues a London editor who holds that liberal publicists obscure the nation's real aims

Britain's Left Is Defeatist

By F. A. VOIGT

The Nineteenth Century and After, London Independent Monthly

MAHAN, in his *Life of Nelson*, states that of the 2,600 naval reserves, known as "Sea Fencibles," who were called up when a French invasion seemed imminent, only 385 responded to the call, although Nelson had made it quite clear that they were absolutely needed at once and that they could return to their homes as soon as the danger was over. These men were, according to Mahan, "exempted from impressment upon the understanding that they would come forward for coast defense, in case of threatened invasion." Nelson's acid comment on the poor response they made to his urgent call was: "They are no more willing to give up their occupations than their superiors."

It would seem to us now that although England was fighting for her life in Nelson's day as she is today, her people are much more uniformly

and passionately aware of her need than they were then. And yet, if we consider those who by virtue of their literary gifts are called upon to guide the public by expounding the nature of the conflict and to express national aims and ideals for the benefit of their own and subsequent generations, we shall find unsurpassed persuasiveness, lucidity, depth and grandeur amongst the writers of those days and unsurpassable unpersuasiveness, confusion, superficiality and pettiness amongst the writers of today. Socialism and internationalism are very vocal—patriotism is almost silent.

It would seem to be certain that changes of a socialistic character will come about, whether for good or evil, in this and other countries, although it seems equally certain that the spell cast by the word socialism and by Socialist slogans has been broken, and that socialism is no longer the passion-

ate aspiration it was once, the dream of a new Heaven upon the old Earth, but a matter of purely pragmatic policy.

We find today's political literature shallow, ill-informed, ill-considered, and, in its effect, defeatist, as we shall try to show. There are exceptions—the excellent *Oxford Pamphlets*, for example, and Professor E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years of Crisis*. It is highly characteristic of our day that a book, as full as this one is, of knowledge, insight, and mature political wisdom, should be the object of so much uncomprehending criticism and misrepresentation.

Most of the authors we have under consideration are middle-aged. Some have reached old age. The youngest, Sir Richard Acland, was born in 1906, Professor Laski was born in 1893, Sir Norman Angell in 1874, Mr. H. G. Wells in 1866. It is, perhaps, of some significance that, apart from Sir Richard Acland, who was then barely breeched, none of these appear to have undergone any mental development at all since the end of the last war. Sir Norman Angell, in *Why Freedom Matters*, adds nothing of interest to what he has written many times before. Professor Laski, who wrote some good books once, spins out monotonous platitudes about freedom, democracy and that prospective "European revolution" which has become so fashionable. Mr. H. G. Wells seems to have lost the great gift he once had for the vivid portrayal of incident and character and has developed an apparently irrepressible loquacity. All these gentlemen write far too much. And their

style fits the substance—if anything so tenuous can be called a substance: there was never English prose as insipid and undistinguished as theirs.

It is one of the strangest phenomena of our own day that youth and old age are being robbed of their own—youth in the "totalitarian" states, and old age in the materialist democracies. Young people in Germany and in Russia tend to be without shyness, introspection, without generous ardor. They are neither sad nor gay, and do not day-dream. They are often fanatical, doctrinaire and have the fixed seriousness of the prematurely old. "Totalitarian" systems claim to be youthful precisely because they are destructive of youthfulness. This work of destruction is the most frightful they have accomplished—it is a kind of murder, the murder of young people who yet go on living. From this murder, which is worse than physical homicide, all their other murderous works proceed.

THE fictitious tolerance that prevails where strong convictions have vanished, removes the challenge and the rivalries that will either impose upon the maturing spirit a dignified silence and renunciation, or will press from it that purified essence which is genius itself and, when distilled in verse or prose, becomes an imperishable part of the national heritage. In materialist democracies, as in "totalitarian" states, life is robbed of its significance because it becomes an end in itself. Men always have aspired and always will aspire, in varying degrees, to freedom and equality. But the two go ill together—indeed, they are in perma-

ment conflict. Complete freedom would exclude equality. Complete equality is possible only under absolute despotism. There is more freedom and less equality in England than in Germany. The Germans have exchanged the freedom of the Republic for the relative



—Punch, London

equality of the Third Realm. There is little evidence that they regret the change.

The writers we are now considering, regard freedom and equality as desirable, indeed as more desirable than anything else. But none of them appear to be aware of the immense dangers inherent in freedom and equality, and in their powerful and often irresistible trend towards self- and mutual destruction, though it is difficult to believe that Professor Laski, who has some knowledge of history, can really be as unaware of these things as his more recent writings suggest. Perhaps he is trying to be "popular" in the sense that, by reducing problems to their simplest terms, he hopes to make himself understood to a large public. But "popular" writing, like *Where Do*

We Go From Here? can do no good, indeed it can only do harm, in so far as it misguides instead of guiding. It is meant, no doubt sincerely, to enlighten. But it does nothing of the sort. All the writers we are considering are obscurantists. They mention many problems—war and peace, armaments and disarmament, economic planning, national sovereignty and the like. But they propose solutions so easy that the problems are problems no longer. All these authors in effect deny the existence of the problematic as such. They will not allow that anything is insoluble. Sir Norman Angell calls those who maintain that there are limits to human endeavor and that an ideal world is unattainable "nihilists"—an abuse of language that is highly characteristic of his nebulous mind. He is particularly severe in his condemnation of Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the profoundest thinkers of our day. To guide and enlighten the public, it would be necessary to be quite explicit about the seriousness of the big problems of our day, about their extreme intractability, of the uncontrollable nature of oncoming events, of the hazards of political and economic prophecy. There is no insurance against fate—but insurance against fate is precisely what these authors offer. They do so with complete cocksureness and imply that those who differ from them cannot possibly be disinterested.

As a matter of fact, the public to whom they address themselves has quite a shrewd sense of these matters. It has, on the whole, remained uncorrupted by "popular" books. The al-

lurement of simple solutions, that are not solutions at all, is one of the principal causes of modern mass-movements, of fascism and national socialism, as well as of marxism and of the utopian pacifism which has done so much to bring the Second World War about. The authors we are considering share the responsibility for the war, seeing that they have been amongst the promoters of utopian pacifism which, through disarmament and "collective security," helped to reduce the armed preponderance of the victors over the vanquished in the last war and so enabled the Germans to achieve the ascendancy they needed to attempt the conquest of Europe. All the authors in question have been consistently wrong about international affairs ever since the peace that ended the First World War, if not longer. But nowhere is there a sign that they themselves are aware of this. Indeed, the complacent assumption that they have always been right, and are right still, pervades their books. They assign the blame for the disasters of our age to various abstractions—to reaction, to capitalism, to "privilege," to belief in national sovereignty and so on. And yet it is *their* world that is in ruins. All *they* stood for has been defeated. But they can see no flaw in what they stood for and still stand for, although the completeness of the defeat is sure evidence of a fatal, a fundamental, flaw. They appear to have had no heart-searchings, no genuine doubt, and have, consequently, undergone no inner change. But the world has changed and will go on changing, so that their writings have an ever-growing remoteness and

are losing even the most distant relationship with any recognizable reality.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in *The Common Sense of War and Peace* (we note the arrogance of the title) and other recent writings by Mr. H. G. Wells. This book is a typical product of the materialist democracy in which human life loses its meaning. Except as part of a divinely appointed order, life cannot have a meaning. And when life has no meaning, old age acquires a tragic emptiness, for it is the approaching end of everything. Life, especially when it has been fortunate and attended with much success, becomes, in retrospect, a kind of holiday that is almost over—and there will never be another. Old age cannot come into its own. Its mellowness and serenity are troubled by hopeless attachment to the fugitive past, an attachment that grows more and more



—Punch, London

hopeless with the accelerating passage of time. Youth may at least seem to have a meaning even apart from a divinely appointed order, a meaning derived from the life that stretches out

ahead, whereas old age cannot. In the setting of a divinely appointed order, life acquires a significance that deepens with advancing age. In the "totalitarian" states the young have no youth, but only a false maturity—in the materialistic democracies old age is without the fullness of maturity and clings to a distressful pseudo-youthfulness. To stop writing is always possible, but the urge to write is hard to resist when writing becomes like a drug to deaden the sense of fugitive time.

IT MIGHT be supposed that materialists might also be realists, that they might at least show some pragmatic knowledge and insight. But they are all idealists in so far as they project into space, as it were, the image of an ideal world. Plato's *Republic*, like Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, has a permanent value, not only because of its imaginative and literary quality, but also because it provides an *apparatus criticus* by which policies, governments and morals can be judged. Plato was eminently realistic, as indeed all the great idealists have been. Mr. Wells' *Modern Utopia*, which was published several years before the First World War, still has a certain interest as a shrewd and rather fresh, even if superficial, commentary on life. But his recent utopias, whether explicit, as in the *Shape of Things to Come*, or implied, as in *The Common Sense of War and Peace*, have no interest whatever. The same is true of the utopias implied in the other writings under consideration. The answer to Professor Laski's *Where Do We Go From Here?* is, "To Utopia!" But Professor Laski's *Utopia*,

like all the others, is flat, colorless, unbeautiful, and devoid of both imaginative and pragmatic insight. In his essay "The Need for a European Revolution," which he has contributed to a composite volume entitled *Programme for Victory*, he appears to be wholly unaware of the terrific implications of his theme. He shows no insight whatever into the revolutionary movements of our day: for example, he writes that "the essence of fascism, whether in its German or its Italian form, is the use of the outlaw by privilege to defend itself against the demand of the masses for justice." Fascism "in its German form," that is to say, national socialism, is precisely what Professor Laski thinks it is not. It is itself "the demand of the masses for justice." A peculiar sort of justice, certainly, and productive of appalling injustice, but "the masses" are not always reasonable in their demands, their conceptions of justice are sometimes primitive, and when they resort to action they often achieve the opposite of what they wanted to achieve. Professor Laski has the idealized notion of "the masses" that is conventional amongst those who belong to the political Left. The "worker" is an almost god-like being, while "the masses," made up of "workers," are inherently righteous. If they go wrong, it is because they have been misled or "betrayed" by the agents or allies of "privilege" or capital (according to the literature of the extreme Left, especially of the Communists, the "working man" is represented as a sort of god, but is more like a complete imbecile, in so far as he has allowed him-

self to be misled and betrayed since the beginning of history).

Even if it is not conceded that the German "masses" wanted "justice," no honest observer will deny that national socialism was and still is a genuine mass-movement, and one of the biggest that ever existed—the Bolsheviks were a small minority when they came into power, whereas the National Socialists had a prodigious popular backing. But it does not suit Professor Laski and others of the Left to treat national socialism as a genuine mass-movement, though they cannot deny its magnitude, for to do so would be to impugn the inherent righteousness of the masses. It becomes necessary, in contradiction with all the evidence, to create the myth of "privilege" or of "capital" which, as it were, hired National Socialist gangsters to prevent the rise of the genuine masses. But the fact is that the "capitalists" who supported national socialism during its rise to power were rare exceptions. The movement did not depend on their money but on the contributions paid by its numerous members, on the sums collected at meetings, and on the sale of newspapers, books and pamphlets. Nowhere is the myth stated with cruder ignorance than by Sir Richard Acland in *Unser Kampf*. "In Germany," he writes, "the big industrialists financed the Nazis into power to beat down the workers' standards of living." Sir Richard also repeats another myth that finds favor amongst simpletons of the Left, namely that the German industrialists wanted war. "Hitler prepared for war not only because it was in his nature, but also because it was

necessary for his backers." We invite Sir Richard to name one leading industrialist who wanted the war. The same myth is repeated with regard to the last war. Professor Laski writes that it was "a struggle for markets between the rising power of Germany and allied empires threatened by German economic conditions." The financial and industrial leaders in all countries were, for the most part, against the war. The "allied empires" were not "threatened by German economic conditions"—indeed they were not threatened at all. Economic, financial and imperialistic motives were no more than very subsidiary causes of the war.

It was only when the success of the National Socialists was as good as certain that large numbers of "capitalists" went over to them. National socialism was not only a mass-movement, it was also a revolutionary movement and not a device to keep the revolutionary masses down. Indeed, there were no "revolutionary masses" in Germany outside the ranks of national socialism. What Professor Laski, Sir Richard Acland and others of the Left have to say on this subject is nothing but shallow propaganda.

IN *Where Do We Go From Here?*

Professor Laski repeats another commonly accepted error, namely that Hitler's chief supporters came from the ranks of the unemployed. Hitler never won the allegiance of industrial labor during his rise to power. Unemployment helped him very little—it greatly helped the Communists. It is true that the Communists, in their turn, helped

him by splitting the Left and, later on, by going over to the National Socialist party in considerable numbers, so that in the end he did profit by unemployment. But it is quite untrue to say, as Professor Laski does, that "the mass support" Hitler "gained in the economic crisis came, above all, from the unemployed."

Professor Laski accepts the view, which is generally accepted by the Left, about the "betrayal" of Czecho-Slovakia. Great Britain and France, so he declares, compelled her to surrender "in disregard of solemn engagements." This is not true of Great Britain. France had a treaty of mutual assistance with Czecho-Slovakia, Great Britain had none. In *Where Do We Go From Here?* he gives the conventional Socialist view of relations between England and Russia. It is quite evident that he never seriously studied the subject, that he never went to the trouble of following events closely, day by day, and sometimes hour by hour, consulting documents, sifting the evidence, obtaining information from experts, revising judgments, analyzing rumors and accounting for new situations as they arise. Such work is the routine of every conscientious political journalist. Professor Laski has not done it. He has not even drawn on the reports and articles of those who have. In his historical books he has often shown a scholar's regard for accuracy. In writing about the events of his own day he is strangely indifferent to accuracy—it is perhaps difficult to be prejudiced, contemporary and accurate. His work has become little more than common propaganda. He finds it

"difficult to believe" in the "sincerity" of the British and French Governments when they tried to conclude a pact with Russia in 1939. No amount of "sincerity" could have produced the desired pact, and Professor Laski produces no evidence of what he calls "insincerity." He finds it "difficult to believe" them sincere because he does not want to.

ONE might be disposed to think that, after all, if people want to read this stuff, what does it matter? These books are harmless, even if worthless. That is not so. There is one matter that calls for special attention: namely, what the authors have to say about war aims and about the peace that must follow the war. On this matter they are in substantial agreement with one another. Their views are shared by many other authors and not a few Members of Parliament, though we are convinced that they are not shared by the English people as a whole. Authors who are on the political Left are much more numerous and more voluble than authors who are on the Right, at least when international affairs are their subject. There is so much open or latent defeatism amongst them that the Right appears to be almost entirely free from it by comparison. Defeatism is the child of the internationalism and of the "appeasement" that did so much to bring the war about. After all, the Conservatives were in office, so that upon them the main responsibility for "appeasement" falls, whereas Labor, in opposition, was the chief exponent of internationalism.

All the authors we have been con-

sidering, supported one of the two policies that helped to bring on the war, and opposed the one policy that could have averted it. And they have learnt absolutely nothing, but are doing all they can to promote a policy that will, if it prevails, mean that the war will be lost in spite of victory in the field. If they have their way, England and the Empire will lose the peace, even if the Imperial forces win the war, just as the peace between the First and Second World Wars was lost, thanks, very largely, to the policy supported by these authors during that period. We cannot dismiss them as being harmless.

We do not suggest that the Right is free from defeatism merely because it is less articulate. That the Conservative, Liberal and Labor members of the Government are determined to win the war, we do not doubt. But the fact remains that a very considerable body of literature associated with the Left is promoting what is, in its ultimate consequences, defeat. That there is little or no literature of this kind associated with the Right is to the honor of Conservative England. At the same time, there is in high society—and especially amongst those who fear the loss of their wealth by taxation or social change—a good deal of latent defeatism which may become very dangerous indeed as the war grows more and more destructive and peace remains out of sight. Lord Rat and Lady Skunk, who were so conspicuous in the days of “appeasement,” have retired to their holes, but they still exist, and will emerge again if they are allowed to.

As for the spirit of the British people, there is no uncertainty about it. It is the spirit of combat, accompanied by loathing of the war but animated by a determination that grows stronger as the war goes on, a determination to defeat the enemy and impose terms of peace that will make it impossible to wage war again. But the making of peace is a tricky business and it is essential that the utmost vigilance should be exercised, so that Great Britain and the Empire are not cheated out of the peace they will have won at the cost of so much sorrow and sacrifice.

WHAT are the people of England fighting for? For nothing other than the notions entertained by Sir Norman Angell and his fellow authors—at least according to these authors. That the English are fighting for England never once occurs to them. The English are not fighting for abstractions. Nor are they fighting for the prevalent political system, however well it may suit them, any more than Drake, Hawkins, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Philip Sidney fought for the political system of their day, which happened to be a despotism. It is said that nationalism is the product of the French Revolution. It may be so, but patriotism is a little older. Æschylus proclaimed the war aims of his fellow-countrymen who fought at Salamis:

“Go to it, sons of Greece! Free your native land. . . . You are fighting for your all!”

This is the war aim of the English, to free their native land. They, too, are fighting for their all. And they know it.

Straws in the Gale

The Spanish Gentleman

The other side the Pyrenees
Where, leagued with all our enemies,
Franco exterminates at ease
The "Red" Republican,
His Fascist régime we support
For General Franco is a sport,
A *caballero*, or for short,
A Spanish gentleman.

True, Spain was to the Axis sold,
There Nazi murder-planes patrolled
And there, the world need not be told,
Italians also ran,
But though some Spaniards wish us ill,
We cultivate New Spain's goodwill
The Generalissimo is still
A Spanish gentleman.

The swastika above Tangier
Just hoisted with a Spanish cheer
Does not officially appear
An anti-British plan,
Though when we ask what it may mean
(Arriving later on the scene)
The answer is a tangerine
From the Spanish Gentleman.

We do not care to make a fuss
With someone who is "one of us,"
So fresh assistance we discuss
And joint proposals scan. . . .
But while some circles still acclaim
That hoary diplomatic game,
Most Britons have another name
For the Spanish gentleman.

—"Sagittarius" in the
New Statesman and Nation

Piscatory D.T.'s

My friend Lou is crazy about fishing.
So you can imagine how disappointed he
was when one day he came to his favor-
ite brook and found that he had forgotten
his bait. But looking around, he discovered
a snake with a frog in its mouth. Quickly

he took the prey from the snake's mouth
to use it as bait. The snake looked so down-
hearted when robbed of its dinner that
Lou felt sorry for the animal. He opened
his lunch-box, took out a black bottle and
gave the snake a drink of whiskey.

The snake disappeared and Lou cast his
rod. Fifteen minutes later, he felt a nudge
against his leg. He looked down and saw
the same snake. The animal had another
frog in its mouth and looked up to Lou,
hopefully.

—*Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, Batavia

Must Be Exaggerated

An American correspondent recently re-
turned from Italy reports that several hun-
dred Italians are still loyal to Mussolini.
Few of us realized that Mussolini had such
a large family.

—*Saturday Night*, Toronto

Preferred Treatment

Four-room bungalows costing about
£130 each are to be proposed as temporary
homes for bombed-out people. As these
bungalows would not be a satisfactory
form of housing in a post-war era, it will
be suggested that they be utilized for old-
age pensioners after the war.

—*Daily Mirror*, London

Add War Aims

When she visited Harrow School yes-
terday Queen Geraldine of Albania was
welcomed to "this great fortress island
of Britain—and to Harrow." Mr. Price-
Hodges (Head Master of Buckingham Col-
lege, Harrow) said: "When the hour comes
and you are again in Albania may we
hope that you will take with you the greet-
ings of British schoolboys to schoolboys
there."

—*Manchester Guardian*

Feline Pluralist

I have just heard of a disgraceful case of pluralism in the Government service. It appears that a large black cat which frequented a Home Guard post not far from the Admiralty was adopted by the H.G. personnel manning the post. It was finally placed on the payroll, receiving an allowance of half a pint of milk daily from the platoon fund.

Then it was discovered that while in receipt of these emoluments from the War Office the cat was also on the strength of the Royal Navy. It was, in fact, the official Admiralty cat, drawing pay and allowances for milk and cat's meat of 1s 6d a week.

The allowance used to be only 1s. Some time ago it was raised to meet the increased cost of living, though not without controversy.

—Lord Peterborough in the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*, London

More War Aims

I believe I am correct in saying that, with the exception of Lord Ilchester, not one member of the Jockey Club, nor one leading owner has come into the open and stated boldly that the continuance of racing is a matter of national importance, and to give up racing would be a national disaster. Lord Harewood, I know, has done valuable work and has not spared himself, and I believe that but for him and Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labor, there would have been no racing at all after the Spring of last year.

—Hon. George Lambton in *Country Life*, London

Scriptural Blitzkrieg

But the Church has apparently been shaken by the so-called "Higher Criticism" of the Bible, launched by German scholars. It might well be called the first German offensive.

—Letter in the *Oxford Mail*, England

Courtesy M.G.M.?

The controversy over the B.B.C. signal has again arisen. Why not have the roar

of a lion? I should imagine this is universally known and popular.

—Letter to the *News Chronicle*, London

Not Even That

"What," asks a contemporary, "is Italy's place in the conflict?" I understand she is lending Germany all aid short of war.

—"Dogberry" in the *News Chronicle*, London

Hustle

The visiting American technical man finds difficulty in establishing quick and effective contact with the operative section of the appropriate department in Whitehall for obtaining action in a given sphere of the war effort.—*Daily Telegraph*

Mr. X, I'm delighted to meet you,
You bring timely assistance indeed,
But Lord Y could not stay in to greet you
And I can't tell you how to proceed.
For material leased, loaned and rented
We have no authority here
Your inquiries should not be presented
Till you find the appropriate sphere.

We will work for full co-ordination,
But your Bill was so suddenly signed
That for maximum implementation
Our machinery is somewhat behind.
Great Britain's own wartime production
We've had too little time to prepare,
So we're switched to post-war reconstruction

And today my Chief's taking the Chair.

I've heard that a branch was deputed
To deal with American aid,
But the office has been devoluted
And liaison has still to be made.
Your contact will soon be effected
With an operative section no doubt,
And I'm trying to get you connected
But everyone seems to be out.

In regard to the present position
I'm afraid that I can't help you much;
If you cable our Purchasing Mission
I am sure they will put you in touch.
Lord Y will regret that he missed you
When he hears in due course of your call.
And I'm sorry I cannot assist you
But we're busy today in Whitehall.

—"Fiddlestick" in *Time and Tide*, London

Clemenceau, Poincaré and Joffre
were all critical of his abilities

Pétain — Judged by His Peers

THE GENERAL'S DILEMMA

By JEAN LE BRET

Le Jour, Montreal Liberal French-Language Daily

(Editor's Note: In recent weeks, criticism of Marshal Pétain and his policies has become voluble. He has been under the fire of Berlin, and that of the Nazi-dominated newspapers in Paris, which was to be expected, but he is now attacked violently by the scattered "free French" communities where hitherto the opinion had been heard that Marshal Pétain, whatever his faults, was doing his best in a difficult situation. To escape the charge of personal bias, the author of the following article, long a bitter critic of the Vichy Chief of State, has collected here the opinions of Pétain held by some eminent Frenchmen in the past.)

AN OPINION expressed by Marshal Jacques-Joseph-Césaire Joffre:

"The firm attitude of General Foch,

who had been summoned to General Headquarters, at first calmed the excessive fears that were felt, but General Pétain [then defending Verdun] again began to alarm everyone." (From *Mémoires du Maréchal Joffre*, page 222.)

"... this conversation made me fear that Pétain had allowed himself to be over-awed by the enemy, and I was compelled at this time [June 26, 1916, during the Verdun defense] to remind him that he must continue an unflinching resistance along the right bank of the Meuse, and not permit himself to be frightened by the risk of eventually losing some equipment." (*Ibid.*, page 227.)

"And then Pétain who always, perhaps sometimes with reason, looks upon the dark side of things, and is indifferent to the brighter side, gave

some curious orders. He acted upon the worst hypothesis, and he proposed withdrawals that were extremely dangerous to suggest to his troops." (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, page 92.)

"General Pétain took command of the Army of the Center on May 2 [1916]. On July 3, I went up to see him at Bar-le-Duc, the headquarters of the French Second Army. During my tour of inspection I was forcibly impressed with his pessimism, and later I had corroboration of this mental attitude of his." (*Ibid.*, page 216.)

Opinions expressed by Raymond Poincaré, President of France during 1913-20 and Premier during 1922-24 and 1926-28:

"Clemenceau arrived [November 4, 1917]. Very cordial conversation with him. He spoke about Pétain whom he judges with friendly discernment: 'the best of our chiefs, although with a certain inclination to indulgence and camaraderie, and sometimes given to false ideas and also inclined to deplorable expressions of pessimism and discouragement.'" (From *Au service de la France*, page 367.)

"... Clemenceau, whom I encountered when inspecting the latest spot to be struck by shrapnel, told me he had gone to see Pétain in Compiègne [March 1918]. He holds against Pétain the latter's exaggerated pessimism. 'Can you conceive of this?' the Tiger asked me. 'That Pétain told me, the Premier of France, that if the French are defeated, we must attribute catastrophe to the British?'" (*Ibid.*, page 86.)

"Clemenceau took me aside [March

26, 1918] and said: 'Pétain is annoying and provoking in his pessimism. Can you imagine, for instance, his telling me that the Germans would beat the British armies in open battle, and that afterward the Boche would overwhelm the French? Should a general speak such words, or even think them?'"

"... Milner speaks to me about Pétain without enthusiasm [March 26, 1918]. He is by no means willing to have Douglas Haig (British Commander-in-Chief) subordinate to him. He is far more favorably disposed to Foch than to Pétain, and believes it would be of great advantage to have Foch undertake the task of co-ordinating the movements of the Allied armies." (*Ibid.*, page 89.) "... Clemenceau called a ministerial cabinet council at eleven o'clock, summoning all the under-secretaries of state. Clementel reported to me that he had been told by Joffre that 'although I am not admitted into the inner circle, I see and know enough to understand that Pétain has committed the same errors as those he made when he asked to abandon Verdun to the enemy. The fact is that the present situation can be saved, if one seriously wants it saved.'" (*Ibid.*, page 91.)

"... Loucheur [then Minister of War] is very dissatisfied with Pétain whom he considers a dyed-in-the-wool defeatist and who told him, Loucheur, a few days ago, 'We must start peace negotiations.' When the Minister repeated this to Foch, the latter said, 'to ask peace would be insanity. We have known much more perilous moments than the present one in the past

terrible months.' " (*Ibid.*, page 93.)

" . . . Joffre says Pétain lacks character. . . . Foch is confident and he hopes that later we will be able to take the offensive. He remarks that his relations with Pétain are good—that in a secondary role (Pétain was then Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front), as a man to transmit orders, he would be perfect. But because he shirks responsibility, he is not qualified to serve as a commander-in-chief. (*Ibid.*, page 123.)

"When Foch came to Paris [June 1917], I got in touch with Pétain in an effort to get him to understand my ideas more clearly. I also arranged a meeting between him and Weygand, in the event that it might be necessary for the two men to work together. Pétain needs to be encouraged; I have repeated to him that I take all responsibilities. [But] he wants further to shorten the front." (*Ibid.*, page 222.)

Opinions expressed by Georges Clemenceau, as related by M. Martet in *The Tiger*:

"At Doullens, I was in the middle between two men. One of them told me that we were cooked, and the other paced up and down like an insane man and wanted to fight. I said to myself—let's try Foch; at least with him, we would perish with a rifle in our hand. And so I dropped that very sensible man, Pétain, who was so full of good intentions, and I chose that insane man whom we know as Foch. It was that lunatic who pulled us out of the mire."

" . . . During this [post-war] period, while Germany is preparing, what does the French army do? It disarms. The

High Command has apparently abdicated. It has forgotten that the indispensable quality of a real leader is character. Even in the face of constant violations of the Versailles Treaty, scarcely any generals have lodged serious protests. After the war, and after years of experience acquired at such cost, the age limit of our generals was set at sixty-one. Later it was extended to sixty-two, sixty-six and, finally, to seventy. For this abdication of conscience, some day the nation will pay very dearly." (From Clemenceau's *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, page 301.)

Views expressed by André Chéradame, French publicist and historian:

"After the war, when I saw that the politicians were driving France toward disaster, I tried to induce Marshal Pétain, with the authority attached to his name, to intervene publicly. My last overture in this direction occurred in December 1930, at the Marshal's office on the Boulevard des Invalides, the bureau of the Vice President of the Superior War Council, the post he held.

"At my suggestion that he intervene, he said to me, 'Why, my dear friend, they could cut me off the payroll.' . . . This answer crushed me.

In *Defense of the Americas* the foregoing author remarks:

"The Canadians as well as all the Americans of the various States in the New World, those who love and admire France, should know this: that the French people have not been vanquished, that they have been betrayed. Accordingly, France is entitled to all

the brotherly pity of the Americans for her infinite suffering and the atrocious slavery to which she is now subjected."

M. Chéradame asks, by whom has France been betrayed? And he answers as follows:

"On May 18, 1940, when the Germans were approaching Paris, Paul Reynaud reorganized his cabinet and brought in Pétain as Vice-Premier. To Pétain at this time I twice sent energetic protests against the abominable presence in France of some 200,000 Italians, comprising a fifth column whose members were free to continue their dangerous espionage. I have proof that those protests reached Marshal Pétain. But one fact is indisputable. Between May 18 and June 10, the last the date Mussolini deemed the time ripe to declare war on France, Pétain allowed Italian spies to move freely all over France. This cannot be denied. This was equivalent to stabbing French soldiers in the back."

And so one sees clearly the real outlines of Pétain, not as sketched in the propaganda of Goebbels and accepted by the ignorant. Here one may see Pé-

tain the pessimist, the defeatist, the weak, the "Hero of Verdun" who had wanted to relinquish his post, a Pétain who even at that time was anti-British, and who preferred the Germans. In mid-war he was in a nervous state over his longing for abandonment and an armistice; he shirked responsibility and was incapable of serving as a commander-in-chief. One recognizes in the foregoing extracts that, as far back as a quarter century ago, Pétain lacked character. One sees a Pétain venal enough to prefer his job and the personal profit emanating from it, to his military obligations, among which was the duty to denounce the insufficiency of our armaments and to remedy this lack.

Yet this old man is considered by some a symbol of authority! This Simple Simon does not realize that his famed "authority" will collapse when, as is inevitable, Hitler attacks his Church. . . . We are now at war, and Canadians are risking their lives. I ask, can one support de Gaulle and France at the same time that one upholds Pétain and the capitulation that Vichy implies?

—AND HIS OWN VIEW

By MARSHAL PHILIPPE PÉTAİN

Revue Universelle, Pro-Monarchist Fortnightly, Vichy

INDIVIDUALISM inevitably leads to anarchy.

In the misfortune that befell the Fatherland, every one of us has come to realize that there is no such thing as the individual's destiny and that

Frenchmen only exist for France, the State.

Dispossessed of their homes, wandering far afield, removed from their work benches, reduced to the penury of nomads, millions of our compatri-

ots at last have learned through cruel experience that man, when he moves as an individual unit, is the most miserable of creatures.

In this shipwreck of the security and the safeguards that once were familiar to us, the homeless among us have sought help from their native villages and from their families. In effect, they looked to the remnants of the nation for succor and relief. But they have learned that when the individual seeks to sever himself from the society which was his mother, he withers and dies without justifying himself.

In France, this cult of individualism had come to graft itself on our desire for independence, and it transformed a positive characteristic of us Frenchmen into a grave weakness. It was not understood that independence is compatible with discipline, but individualism leads to anarchy for which the only poor remedy is socialism. But two conflicting fallacies, accepted in turn, do not make a truth.

Our intention is to reconstruct, and the prerequisite to reconstruction is to root out this individualism, which destroys the family by loosening or breaking its bonds; this same individualism, moreover, destroys labor for

whom it proclaims the right to laziness and, finally, it destroys the Fatherland whose unity it endangers if it does not destroy it.

Systematically opposed to all social groups in which the human personality has its basis, individualism has never displayed any creativeness. And it must be obvious that throughout those eras of history when individualism was dominant, the emergence of gifted individuals was rare.

The individual must look to society to guarantee his rights. Let us have a solid society in which the fundamental social unit, the family, is the strongest; the family will serve as bulwark for the religious, domestic and educational rights of the individual.

But, above all, let us have a strong state. In that state, public order will have us as Protector, and contradictory laws will be prevented from turning France into another battlefield. In such a society, everyone would discharge his duty to the state, never losing sight of the grandeur and nobility of the collective enterprise to which he contributes. The humblest service will satisfy the human heart if that service can be inscribed upon a vast monument.

Quislings Uncovered

Names and addresses of local spies and Quislings in German-occupied countries are being given in foreign-language broadcasts from the B.B.C.—with devastating consequences. Reports have reached London, particularly from Czecho-Slovakia, that several have committed suicide. Activities of these spies are given to the B.B.C. by the secret services of Allied Governments in London.

—*Daily Sketch*, London

One Filipino view is that they must be loyal to the U. S., whatever the perils of independence

The Philippines in World War II

By CARLOS P. ROMULO

Philippines Herald, Nationalist Daily, Manila

I AIM briefly to consider certain aspects of the Far Eastern crisis that should concern the people of the Philippines because of their explosive character and dramatic possibilities.

There are a few facts that we should first try to grasp. First, that the Far Eastern crisis is neither a new nor a sudden development, since its roots may be said to go as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century when Japan began to rise as a modern power, and since furthermore the present crisis is plainly the result of various preceding crises arising and converging into a climax. Second, that the Far Eastern crisis does not stand alone by itself, isolated from the larger world conflict of which it is only a part, but that together with the European war it will determine the course of human history and civilization in the next thousand years. Finally, that the

threads of our destiny as a people are involved in the mighty Far Eastern tangle of conflicting motives and ambitions, and that by reason of our geographical position, if nothing else, it is our duty to be alert to every development in the crisis and to adopt every measure that the facts may require at any given moment.

Remembering always that China is the center around which the Far Eastern crisis has revolved for a long time, the alignment of the forces involved, actually or potentially, in the great conflict of Asia may be reduced to the following: first, the Axis Powers represented by Japan which are anxious to extend to Asia their common concept of a so-called New World Order; second, the Anglo-American Entente which is determined to preserve the *status quo* and to check the advance of Japanese imperialism at the expense of Britain, America and their

logical allies; and third, the Soviet Union, so far neutral, which is inclined to keep her own counsel, and has shown no design except to defend her borders in Asia and possibly to continue assisting the legitimate government of China in its resistance to Japan.

These are the three principal forces involved in the Far Eastern crisis that today threaten to collide at any moment. Thus dramatically arrayed against each other, they would seem to account for every factor in the situation worthy of mention. But they do not account for all the factors at work. Excluded from the computation is the force of the colonial countries and peoples over which the great imperialist powers, jealous of each other, are even now upon the verge of quarreling.

The Filipinos belong to this fourth unmentioned and indefinite force. It is highly important that they realize this, for only if they know where they stand and to what group or side they belong can they lend their strength towards the achievement of genuine freedom and true greatness by the peoples of Asia. If they remember always that they are probably the first Asiatic nation to enjoy not merely a degree of national independence but the blessings of democracy as well, they cannot then ignore the significance of the role that they will play in the ultimate enthronement of liberty among the peoples of Asia.

THE Far Eastern crisis is one of imperialism in two senses. On the one hand, it is a struggle between the imperialistic powers themselves. On the

other hand, it is also a struggle between the imperialistic powers and the inhabitants of the subject colonies. These are the two aspects of the crisis, and to be able to understand it properly, we must view the entire situation with these aspects in mind.

The principal protagonists in the current Far Eastern drama are the United States and Japan. The conflict between the policies of these two countries respecting the Far East is so fundamental that it will not easily yield to a peaceful and permanent solution. Japan has proclaimed that she is determined to uphold what she calls the "New Order in East Asia," by which is meant, a political and economic organization including all the countries in the Far East over which she believes she has the right to preside as the most powerful Asiatic power today. On the other hand, the principal tenet of American foreign policy in the Far East is the maintenance of the *status quo*, the non-recognition of the fruits of aggression, and the observance of the Open Door in China.

Despite the hopes that have been expressed by leading statesmen of both countries that the Japanese and American points of view may in some way be reconciled, the prospects of such a reconciliation are not at present bright. Yet the responsible leaders of both countries realize and have admitted that a war between Japan and the United States would only injure the interests of both, and result in the complete elimination of one or the other from the Far Eastern field as a power to be reckoned with. They realize also that through such a conflict

they will play into the hands of the only one nation that will profit from the fatal injuries of either or both, which is the Soviet Union. From the purely selfish point of view, they must also see (the Japanese more than the Americans), that when two great powers fight, they do not only injure each other directly but they also give a chance to the subject peoples under them to declare themselves free from the imperial yoke.

A WAR between Japan and the United States may, however, be postponed for some time, for neither is too anxious to get in trouble right now: Japan, because the inconclusive character of the war in China prevents her from embarking in full force upon a new and more difficult adventure; and the United States, because the two-ocean navy, the enlarged air-force, and the conscripted army that her experts believe to be necessary in order to meet simultaneous threats from across the Pacific and the Atlantic, will not be anywhere near ready before 1942 or 1943.

But big things can grow out of little things, and by reason of the explosive character of the international atmosphere in the Far East today, one little match-flame may be all that is necessary to set the fuse of war on fire. The danger of a larger war in the Far East than is being fought today—of a war, specifically, that may involve the Philippines—is heightened by the fact that developments here are tied up with those in Europe so intimately that they may almost be said to be synchronously related.

Thus, if the Axis Powers should win the war in Europe, it is almost certain that Japan will strike immediately and strike hard in the Far East. But if the Axis loses prestige, then Japan will avoid—as she has avoided during the past few months except for the landing of troops in Indo-China, a colony of defeated France—positive acts that may bring her into direct conflict with either Britain or the United States or both.

If Japanese policy is wholly dependent upon the fortunes of war in Europe and upon the effect of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact, what is there to be said definitely of the attitude of the Soviet Union? What has long been called the “Russian Enigma” is today an enigma still, not less dark or ominous than before. All that the world can feel certain about the Soviet Union is that she will do anything—sign any treaty or ally with any country—that promises to give her a certain measurable benefit or advantage. Knowing that she holds a key position in both Europe and Asia, she is apparently determined to make use of that position for purposes of international blackmail against both sides on both continents.

In view of this massing and disposition of forces, what are we in the Philippines to do? The Philippines belong to what I have already called the “fourth indefinite force” at work in the Far East. We belong, in other words, to that vast group of nations—nearly six hundred millions in all—inhabiting India, Malaysia, the East Indies, Korea, Formosa and the Philippines. We are the forgotten factor in

the present crisis and in the war that may soon break in this part of the world. Racially and geographically, as well as by reason of our common political aspirations, we are morally united with them.

It is a fortunate circumstance that most of these millions who now inhabit the British, Dutch, French, and American colonies in the Far East owe allegiance to powers that are virtually allies in the European War. If certain guarantees can be given to the peoples of these colonies that they will enjoy, after the war is over, an increasing measure of liberty for themselves, then the bases of the struggle will not be conflicting nor the motives mixed.

The liberation of colonial peoples must be a part of the war aims of the democratic countries that are resisting the totalitarian powers. For if these countries refuse to include this as part of their program, then their claim that they are fighting to preserve human freedom and the democratic way of life for all mankind is meaningless and without content. But if they do include this as part of their program, then indeed all these numerous millions of subject peoples will have cause to make the battle of Britain and Holland and Free France and America their own. They will fight side by side with their present rulers because in the triumph of their cause they see the lineaments of their own freedom boldly etched.

FORTUNATELY for us in the Philippines, we have no doubt whatever that the Second World War, or any

war in which the United States may become involved, will indeed be a war to preserve democracy and liberty. We are aware that the old slogan of the First World War is never mentioned now except in a tone of sarcasm and derision. But we in the Philippines know for an absolute certainty that the war will, in so far as it shall concern us, be truly a war for freedom and democracy.

For this is the only true meaning of Filipino loyalty to the United States: that in casting our lot completely and unreservedly on the side of the American nation, we shall lend our strength to the preservation of liberty—the same liberty that the United States has vouchsafed to us in the most remarkable compact concluded between a sovereign power and a subject nation in modern times. In this sense, therefore, the cause of Britain, the cause of Free France, the cause of the Chinese people, and the cause of the United States, is our cause. Their cause is our cause because in the large principles of democracy for which they are fighting are involved the principles of liberty and equality which apply particularly to us as a subject people moving toward independence.

And this, too, is the reason why we cannot honorably retreat from the independence program that we have marked out for ourselves. We cannot retreat because the ideals of democracy and liberty are all of one piece; because we cannot abandon our aspiration for freedom and independence and at the same time pretend to be advocates and defenders of democracy.

Once the British are defeated, the millenium will arrive and the Duce will 'destroy all human wickedness'

Utopia, as Seen by Fascist Italy

THE WORLD WILL FOLLOW ROME

By MARIO APPELIUS

Popolo d'Italia, Milan

IN THE wars of the past, it was difficult for the people to fight on the national and social fronts at the same time. There was an antithesis, plutocratic in essence and of Jewish inspiration, between nationalism and socialism, which seemed to be absolutely irreconcilable. It was Mussolini who, by welding nationalist and socialist ardor together, destroyed with one stroke of genius that fatal antithesis and in fascism laid the basis for the union of the national ideals and social aspirations of the Italian people. This became a guiding beacon for all peoples, except the plutocracies, and it is an ideal which is now spreading over all the world.

The Italian people are now fighting on a double front, for the final historical consolidation of the national and social war. In its victory Italy must

find the solution of its great national problems of security and expansion and the means for decisive advancement on the social plane.

Italy had reached a dead end of national progress. It was no longer possible to expand because of implacable opposition from England and France. The English veto was that of the bankers, merchants and bureaucrats, of the big owners of gold and raw materials who had concluded that every further aggrandizement of Italy would be detrimental to British commerce and finance and to the peaceful exploitation of the great British colonial landholdings, and that Italy's expansion should therefore be prevented at all costs. It was a bitter opposition, cold, reasoned, full of hate and rage, guided by the sole aim of breaking the back of Italy because she had shown herself strong

enough for much further advance. The French opposition, however, was the daughter of jealousy, vanity, of their organic antipathy toward the Italians, born of their immense presumption of being the supreme flower of human civilization. The French hostility was the more noisy and boastful, the English more taciturn and criminal.

To prevent Italy from growing in power and prosperity, London and Paris set up many artificial barriers around Italy—fought our commerce, depreciated our currency and attacked our prestige whenever they could, mixing their deceitful perfidy with open hostility and waiting for the first opportunity to jump at our throat and hit us below the belt. All attempts by Fascist Italy to find a common ground of conciliation between the rights and interests of the Italian people and the settled hostility of London and Paris, failed in the face of their implacable ill will.

Recourse to arms was thus inevitable.

So, we are fighting for Italy, for the sacred right of our country to grow in greatness and strength as England and France have grown. We are fighting to secure for our country a rank worthy of its history and its civilization, that it may be free to come and go in the Mediterranean without asking permission of anyone, to give strategic security to Libya and Ethiopia and to the great works of civilization and culture which we are constructing to guarantee to our Empire the right to breathe and the space which it needs, to free our commerce with Italian Africa from the unjust and onerous tolls we have to

pay in the Suez Canal, to occupy the place which is expected of us among the great directive forces of Europe and Africa, to reunite Italy and the Italian lands and those inhabited by Italians which our *Risorgimento* has not yet liberated from foreign domination.

OUR war is a sacred war. It is the logical consequence and conclusion of all the wars which our fathers have fought in various epochs against various enemies, first, to reunite one by one our dispersed countrymen and later to give Italy its place in international and economic life.

After many battles, after long suffering, after years of work and having so long given our blood and sweat to our country, the world has finally accepted the idea of granting Italy its place in the front rank. France itself, in the armistice of Villa Incisa in 1940, bowed its haughty head to the *fait accompli* of history. The English alone refuse the Italians their place in the sun. England is now the last obstacle to the realization of the dream of all the great Italian spirits who from Dante to D'Annunzio have prophesied and demanded the return of Italy to its ancient grandeur.

The national character of this war will destroy all that has preceded it and all the Anglo-French infamies which have determined it. Either England will bow its head and submit to the inevitable greatness of Italy or we Italians will be compelled to force it to do so. It is the same question of life or death with which we faced the Hapsburgs at the conclusion of the

peace after Vittorio Veneto. Italy now fights for its second Vittorio Veneto, against England.

It is destiny that our final war of independence coincides with the great revolution which through the whole world now faces the abominable capitalist régime which oppresses and exploits humanity. This revolution seeks to establish international life on a new basis, eliminating the present unjust distribution of riches and raw materials and numerous other unjustifiable political and economic situations.

This revolution fights to establish a new type of civilization with a social content. This new civilization, in which innumerable peoples and nations will finally find peace and prosperity, demands an economic organization of the world different from any which has existed up to now. There will be a new financial system in which gold will not control the fate of labor. There will be modernized political régimes which will be able to impose upon the various social categories the superior collective interest; a vast international co-ordination of the rights and duties of the various nations; an harmonious and intelligent organization of the economic resources of the state. And, most of all, it will be necessary that the immense riches of the globe—sufficient to secure bread, work and peace for all its inhabitants—be placed within reach of all peoples and cease to be the privilege of the few who have based their prosperity on the suffering and misery and fratricidal struggles of other nations.

Even in this great field of human evolution, our final great enemy and

the enemy of all peoples is English egoism. England is the stronghold of capitalism and is maintained in its monstrous struggle against humanity by its confederates in opulence and accomplices in villainy, headed by the Jewish capital and high finance of North America.

The Italian people have the honor of being the first in line in this great battle for social victory in the modern world, which will coincide with the national and social victory of the Italian people.

In the new international order, Italy will find a more ample and prosperous economic life, established in greater territory, with better means and with greater liberty and opportunities for work. This more ample economic life will mean a more prosperous treasury, much richer national finances and a higher level of material and spiritual life for Italian citizens, particularly our workers on the land and in the factories.

The new international order will also allow other nations—naturally, after an inevitable first period of adjustment—to establish a more equitable proportion between military and social and civil expenses, because the new organization will guarantee much greater security to all and to each one of them separately.

THE spirit of fascism guarantees on the economic plane a greater participation by all groups, especially the humble classes, who will enjoy a greater prosperity from the victory of the Fatherland. But not only in the economic field will there be improvement

for the less fortunate. The lower classes will be called to higher functions in the political and moral domains. The program of the Duce in this respect appears in his categorical affirmation on February 23 that, after the victory, he will take a decisive step toward the rapprochement of social differences.

The Duce has always kept his promises to the Italian people. In the social

field, his accomplishments have always far surpassed his promises.

In this national-social war, Italy will destroy all the obstacles of human wickedness and will finally clear the road to proceed with the march toward its splendid destiny. But for this, a decisive victory is necessary at all costs. It is now for Italy to be or not to be. There is no middle road.

THE GESTAPO TAKES OVER

By DINO MANZONI

Norte, Spanish-Language Monthly, New York

TODAY there is no Italian Government in Rome which may be said to rule the nation. Fascism has descended to the lowest ebb in its history. No one in Italy now is unaware that the Italian Empire is rapidly disintegrating.

Simultaneously with the military rout and the naval defeats suffered by Italy have come the collapse and bankruptcy of Mussolini's régime. It was apparent to him a short while ago that there was but one solution—the fatal one of leaning upon Hitler and praying for an Axis victory. That decision taken, Italy today is no more than a vassal power taking orders from Berlin.

Mussolini's mood of despair was not hidden from the Nazis. The Gestapo lost no time in assuming control of the key activities of the Italian Government. For the present, at least, Germany is supplying the cement to bolster the Duce's authority, which is not destined to disappear immediately.

The reins of power in Italy today are held tightly by the Germans, not by regular troops but by the battalions of Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Gestapo. Ironically, Mussolini caused the Gestapo to be brought in himself in order to maintain his authority in the face of the increasing number of conspiracies to unseat him. These agents have even penetrated into the Italian secret police. If revolution comes, the Gestapo will be in a position to make the first reprisals—not the Italian authorities.

Another sort of revolution, however, had been successfully accomplished by the Germans in Italy. Few Italians in Rome were aware of what was happening. The Germans had laid the groundwork for this machinery to preempt the Rome Government several months before Italy entered the war a year ago. When that pre-emption took place, there was no military display; all that happened is that Gestapo agents and other "technicians" were

placed next to certain high Italian officials as their "advisers." These advisers, as the progressive Italian collapse became increasingly grave, penetrated into all the Ministries. When the Italian crisis arrived, following the defeats in Libya, the Germans were prepared to deal with it.

Italian officials immediately engaged in recriminations and, inevitably, power fell into the hands of the Germans. A political revolution had taken place, although that was not apparent to the man in the street. Now that the Germans are entrenched in the fabric of the Italian Government, they will never leave of their own accord.

To achieve this "invisible occupation," the Germans have had recourse to terrorism. They saw to it, for example, that prominent Italians who were unfriendly to the Nazis, or were pro-British, were hastily mobilized and sent to the front. Even members of Mussolini's "Old Guard," veterans of street-fights in the days before the march on Rome, were sent off to fight.

Seemingly, the orders for this "purge" came from Fascist party headquarters, but the fact was that the Gestapo "advisers" were behind the orders.

By this strategy, Hitler has avoided a costly and bloody military occupation of Italy, although "invisible occupation" is a fact. It has been achieved without regular troops. Today it is somewhat pathetic to recall that Mussolini, after his first meeting with Hitler a few years ago, remarked that "Hitler is one of those men with whom I can work, though we will never agree."

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(Editor's Note: In a series of articles published in April, John T. Whitaker, former Rome correspondent of The Chicago Daily News and The New York Post, stated that widespread ill-feeling had been aroused in Italy by the obvious presence of the Gestapo throughout the country, which suggests that the occupation described in the foregoing was less "invisible" than Dino Manzoni suggests.)

The Flexible Benito

After thirty-three years Italy has regained her independence. An alliance has come to an end that never was and never could be popular. Italy turns westward and enters the Entente Cordiale. We are free from the heavy-handed protection of Germany and the unpleasant company of Austria. We have returned to our senses. The healthy and open diplomacy of the people itself has won a victory. We shall fight beside the French, the Belgians, the Serbs, the English and the Russians, and our intervention will complete the fiery ring around those empires that are responsible for the European conflagration.

—Benito Mussolini (May 17, 1915) quoted in
Countercurrent, Boston

In Latin America

PAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RAPPROCHEMENT

THE last few weeks have amply demonstrated that the conventional view that cordial relations between Latin America and the United States are impossible, for a variety of reasons, is being abandoned, together with many other "truths" hitherto held eternal. Chief among those reasons, it was held by many students of Pan-American relations in both north and south, was that the United States was the strongest competitor abroad of a few Latin-American countries, not to mention the fact that this country has never been a buyer of vast quantities of goods manufactured or otherwise produced by several of the twenty republics to the south.

Obviously, it cannot be denied that the blockade of the British, whom the United States is supporting, has cut deeply into the trade of Latin America with its best customers in the pre-war years. But today it should be observed that these losses, very substantial in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, for example, are in the way of being compensated for by new trade with North America and by reciprocal trade agreements among the various republics of Latin America itself. Moreover, Latin Americans are steadily developing new industries whose products should find a ready market throughout this hemisphere. In this

sense, the European war has not been without its blessings for Latin America, which now has a more pressing incentive than ever for industrial development; such necessary development might have been postponed indefinitely had not the war begun.

In the past month, some of these Latin-America republics, to make themselves independent of the industrial products they formerly imported from Europe, took steps for the early establishment of industrial production of iron and steel. Contrary to some expressions heard in the United States, any such degree of industrialization in Latin America need not be regarded as a threat to our markets there. To hold that view is to ignore the fundamental truth that industrialization in Latin America will inevitably increase the purchasing power of that continent; it will in time transform its primitive, agrarian economy, in which very little money circulates among the masses, into an economy where eventually millions of workers will be paid in cash for their labor—for the first time in their lives. It was not until some twenty or thirty years ago, at the time of the initial establishment of mining operations and textiles production in South America, that any of the millions of peons were able to buy a pair of shoes, or a watch, their first

"European" clothes or any of the countless gadgets of civilization.

The present abnormal situation makes it exceedingly difficult for Latin Americans to procure abroad the steel products they need, just as it is difficult for the United States to obtain certain indispensable ferro-alloys. But Chile, for example, is now working various mineral deposits which are likely to supplant the Scandinavian alloys needed by the United States for defense purposes and which are no longer procurable from Norway. Moreover, Chile has coal, it should not be overlooked, and has excellent facilities for development of hydro-electric power in the south. Its coal can be transformed into the coke necessary for iron production. American steel specialists are now in that republic studying the possibilities of such industrialization in Chile. In addition, because of enormously increased demands for copper, Chile is unable to mine enough for the American demand, although not so long ago production of copper in the Republic was not profitable. And if Chile has lost the European market for her nitrates, she is finding ample compensation elsewhere.

The blockade cut off newsprint imports from Scandinavia, but Latin-American importers found a supply fully adequate to their needs in Canada. Bolivian tin, which hitherto had to be sent to England for refining, will soon be refined in this hemisphere. Brazil, which in recent years had to destroy thousands of tons of coffee, is now developing a plastic product ("coffelite") which may be used in

the production of containers, so that the materials used in "tin" cans can now be utilized in war industries. To a considerable extent, Brazil already possesses its own iron and textile industries, a fact which has never presented any problems so far as concerns her relations with the United States.

IN THE past, the chief sore-spots in inter-American trade relations have been those arising between the United States and Argentina. The Buenos Aires Government with much vigor promoted the slogan, "Buy From Those Who Buy From Us"—which meant, primarily, don't buy from the United States. But in recent weeks American trade with Argentina, as well as Uruguay, which has much the same economy, has increased substantially, due chiefly to the War. But another factor may be the announcement by our State Department that trade agreements are being negotiated with those two countries covering the purchase of salted fish, cheese, plums, pears, grapes, flax-seed, corned-beef hash, broom corn, wools, hides, footwear—and even champagne; in addition, from Uruguay this country will soon also be importing tallow and glycerin.

It should be recalled that not until 1939—the year the War began—did the United States sign any trade agreements with Latin America. The first agreement was with Venezuela, and since then ten other republics have signed trade conventions with this country.

—S. N.

Twenty-five Years Ago

World events as interpreted in The Living Age, June 1916

IN JUNE 1916 the Anzacs had already made their reputations as fighting men, and *The Living Age* published an article by Frank Fox from *The National Review* in which he attributed it to the fact that "Australasian life leads to a certain hardness of outlook that must seem a little savage to the British citizen. Life is prized, of course, but its loss—neither of one's own nor of the other fellow's—is not regarded with any superstitious horror. Certainly it is not considered the greatest evil. . . . British in breed, 'young British' in outlook, resourceful, ruthless a little, the Anzac greeted this war with joy rather than dismay." *The Saturday Review*, writing of *The Men From Anzac*, said that it was at the time of Queen Victoria's jubilee "that the Empire became conscious of her unity in the world's affairs. Leaders everywhere perceived distinctly for the first time that the Empire, like a masterpiece of art, must be preserved as a whole."

Just as in 1941, one small corner of the Empire did not consider it a "masterpiece of art," and *The English Review* ended an article on "The Secret History of the Sinn Féin" with the queries: "Are the Sinn Féiners 'true to faith' when they enter into an unholy alliance with the pagan icono-

clasts who desecrated the altars, massacred the priests and violated the cloistered hearths of the ancient faith? And are they 'true to freedom,' these sons of the Isle which through long centuries has fought for freedom, when they would welcome to their shores Teutonic Imperialism, materialism and—ah, yes, and Teutonic slavery?"

Edward Porritt discussed the American Presidential campaign in *The Edinburgh Review* and concluded: "If the tariff and other domestic questions are subordinated—if the election turns solely or mainly on the issues that have developed out of the war—it is impossible to predict the result. Americans who feel strongly that the United States should be in the war are not in a majority even among those whose sympathies are whole-heartedly with Great Britain and the Allies; and it is difficult to make the masses of the people understand that a severance of diplomatic relations with Germany over the *Lusitania* outrage need not necessarily have involved the United States in the war."

In the London *Outlook*, Ignatius Phayre blamed lack of war enthusiasm in the United States on "Our Embassy in Washington," with the subtitle, "Its Disservice as a 'Tower of Silence' " in comparison with the German Embassy

under Count von Bernstorff. Also, "Look south, past the Rio Bravo, at seventeen South American nations and two island republics of the Caribbean. Here German agents buy up newspapers and flood the land with books and pamphlets, leaflets and postcards. 'She summons the music-hall ditty and the moving film to her assistance,' says my friend, Señor Santiago Pérez-Triana, our unique authority upon Latin-American matters. Thus each day the lie resounds, till it acquires the semblance of reality and becomes a seed of mischief in a furrow of ignorance. Let the Spanish-American look to the old homeland, and still he sees the German looming. 'At present,' owns Señor Luis Araquistáin, of the Madrid *El Liberal*, 'the fingers of one hand would count the daily papers which have not been bought up.' And Madrid has twenty large dailies.

"In the United States there could be no question of buying the press. Count Bernstorff simply fed it with good stories and news. . . . Mr. W. R. Hearst's papers, the *American* (morning) and *Journal* (evening), are scathingly anti-British and have great sway with the masses."

The Saturday Review described "Abraham Lincoln: The Democratic Dictator," perhaps as a hint to Woodrow Wilson: "In all his governing qualities Lincoln remains by far the greatest example of what the ruler of a democracy should be during a perilous time. Infinite patience, with humorous magnanimity, gave him command over himself; growth in forethought, swiftness in decision at critical moments, and courage to enforce

the right policy on his own side, gave him command over the opposition. In minor matters he employed compromise: in matters of supreme moment he was a dictator. Lincoln knew when compromise became a coward and a sneak: and this lesson is the toughest one that democracy has to learn."

Bishop Herbert Bury, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, estimated the number of prisoners of war, "if the reports of the belligerent powers are correct," at nearly 4,000,000.

—*And Fifty Years Ago (June 1891)*

THE *Living Age* published an article on "Canada and the United States: Their Past and Present Relations" from *The Quarterly Review* which held that "the political development of Canada has given her a position in the empire which makes her at last a factor in the affairs of the continent of America, and that the time has passed when her boundaries and her territorial claims can be made the mere shuttlecocks for ambitious and astute statesmen of the United States. Canada has won this position only after many sacrifices and a stern fight against the ambitious designs of a powerful neighbor, not always animated by the most generous feelings toward the Dominion, and too often carried away by a belief in 'a manifest destiny' which would eventually grasp the whole continent."

Other contributions came from James Bryce, the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, George Saintsbury and A. C. Swinburne.

Poems of the Month

Chosen by TOM BOGGS

The Strolling Girls

As surely as spring dusk brings out the
stars

Spring dusk brings out the strolling girls
Watching cars.

The bright blond girls, the slim dark girls
in sweaters

Walking on proper errands to the drug
stores

Or mailing letters.

Their purposes in dusk are as mysterious
As the soft wanderings of twilight cats
And just as serious.

THOMAS DUNCAN

—in *Lyric Moderns*

Poem

I wish for a poem
with as hard an edge
as the Daily News Building
or the Whitestone Bridge,

that the young can repeat
with no less joy
than Flat Foot Floogie
with the Floy Floy,

as simple
and as far from a riddle
as a clean left hook
or a cowboy in the saddle.

LINDLEY HUBBELL

—in *Compass Anthology* 1941

Early Evening Quarrel

Where is that sugar, Hammond,
I sent you this morning to buy?
I say, where is that sugar
I sent you this morning to buy?

Coffee without sugar
Makes a good woman cry.

*I ain't got no sugar, Hattie,
I gambled your dime away.
Ain't got no sugar, I
Done gambled that dime away.
But if you's a wise woman, Hattie,
You ain't gonna have nothin to say.*

I ain't no wise woman, Hammond.
I am evil and mad.
Ain't no sense in a good woman
Bein' treated so bad.

*I don't treat you bad, Hattie,
Neither does I treat you good.
But I reckon I could treat you
Worser if I would.*

Lawd, these things we women
Have to stand!
I wonder is there anywhere a
Do-right man?

LANGSTON HUGHES

—to be published
in *Shakespeare in Harlem*; Knopf

"The New Yorker"

Turning the knob of the morning I wait
for speech
On the electric air, for news of the sound
Of living. In this immediate room I reach
For meaning in the fine print of the air.

The seismograph has registered Shanghai,
Disturbances in Spain. The shaken ground
Splits open. But clever clarinets declare
Swing music in the ballroom of the sky.

Furs for the bedroom, where to play and
eat,

(Continued on page 400)

Books Abroad

CONTRASTS IN PUBLISHING

The Times Literary Supplement, London

THE relations between the British and American publishing trades, the likes and unlikes of their problems and methods, could be discussed from several angles. Historically, the main drift—and not surprisingly—has been a gradual emancipation from and over-shadowing of the British book market by the American. This has led to a steep decline in the sales to America of British books in sheets; a large increase in the publication of American books in Britain; and in some British quarters an inclination (more or less competently carried out) to imitate American methods of securing and publicizing individual works.

But no alteration in the balance of power, no amount of friendly imitation of business technique, no eagerness to secure American titles for issue in the British market can remove the fundamental contrast between the two territories—the different mentality of the public to whom the publisher seeks to appeal. This difference has its roots in the past, and up to the present shows no sign of modification or decay.

The late 1700's are generally considered to have marked the first emergence of the British book publisher as a phenomenon distinct from the printer, the book seller or the librarian. By

the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century he was firmly established as an independent feature of book-trade organization, and from then until about 1890 his progress was one of increasing prosperity and influence, while his business was conducted according to a tradition no less aristocratic for being (as traditions go) short-lived. In the eighteenth century new books had found their public exclusively among the upper classes and the well-to-do. With the increase of would-be readers, lending libraries sprang up, to spread few copies of an expensive book over many subscribers. Then, about 1830, cheaper reissues of popular current literature began to appear, and a publishing procedure became stabilized by which people of modest means were forced to borrow their new books, and did not buy until cheaper editions were available. This system, which persisted long after the social structure which conditioned it had passed away, has left an enduring mark on book trade and on reading public. Even today British publishing still shows traces of a sequence of graduated cheap editions, which is a legacy from the days when original issues were too costly to be bought by any individual other than a man of wealth, and had to be followed by a series of cheaper editions to meet a descending scale of potential demand.

American publishing, on the other

hand, although it came into being at much the same period as its English counterpart, was (and remained for long enough) parochial and localized. It was also, and has never ceased to be, democratic. The first two characteristics were natural enough, in view of the vast size of the country and the rawness of a civilization which was too busy absorbing territory in quantity to bother about improving its own quality.

The eastern States alone—where British influence, however unpopular, was still strong—made any pretension to serious book-trade activity. First Philadelphia and then Boston was the cultural capital (in which cities in turn was concentrated the publishing trade of the republic) and the area of their operations, though gradually extending, was little more than marginal to their tremendous hinterland. No less natural was the trade's fundamental democracy. It operated from the first (and continued to operate) on a lower price basis than its English counterpart, for its public, whatever contrasts of wealth and poverty it might include, was genuinely democratic, and books made no more of an attempt to cater to a hierarchy than any other commodity. The results of this levelling are as visible nowadays as those of its opposite are in Britain. American publishers have never individually systematized their cheap editions, which—if produced at all—are issued either by companies existing for the purpose or in "Libraries" and "Series" composed of works drawn from the lists of various firms.

Reasonable prices for new books

had always inclined the American book-lover to buy; but it was the pirate-era, when for a shilling or less the reader could obtain almost any item in popular and up-to-date British literature, which turned this inclination into a habit. It may be added that American readiness to buy, rather than to borrow, was reinforced by the influx of educated emigrants from European countries, where the idea of borrowing food for the mind would have seemed as barbaric as to borrow food for the body and, after chewing it once or twice, to send it back again.

The respective existence of a public of buyers in America and a public of borrowers in Britain marks the fundamental difference between the publishers' problem in the two countries—a difference which has wide ramifications and affects every aspect of the trade. The cosmopolitan population of the United States is alive to books and interested in them; also its miscellaneous origins give it sympathy and inclination toward the literatures of other countries than the United States, with the result that translations sell well in America. In Great Britain the public really interested in new books is small, and translations rarely penetrate the insular apathy of the majority of readers.

IN America, public libraries, colleges and institutions buy new books when they appear, and do not wait (as do many in this country) for a chance to pick up at a cheap price ex-review copies or discards from the big lending libraries. The American press, radio and news-propagators in general

co-operate readily with publishers in getting books known, because their public like them to do so. In Great Britain they help little, if at all, and the public do not care. Indeed the whole angle of approach to books, whether of the individual or the institution, is in America one of welcoming curiosity, not of suspicion or indifference. When it be remembered that American publishers have not only a public interested in books—a public of whom many make money quickly and spend it readily—but also one three times as large as that in this country, it may well seem as though all the advantages are on their side and none on ours.

Yet such is not altogether the case, even though the handicaps under which they suffer, and from which British publishers are more or less free, may be partly of the Americans' own making.

There are a variety of worries peculiar to the American trade for which the national code or the national temperament must bear the blame. Of these, two may be recorded. In the first place, the American publisher is vicariously involved in the grave troubles caused to the retail book selling trade by the cutting of book prices in big department stores. In Great Britain what is known as the Net Book Agreement effectually prevents the sale retail of any new book published at a net price at less than that price. In America a similar agreement, signed by publishers and booksellers, was challenged at law and overthrown as being a "conspiracy in restraint of trade."

The result has been fantastic. Wealthy department stores had the idea of using their book sections as decoys to draw the public into their doors by offering the latest big-selling books at heavily cut prices. They bought the books at usual trade rates from the publishers but deliberately sold them at a loss, regarding that loss as expenditure on publicity and justifiable by the amount of business done in other sections with the crowds attracted into the building. Soon one store was in competition with another, and it is said that while the popularity of *Gone With the Wind* was at its height the price of a copy in two big department stores in New York fell daily, as first one cut it by a few cents, then the other undercut by a few cents more, and so on. It is manifest that the effect on the regular bookshops of this competition in popular books was ruinous.

THE British publisher is only to a small degree the victim of frenzied rivalry in publicity expenditure, which has developed since the end of the Great War. The younger firms, many of whom blossomed in the heady prosperity of 1918 to 1929, tended to look out only for the quick seller. Competition for popular writers intensified this tendency. Naturally this sort of ballyhoo was often successful, and presumably those responsible for it were satisfied. But it is not a healthy state of affairs, nor do book production and distribution which fail to give pride of place, from the outset and all the time, to the book produced constitute real publishing.

Our Own Bookshelf

ALLENBY: A STUDY IN GREATNESS. By Sir Archibald Wavell. New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. 312 pages. \$3.00.

Reviewed by JOHN MITCHELL

ALLENBY became great in the desert where victory comes hard and may prove fleeting, as the distinguished author of this biography knows from recent experience. Indeed, the headline reader will open this book on guard before the round assertion of its subtitle; greatness, as we see by the papers, is no more secure in today's whirlwind than nations or persons. There is wry significance in the fact that war cut short General Wavell's literary labors, but that it should also dispatch him right back to Allenby's old proving ground, to face a threat incomparably graver than that which shaped his hero's apotheosis, seems rather mortifying. Thus under the impact of events today *sic transit gloria* acquires tempo.

A highly articulate military man, General Wavell by his calm avowal of Allenby's stature inadvertently opens a wide field of speculation. His test is by Allenby's own standards, and is chiefly upon military evidence, while he seems unaware that those standards themselves may be in question, and that in the end a great man must be judged by the whole. Sharper is the test that Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who also achieved fame in the desert,

mentally imposed upon the great man when he likened his mind to the prow of the Mauretania. There was so much weight behind it, said Lawrence, that it did not need to be sharp like a razor. To doubt Allenby would be like doubting the British Empire.

With that in mind we accompany Allenby to his supreme test at Damascus as a brilliant conqueror, but for a test that was political and, ultimately, human rather than military. For Lawrence, Allenby failed. For Author Wavell, what took place in the ancient capital of the Arabian Empire that day is either discreetly evaded or slurred over as not worth attention. As the instrument of British policy in his triumph, Allenby was simply being himself, and we must know his life to understand.

Of a North Country family, he entered the Army on a rising market; and to it he brought the courage, loyalty and brains becoming a descendant of the great Cromwell. His apprenticeship as a cavalry subaltern was served in Africa and it was there during the Boer War that he made his name as a commander. World War I and the Western Front some years later, however, were not so lavish of honors. This man, so immune to ambition, must nevertheless have felt its urge under adversity, and he flung himself energetically into the campaign in Palestine to succeed where others failed.

Meanwhile, he had developed the classic attributes of the general, the forcefulness, brusqueness and disciplinarianism for which he was famed throughout the service. Increasing authority brought increasing asperity, as Wavell says, and there is evidence in the book that "character" became an obsession with this man who had so much of it himself, accounting for those explosions of wrath at the weaknesses of others which Wavell merely lays to Allenby's shyness, his inability to mix with people. Allenby may not have been a snob, but readers on this side of the ocean can hardly avoid the hunch.

THE accusation that he failed as a leader of cavalry in 1914 may be put to jealousy among competing officers; the author cites the facts of history and declares that Allenby's record in the West did not suffer. That war saw the virtual passing from the battlefield of the cavalry arm, and the criticism Allenby took might well have been the blight already descending upon the horseman as fighter, though Wavell does not make the point. At any rate, Allenby went to Palestine as Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, less honored among his men, however, as "the Bull," and there he got Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the weary British nation in 1917.

The year's campaign was brilliant, dangerous and unorthodox. At Gaza-Beersheba, in October 1917, Allenby coolly split his army into two parts, to hammer both ends of the Turkish line, risking a counter-stroke in his thinly

screened center. Sand, disease and drought were also enemies which the history-wise general fought with one eye on the Bible, for pointers on how they had done the job then. Only in 1918, after Jerusalem, when political considerations were added to the burdens of battle, did Allenby's role become rather inglorious.

There can be no doubt of his skill as a warrior. Successively and victoriously he faced two of Germany's best commanders and an army of Turks hardly inferior in numbers to his own. In the final series of engagements that ended at Aleppo on October 31, 1918, he had in less than six weeks captured 75,000 prisoners and 360 guns. One of his divisions covered some 550 miles in thirty-eight days, the greatest exploit in the history of horse cavalry. For that campaign Allenby was made a Field Marshal.

But history, and not General Wavell's book, will decide if, in his evident readiness to do anything asked of him, Allenby was not also a rather unconscionable wheelhorse for the British Foreign Office and Cabinet. When he entered Damascus it was the greatest moment of his career and a fateful one in the history of that imperialism of which he was the perfect embodiment. For then were planted the seeds whose melancholy fruit today overshadow Islam. Feisal, leader of the Arabs and a British ally, was there to witness the triumphal clinching of Arab claims to Damascus and Syria. Colonel Lawrence came to see that his promises to the Emir were fulfilled. And it was the high-minded Allenby's task to inform them that the repreh-

sible Sykes-Picot Agreement was being invoked under pressure from the French, as was also the dubious Balfour Declaration to the Zionists; in short, to confront the Arabs with his army and the fact that they were to get nothing like what they expected, and to let Lawrence know he had been tricked.

Yet General Allenby could write to his wife that she would like Feisal whom he described as "strong in will and straight in principle." Lawrence, Allenby believed, had something of the charlatan in him. Indeed, Allenby had that sterling personal character which was the well-spring of the British colonizing genius. He always slept well and ate well; he loved flowers and children. Perhaps that is what General Wavell means by greatness.

UNITED WE STAND! DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Whittlesey House. 1941. 364 pages, appendix and index. \$3.00.

MR. BALDWIN, the military and naval editor of the *New York Times*, has written for the layman a down-to-the-ground survey of the ability, or lack of it, of the United States to defend herself, to engage in a war overseas, and what steps are demanded of the President, Congress and ourselves by the ominous present. The author writes with conviction and even passion; for a discussion of military and naval affairs by a technician, the book has a curious flavor of pamphleteering and tract-writing, but this occasional exhortation does not detract from the obvious sincerity and seriousness with which Mr. Baldwin writes.

First, certain of Mr. Baldwin's unequivocal statements should be listed. He believes, and says that most military authorities he knows also believe, that if this country is immediately united in war support of Britain, Germany eventually will collapse—but that is a momentous "if." As the author remarks, the country is far from united. In these days of total war, where civilians as never before are a factor in war, partial unity in support of England is not enough and, in every likelihood, will result in an Anglo-American defeat or stalemate.

"There is one man," he writes, "who can contribute greatly to this end, and he is President of the United States. He can speak the language of the common man more simply, more fluently than any other man of our day. It is perhaps ironic that he who must unify us has contributed more greatly to disunity than any other single individual. . . . He it is who must voice the battle cry of freedom, but he cannot do it simply by a call to war. . . . For the nation must not go to war unless it is the overwhelming wish of the overwhelming majority. Whatever we must do, we must do united. That is the task of the President. That is the task of the nation. . . . Only America can defeat America."

Mr. Baldwin lays much emphasis on the adverse effects on American trade, and possibly upon our way of living, should the Nazis win. However, he is not alarmist throughout. For example: "Colonel Lindbergh, as all military observers know, was perfectly correct when he said that the United States could not be invaded by air."

(Be it noted, on the other hand, that Mr. Baldwin does not hold with Lindbergh that, whatever the degree of American war aid, Britain will inevitably lose the war.) The author goes a good deal farther. Writing of the "bogey of invasion," he says that he "does not know a single responsible military or naval officer or Germanment official who believes that this nation is threatened by *direct* invasion, even if Germany wins." And "... our navy today is probably capable of meeting in its own waters the present combined fleets of Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan. Our fleet is the world's only real blue-water navy."

On the whole, Mr. Baldwin paints a fairly encouraging picture of America's military, naval and industrial strength, actual and potential. But he is exceedingly gloomy over the all-important issue of our unity, both in our armed services and in our civilian ranks. Repeatedly he states that without this all-embracing unity, we stand every risk of losing the conflict, and repeatedly he points to the tragic results of disunity in Norway, France, Britain (early in the war) and elsewhere.

In many of his technical discussions, Mr. Baldwin is pungent and convincing. The oft-repeated claim of the late Lord Lothian that the British Navy has for decades protected the United States is waved aside by Mr. Baldwin with an impressive excavation of past historical facts.

Mr. Baldwin argues earnestly for a defense-planning commission at Washington, endowed with sufficient authority to break up not only the

short-sighted preoccupations of our armed services but also the loss of time resulting from selfish conflicts among industries now engaged in defense contracts. He demands a much improved military leadership, which today is "definitely not good"; he is much easier on the United States Navy. Incidentally, he inveighs against the onetime highly respected doctrine of Liddell Hart that the Germans could be defeated by purely defensive tactics.

At a time when the American people are on the brink of making probably the most momentous decision in the nation's history, Mr. Baldwin's matter-of-fact survey and resumé of American strength may be described as obligatory reading. It is not short of an ultimatum.

—L. M.

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF CANADA. By C. P. Stacey. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1940. 157 pages, appendices, notes and index. \$2.50.

CANADA FIGHTS, An American Democracy at War. Edited by J. W. Dafoe. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1941. 274 pages and index. \$2.00.

THESE two books, taken together, present an excellent picture of Canada at war, her resources and her problems as a belligerent. Professor Stacey, a Canadian who is a member of the history department of Princeton University, made his study of *The Military Problems of Canada* under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. The manuscript was completed in August 1939, and while it was considerably revised after the war broke out, its chief value is still that of a carefully documented study of the military geography of Canada and the history of her defense policies before the war, a background of great importance for un-

derstanding and evaluation of current war effort.

Canada Fights is the combined effort of several Canadian newspaper men, and one university professor, under the editorship of John W. Dafoe of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, and is frankly intended as a popular description for the American public of Canada at war as of the present speaking, including the political and economic frame of the actual war activities. It is no attempt to "sell" Canada to the United States but a critical and objective estimate which is invaluable for an understanding of the country with which we have formed a unique defensive partnership.

—M. McF.

PLAN FOR PERMANENT PEACE. By *Hans Heymann*. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1941. 315 pages, charts and index. \$3.50.

AT A time when a literal world war impends, the present may seem an unpropitious moment to publish a volume on the mechanics necessary to the establishment of a lasting peace, and such a work might appear immediately to invite comment upon it as utopian. Certainly the project outlined here by Professor Heymann, one-time economic adviser to German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau and now research professor in economics at Rutgers, is monumental, and to the reader of current headlines its realization would seem remote in the extreme. But no one may regard this war without constant thought and hope for its end, and with that there must be consideration and concentration now on the shape and organization of the world after the conflict.

Professor Heymann is much less vague, when he looks into the future, than the majority of his contemporaries, what he gives in effect is a blue-print of a new democratic world order, more grandiose in conception than the League of Nations, since the plan embodies a United States of the universe. Because of inclination and training, the author's stress is on the economic, and he makes no apology for tempering his occasional idealistic stipulations with materialistic recommendations. His unnecessary justification, by implica-

tion, is that every recommendation he advances is made in the light of the experience, failures and frustrations of the League of Nations.

Professor Heymann first lays down his "fourteen ideals for a living peace." A good many of these have been enunciated by others in recent years, seeking a workable formula for an international organization, but the author among these points, or "ideals," includes such stipulations as free trade, free access to raw materials and their organized distribution; international control of production in proportion to needs (*i.e.*, use); "assurance of a minimum of subsistence for every human being; organized international social and unemployment insurance; labor migration, emigration and colonization of immigrants under auspices of all nations, and an internationally guaranteed and unified medium of exchange.

How may these aims be realized? The author takes for granted the good will of mankind and its aversion to bloodshed. In Professor Heymann's opinion, the open sesame lies in the establishment of a Bank of Nations which will have twelve basic functions. They will be these:

"1. First step in reconstruction must be the introduction of an international auxiliary medium of exchange.

"2. Introduction of such a medium of exchange would necessitate establishment of a superordinated bank with power to issue bank notes technically in accordance with the highest money-creating principles.

"3. Principal task of the Bank of Nations is to be the granting of short and long-term credits on a basis of sound collateral.

"4. Establishment of branch banks in every member nation, consisting of issuing and credit departments.

"5. Establishment of subordinate national trust banks to finance new productive enterprises—factories, soil reclamation, public utilities, etc.—and to maintain and enlarge existing business and trade. Because of their productive character, these banks would be called Construction Banks.

"6. Bank of Nations to grant long-term bank-note credits to Construction Banks. These credits would be amortized by a new method, according to the depre-

ciation of objects on which credits are granted.

"7. Aside from soliciting capital, the aim of the Construction Banks would be to extract capital gradually from the market through bond issues. Payment of interest on bonds would be dispensed with until the bonds were issued. Free-of-interest period might last three to ten years—this for the benefit of weak debtors.

"8. When issued, bonds to yield customary rate of interest as first-class securities and to be provided with a flexible share in the class securities and to be provided with a flexible share in the profits derived from the objects it has financed.

"9. Until the end of the free-of-interest period, bonds to be held by the Bank of Nations or branches as securities. At the end of the free period they would be issued in series in accordance with the ability of the market to absorb them. Payment by subscribers to be made in Bank of Nations bank notes, which are to be destroyed when returned to Bank of Nations.

"10. Aside from amortization of their capital, the debtors to pay the following additions: (1) fee to cover operating expenses of the Construction Banks from the end of the free-of-interest period; (2) interest on bonds; (3) share in the profits derived from the productive enterprises created by the loan. Loans to be guaranteed jointly by all debtors and super-guaranteed by the Construction Banks, whose obligations thus become gilt-edged securities.

"11. In order to assure their value, objects serving as collateral for loans to be insured by maintenance insurance, which would cover premature decay of property and provide funds for upkeep and vital repairs. This would assure maintenance of value during the useful life of the objects.

"12. Amortization of loans by debtors to proceed steadily until the debt of the Construction Bank is completely repaid. Amortization to be carried out according to statutory regulations in Bank of Nations Construction-Bank notes which are to be destroyed when returned to Bank of Nations. Thus the Bank of Nations would be completely covered (even during the time when the bonds yielded no interest). The joint guarantee of debtors could also

serve as security for short-term trade credits. These credits would be examined individually and approved by the central bank in series."

This is a long extract, but it is given because it is the substance of Professor Heymann's "Plan for Permanent Peace," a project which had its genesis in a memorandum prepared by the author in 1920 for use by Dr. Rathenau at the economic negotiations of the Conference of Genoa two years later. The author believes that "in this mechanism of economic solidarity one dream after another, one ideal or utopia after another, finds its most natural fulfillment." Professor Heymann recognizes that skeptical political scientists will deny the feasibility of the project, but in a late chapter he bases his certainty that it will materialize upon "my faith in the strength of the creative human drives" and because "I do not sympathize or agree with maxims which proclaim the inevitability of constant wars and permanent revolution."

WHERE ANGELS FEARED TO TREAD. By V. F. Calverton. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1941. 381 pages. \$3.00.

LITERALLY a few hours before his death, V. F. Calverton finished this book dealing with the various attempts at practical realization of Utopia on American soil. But Calverton, who by the age of forty had written a dozen volumes, compiled several anthologies in a variety of fields, and edited a significant magazine, has given us a final book which will be considered not only timely but dateless by all those who see beyond the immediate results of the bombing of a city or the sinking of a warship.

Whatever the outcome of the War, we are on the threshold of a new period of history. If the totalitarians win, they will establish their "new order," in which there will probably be food and shelter for everybody, as in any jail or concentration camp, but also "master races" and "social categories" so rigidly established within the subdued nations that almost different species of slaves and rulers may evolve, as in the ant and bee colonies. Did not Count Bernstorff, the Kaiser's ambassador

to Washington, write that the larger part of humanity are born with saddles on their backs and a minority with spurs on their boots, and that the perfect order would assign each their places?

If the totalitarians are defeated, and we return to the system of relative political liberty, but without economic security for the great masses, another, final cataclysm is bound to come.

Since Plato, the keenest minds of humanity have been dreaming of the perfect society which will give peace and security to all. Hundreds of "utopias" have been written in the form of dreams, of travels to unknown countries, of awakening 1,000 years hence and reporting the happy future, or of skidding into the invisible country of the fourth dimension. All these dreams remained on paper, however, until America offered a vast, unclaimed, free territory for experiment. Hundreds of groups, religious or of various ideological and economic persuasions, were formed in this country to try partially to realize Utopia during the lifetimes of their founders. Scattered all over the United States are still dozens of towns and villages called "Utopia," which bear witness to the intentions of their original founders. In contrast to the many books summarizing the utopian ideas and visions of the present and past centuries, few books are easily available describing the practical attempts made in this country to realize Utopia.

Calverton analyzes the most famous or important attempts of these colonies from the Labadists, the Ephrata, Bethel, Aurora colonies, the Shakers and Mormons, based on the religious principle of Christian communism, to the Utopias based purely on economic principles, like those of Robert Owen, the Brook Farm, the Oneida Colony, etc. He describes their difficulties in a hostile surrounding world, their systems of common property, the religious tenets on which they based their ideas, and their attitudes toward sex. He gives the reason for the failure of all these attempts.

It testifies to the broadmindedness of the agnostic Calverton that he points out that those colonies which based their communism on religious principles and on primitive Christianity survived much longer and prospered much more than others.

He recognized that religion was the ethical factor able to "drive them to work with greater ardor and zealotry, to realize the things in which they believe," and he showed that, while only a few of the colonies failed for economic reasons, many were disrupted by the abandoning of the religious or ethical principles on which they were built.

Though a materialist and an economic determinist, Calverton thus came to the conclusion to which we all must return if we wish to see a better world; that without recognition of and adherence to ethical principles—to idealist inspiration, or to what some of us in certain cynical periods of our life called empty words—the principles of justice, liberty, solidarity, honor and recognition of the rights of others—there will be no hope for progress toward human happiness, which can be attained only where economic security will go hand in hand with liberty.

—STEPHEN NAFT

A TIME TO SPEAK. By Archibald MacLeish. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co. 1941. 210 pages. \$2.75.

THE two most revealing essays in this collection of articles and addresses by Archibald MacLeish, a book that is most provocatively contemporary with itself, are undoubtedly *Mr. Sandburg and the Doctrinaires* and *Portrait of a Living Man*, a tribute to Justice Felix Frankfurter by an understanding friend and warm admirer. It may be recalled with regard to the latter that Mr. MacLeish, in addition to being one of the distinguished poets of our time, an expert wielder of polemical prose, a public administrator with creative ideas, is also a lawyer who has given up the law for these other careers that are parallel but do not quite meet. Indeed, the author of these trenchant essays and brief poems in prose is in essence the type of young public administrator envisaged by Felix Frankfurter in his numerous writings on civil service and government. It is only fitting, therefore, that the gifted homunculus, so to speak, should pay honorable homage to the master.

Mr. MacLeish's famous essay entitled *The Irresponsibles* is congested with far

too many paradoxical and disfrinded ideas to be discussed in this brief space. If the disgrace of the century, as Mr. MacLeish seems to think, may be laid at the door of the ascetic scholar and the tendentious artist, where, we may ask, does he stand? And is he entirely without stain and dishonor? As is best observed in the two essays mentioned above, Mr. MacLeish is on the side of everything that is devoutly human about men and government, art and civilization. But in damning the arid scholar Mr. MacLeish hurls his reproaches at random, failing to make suitable distinctions that sift the dry-as-dust schoolman from the selfless, objective scientist. In damning the crusading artist he fails to see—or refuses obstinately to see—that a good poet or a painter is amoral (his word) in his medium and not necessarily in his theme, which may have chosen him rather than the other way round. The best proof that an artist may have an intellectual, a philosophical or even a political *raison d'être* will be found in the prose writings and poems of Mr. MacLeish. He is a remarkable poet because his instrument has been polished and refined for itself; but in this sense he proves that he belongs to a transitional epoch, mixing like Yeats a brew that is only a potpourri of the old and the new. Carl Sandburg, on the other hand, as Mr. MacLeish himself recognizes, is a poet of today and tomorrow, inventing a language as he goes along, the best public speech, indeed, to be heard in the whole range of modern poetry.

The contradictions in Mr. MacLeish's writings spring, I believe, from the temper of our times, dislocated, vacillating and desperately unhinged. Mr. MacLeish uses the word democracy again and again in a tandem of thought: he wants democracy to survive, but he also hopes that it can, and will, develop disciplines and techniques equal to those of the totalitarian powers—techniques, in any case, that will greatly unify men of goodwill and inspire youth with courage, freedom and hope. In other words, he would like somehow to harness a super-executive economy to the Bill of Rights to freedom within a compulsive moral and political concept that will nevertheless yield the greatest scope to the creative individual. Many men, thinking on the cruelty of war and dic-

tatorship, as well as on the terrible uses to which we have put the mass machine, will understand and sympathize with Mr. MacLeish's dreams and desires. And many will hope with him that, in the inevitable social and economic changes bound to follow the war, our basic freedoms will be preserved.

—PIERRE LOVING

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY. By Burnham Finney. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1941. 284 pages. \$2.50.

THE headlines, the radio and other media of public information are today drumming into the ears of everyone "all-out for democracy." This book tells, essentially, how far we have gone and what are the prospects. "The truth is that the defense accomplishments since the start of the program are far greater than many people think. . . . Then there is the fact that mechanized war and preparations to defend ourselves constitute a new experience to all nations, including ourselves. . . . If the defense program is to be completely successful, manufacturers, labor, the public, government officers, must get serious about the program."

The author marshals facts in broad sweeps by clever phrasing and simple analogies. For example, "In skill of mass production the United States is a master. It has a Ph.D. and can give lessons to the rest of the world. It has to begin in the freshman class, however, learning how to make on large scale such essential defense weapons as airplanes, gun mounts, anti-aircraft guns, range finders, shells, bombs, and tanks."

The author is editor of the *American Machinist*, and the journalistic style makes this book a popular manual on the Arsenal of Democracy. It is a manual that presents the "inside story" without wasting words. Although it is not complete with statistics, it gives figures and data that lead the reader to say to himself, "I didn't know that we had gotten so far in our preparation and defense production." There is much in this book for the lay public and the industrial executive. The facts given and general tenor are such as to tell the true story without mincing

words and yet at the same time to convey an attitude of confidence and build public morale.

In regard to the airplane industry, the author states that "with the assistance of the automobile industry, [it] is carrying out this decree of the American people without undue delay. If the public will be a little patient, it will get clouds of planes." It is important to emphasize that in the airplane industry, America is geared not to sacrifice quality, not to compromise military efficiency and yet to take full advantage of its superiority in scientific production methods.

The huge undertaking of the shipbuilding program is a blunt revelation. "Three companies overshadow all the others in the private shipbuilding industry. . . . The time element is the hardest thing to lick in pushing along the shipbuilding program. Normally seventy-six months elapse from the time a battleship is authorized until it joins the fleet." Here we have the key to the entire program for making this country an Arsenal of Democracy. Time is the element. The book creates the feeling that if we are to meet the schedule, we must learn and work around the clock. Chapter 12 describes the program of finding trained men and the task of up-grading skilled and semi-skilled help, the undertaking of the national program of training with industry and a federal committee on apprenticeship. The results of these government programs are shown in Connecticut, New York and Ohio. On the other hand General Motors is training 13,000 men in forty plants.

Training men and scientific production methods still leave a gap. There is the need for trained management. The recognition of trained management is shown by the fact that Proctor and Gamble, manufacturers of soap and allied products, was asked to undertake operation of a shell-loading plant. The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company also was chosen because of its management personnel to handle a "bag-loading plant" at the new smokeless powder project being constructed at Charleston, Ind.

"It isn't solely the top leadership, however, that spells the difference between victory or defeat and success or indifferent

results. The army must have good men down the line. The 'non-coms' must know their stuff. Sergeants and corporals must be well trained and there must be plenty of them." To industry this means gang bosses, foreman, supervisors and executives. Today the foremen and other men in the line who have first-hand contact with production workers have a first-hand control in determining whether the schedule will be met or slowed up.

—RICHARD S. SCHULTZ

(Dr. Schultz, director of the Industrial Service Department of the Psychological Corporation of New York City, is a consultant on personnel selection and training for a number of companies engaged in national-defense production.)

SKELETON OF JUSTICE. *By Edith Roper and Clara Leiser. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1941. 346 pages. \$3.00.*

FOR writing this revealing book describing Nazi criminal courts, judges, court procedure and prostitution of news reporting in Naziland, Mrs. Roper and Miss Leiser obviously abandon forever their rights to abide in or to visit Hitler's growing realm. Mrs. Roper was a gifted twenty-year-old girl reporter when in 1936 she began reporting Berlin criminal trials to fit the formula of the Goebbels bureau. She accumulated exhaustive notes of hideous injustice and chicanery. Then, through a ruse, she got out of the country—with her notes. Safe in America and collaborating with an experienced investigator and writer, she wrote her account. The book should be of deep interest to students of law, to sitting judges and to editors and reporters. Although we in America are hardened to tales of Nazi depravity, this book digs into the sordid facts. Incidentally it shows how low the press has sunk in Germany, how helplessly editors and reporters wallow in a sea of putrescence.

Miss Roper leaves one in no doubt that the Gestapo "is one of the most cantankerous afflictions visited upon the German people." She tells how, coupled with the nefarious court system, it has contrived to pull down every obstacle to the progress

of Hitler and his minions. For good measure Miss Roper relates stories of murder and burglary committed during the epidemic of violent crime that preceded the present war.

—PAUL J. WATROUS

MODERN MEXICAN PAINTERS. By McKinley Helm. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1941. 205 pages, 82 plates, 3 color plates. \$5.00.

MCKINLEY HELM'S book on Modern Mexican painting appears at an opportune moment with the present lively interest in the cultural life of Mexico and South America. In fact, the time seems propitious for a serious analysis of the Mexican art renaissance, which occurred during the last World War and which seems to have come to the end of a period with Orozco's latest frescoes in Guadalajara, frescoes which in their tumultuous rhythms and sadistic splendor seem to have foretold the present world conflict. If one may roughly date modern Mexican painting as beginning with the death of Posada in 1913, the movement is over thirty years old. While its leaders are still living and producing, the movement itself no longer has the fiery zeal that characterized its beginnings.

Modern Mexican painting is the product of two revolutions: the Mexican democratic revolution and the revolution in modern art in France in the beginning of this century. Many of the Mexican painters fought in the Mexican Revolution and they derived their themes and their program from it. They forsook easel painting for mural painting and sought to incorporate their social message in simple forms and colors taken from ancient Mexican art in order to reach the Mexican people. But their technical dexterity and esthetics were derived from the studios of Paris. Picasso more than any other living painter has inspired and quickened modern Mexican painting: both Rivera and Siuuieros studied with him in Paris, and his influence is apparent even among the younger generation of easel painters. Orozco, the most original and Mexican of the group, alone remains outside of Picasso's influence. Whatever European elements exist

in Orozco's painting seem to come from the early Italian and Baroque painters.

McKinley Helm makes no attempt to analyze the sources of Mexican painting. But he had the perspicacity and interest to reside in Mexico and to meet the painters in person. The material thus obtained cannot be found in libraries or other books. In particular he gives attention to the painters whose names are less known in the United States, including Tamayo, Lozano, Maria Izquierda, Ledesma, Frieda Kahlo, Meza, Leopoldo Mendez and Pablo Higgins, the American painter who is part of the Mexican movement. Mr. Helm's enthusiasm for the artist as a human being is something most refreshing to encounter in a critic. But one might wish that he had organized his text, so rich in anecdotal material, in a more logical pattern, so as not to confuse the reader unfamiliar with the subject. The book itself is beautifully produced and contains excellent reproductions.

—CHARMION VON WIEGAND

THE NEW AMERICAN. By Francis Kalnay and Richard Collins. New York: Greenberg. 1941. 388 pages with index.

THE subtitle of this book, "A Handbook of Necessary Information for Aliens, Refugees and New Citizens," is a modest description. It is almost an encyclopaedia on the subject. No other work in existence contains in one volume so much information on so many subjects of such importance to all immigrants, refugees, those who seek naturalization, as well as foreign-born citizens. It is also of interest to those concerned with the life and problems of the racial groups partially or not at all absorbed into the American melting pot.

Many handbooks have been published for those of foreign birth who intend to apply for naturalization. This book gives, of course, all necessary information, and a whole section is dedicated to the questions and answers on the Constitution and the Federal Government which may be asked by the judge when the applicant for naturalization is called for final examination. These questions and answers are given in English, German, Yiddish, Italian and

Polish. But the book contains subjects not included in any of the previous books, such as a survey of the refugee situation with a list of organizations which give various kinds of refugee aid. It gives the names of radio stations broadcasting in foreign languages, foreign-language newspapers and fraternal societies of the foreign-born.

It answers many legal questions concerning marriage and divorce, the latest changes in naturalization laws and which jobs are opened or closed at present to aliens—and even how to become a citizen when one has entered the U. S. illegally. The book also explains for what reasons a naturalized citizen may lose his citizenship, and gives relevant details about unemployment insurance, alien registration, etc.

Not only those directly concerned will find this work invaluable, but also teachers, librarians, social workers and editors who are occasionally called upon to give information on these subjects. An excellent index facilitates the finding of necessary information.

—S. N.

WE HAVE A FUTURE. By Norman Thomas. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1941. 236 pages. \$2.50.

Reading this controversial volume one listens in vain for the high piercing voice of Orator Thomas which is the natural and convincing accompaniment of his quite personal notions of socialism and matters at large. Only from the lecture platform, perhaps, could one take with equanimity the continual reiteration of the first person singular of this book but, despite the barrage, Mr. Thomas gets his points across.

At the start the book is full of nostalgia for life before the machine age had hit its stride. He then dissipates these memories with a resounding bang, to show us in contrast what existence is today. The picture is not a pretty one. Meanwhile, the author has discussed banking, blitzkriegs, Karl Marx, loyalties and also frankfurters; he is indeed an encyclopedia of opinions and yet refreshing in all he brings his mind to. As one reads these plausible pages one is struck by the contrast between this Socialist candidate and that other leader

by the name of Debs, who spent so much of his life in jail, and one wonders inescapably how much of that party's attitude on social questions has now become academic.

As to solving our economic ills, Mr. Thomas would simply buy out the capitalist class, pension off owners and landlords and such, and wish them a pleasant old age. Such whimsical advice is a diversion rather than an education. But Mr. Thomas has his role in American society, the not so easy or thankful one of disturbing our complacency and galvanizing our ideals. Our entrance into war he is strongly opposed to, but England he believes "may yet pioneer in a new democracy, as more than a hundred years ago she pioneered in the old."

THE SHAKER ADVENTURE. By Marguerite Fellows Melcher. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1941. 319 pages. \$3.00.

The message that the Shakers have for us today is their demonstration that man can create his own environment if he so wills, which comes as a sort of keel to bear us moderns through stormy seas. The author writes with this in mind and though the sect has faded almost utterly from the present scene it has left its monuments, both tangible and spiritual.

In their way they solved the problem of economic insecurity and among other things taught us a valuable lesson in the vanity of pride, which so often hinders progress to a better life. It is strange that such a small and segregated group—the Shakers never numbered over 6,000 members—should have had such influence. Interesting also is the fact that they began and continued to be of the humblest class of society, showing that even people without education can achieve refinement, if not sophistication, in their way of living.

From their beginnings under the "prophet" Ann Lee and the Wardleys in England during the eighteenth century, Mrs. Melcher traces their history there and, before that, their antecedents in France, to the eventual departure for America and

the settlement at New Lebanon in 1787. The author describes the Shakers as Communists, ordinary citizens, business men and pioneers. The little utopias that they developed were also practical ventures in esthetics and there is a good deal said about Shaker functionalism. But handicrafts had to give way before the machine of modern industry; the Shaker legacy is that if man brings his mind and feelings to his work he can be happy in it. They gave us the germ of that "studio" idea of society wherein production is joined intelligently with beauty and need and out of which may come a satisfactory life.

BOUNDARIES, POSSESSIONS, AND CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL AND NORTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. *By Gordon Ireland. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1941. 432 pages. \$4.50.*

This scholarly book is the companion volume to *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America*, published under the same auspices in 1938, and thus it completes the history of the boundary and territorial disputes of the Western Hemisphere. As almost all conflicts among Latin-American countries were caused by boundary disputes inherited from the time of the Spanish rule, this book represents the documentary history of the most important chapter in the history of those countries. The division of Latin America into various countries after the establishment of their independence followed more or less the provincial colonial divisions under the Spanish rule. It is this "more or less" which in many cases was the origin of bloody conflicts lasting for years. Almost all these conflicts have now been settled by peace treaties or arbitration, the last of them not until recently. This volume deals in particular with the boundary problems of the Caribbean countries: Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Salvador, Panama, Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States.

The boundaries of the continental United States are discussed from the foundation of the colonies through the American Revolution and the subsequent pur-

chases or conquests to the present day. The story of the Mexican line, the Isthmian Canal and the history of the Caribbean and Atlantic Islands, as well as the British, French and Dutch possessions around the Caribbean, are particularly timely in view of the present war and the discussion over granting naval and air bases to this country.

Several excellent maps, diagrams, an index and a complete tabulation of all treaties between these countries—when signed, ratified, or denounced—make this volume an indispensable reference supplement of all histories of Latin America.

TOUGHEN UP, AMERICA! *By Dr. Victor G. Heiser. New York: Whittlesey House. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1941. 228 pages. \$2.00.*

Events abroad are now reflected in the most ordinary matters of daily life, and as the title of this little book suggests, they are about to reach into such personal things as our diet and exercise. Indeed, this contribution to the ever-growing literature of defense, by implication poses the alternative that if we don't learn how to eat and exercise properly, soon we will jolly well be made to.

The war and what it is doing on the positive side for human health is what has caused the genial Dr. Heiser to take up the role of stern adviser on health. He contends that the successes of the German Army are in part due to the stamina of the individual soldier participating from childhood in planned exercises. What the Germans and the Fascist nations accomplish through coercion we can do by individual initiative and desire.

Soft life in our cities is apt to impair the heart, the digestion, the feet, the lungs. Some of us are ever on the verge of exhaustion, and if we are not we shall soon be, listening to so many radio broadcasts telling us how run down we are. A man who expends his last ounce of energy on a single flight of stairs is certainly in no shape for army life or defense emergencies. Exercise and diet are the answer for the tough years Dr. Heiser believes lie ahead of Americans.

On the matter of those over-chewed

THE SOUTHERN REVIEW

VOL. VI SPRING, 1941 No. 4

ALLEN TATE
LITERATURE AS KNOWLEDGE

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R. P. BLACKMUR
CHAOS IS COME AGAIN

★
KENNETH BURKE
CHARACTER OF OUR CULTURE

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vitamins the author is fresh and readable. New discoveries about proteins, carbohydrates, sugars and starches are explained. There is a serviceable formula which explains that we require one calorie of food an hour for every kilogram or 2½ pounds of body weight, depending upon whether one's work is sedentary or muscular. There are extensive tables for reducing and build-up diets. Many persons are unwittingly underweight from too much dieting, and indeed that office-weariness we hear about is often the result of silly malnutrition.

While the author confesses that setting-up exercises bore him, and that sport is the best means of health, he nevertheless lists ten body-building routines. Some day, he feels, there will be more widespread acceptance of mass-exercise—which also does sound like another hint from abroad. In a chapter on habits the Doctor discusses alcohol and tobacco. This book should start a few people at least to thinking how much it is possible to control their weaknesses and ills.

DOLLARS IN LATIN AMERICA. AN OLD PROBLEM IN A NEW SETTING. *By Willy Feuerlein and Elizabeth Hannan. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1940. 102 pages. \$1.50.*

THE ROAD TO PAN-AMERICANISM. *By Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum. New York: Committee for Inter-American Co-operation. 1941. 62 pages. 50 cents.*

The Council on Foreign Relations which publishes *Foreign Affairs*, one of the most authoritative magazines on that subject, and the indispensable yearly *Political Handbook of the World*, has rendered a distinct service in publishing this very timely little book when, after a long interruption, the United States is again about to embark on a vast program of investment in the countries to the south of us. In language also comprehensible to those not versed in the special financial verbiage it treats such problems as causes of former defaults, ex-

change control, dollars for hemisphere defense, distinction between direct and portfolio investments, whether the unpaid old debts should be written off or forgotten or the resumption of their payment required before new loans are extended, etc. It discusses the government policies affecting alien investments and the new directions in our Latin-American policy. A good bibliography on Latin-American-United States financial problems and an index are part of this book, which should be in the hands of all those interested in Latin-American affairs.

Dr. Tenenbaum's pamphlet is a useful brief general survey of Latin America's natural resources, the industrial development, the inter-Latin-American commerce as well as the commerce of the United States with Latin America and the Latin-American war trade. Several statistical tables are quite helpful.

SUGGESTED READING

THE TIME IS NOW. By *Pierre van Paassen*. *The Dial Press*. (Reviewed next month.)

MISSION TO THE NORTH. By *Florence Jaffray Harriman*. *J. B. Lippincott Company*. (Reviewed next month.)

A TIME TO SPEAK. By *Archibald MacLeish*. *Houghton Mifflin Company*. (Reviewed this month.)

PLAN FOR PERMANENT PEACE. By *Hans Heymann*. *Harper & Brothers*. (Reviewed this month.)

MEN AND POLITICS. By *Louis Fischer*. *Duell, Sloan and Pearce*. (Reviewed next month.)

MEN OF WEALTH. By *John T. Flynn*. *Simon and Schuster*. (Reviewed next month.)

WOMEN OF BRITAIN. By *Jan Struther*. *Harcourt, Brace and Company*. (Reviewed next month.)

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POEMS OF THE MONTH

(Continued from page 382)

How to be urban, polished, new and bright,
How to smile down at the world and keep your seat
On a toy bus swaying quaintly through the night.

MARSHALL SCHACHT
—in *New Poems* 1940

Photograph

Click, click! like an elfin musket
A camera flickered . . . and puff!
The clock was halted forever
With a pinch of enchanted stuff;
And the fields surrendered to magic,
And the surf hushed under the bluff.

And a charm was cast over Mother
Between the sea and the sky,
Sitting apron-deep in the daisies
And watching the clouds go by;
For now she shall never grow older a breath
And the daisies never shall die.

JAMES J. GALVIN, C.S.S.R.
—in *Spirit*, New York

Lament

Provocative as blurbs, the clouds imply
Fantastic landscapes to my aerial eye.
Yet part, familiar country to display
As prim as Priestley, flat as Hemingway.
Where cities, huge as Proust, exhaust the earth
And spread about them labyrinthine dearth;
Awaiting with rhinocerine aplomb
The drastic criticism of the bomb.


Airman is merely critic overblown,
Locked in a little cosmos of his own,
With power, if will be bad and aim be good,
To kill more Keatses than a Gifford could.

JOHN MAIR
—in *The New Statesman and Nation*, London

UNIQUE AMONG ANNUALS

The New York Times Book Review (March 14, 1941):

"*THE WORLD OVER IN 1940*. Edited by Leon Bryce Bloch, [Former] Editor, and Lamar Middleton, Editor, of *The Living Age*. With maps. 914 pp. New York: Living Age Press. \$4.



"The third annual volume of *The Living Age* review of world events is of course outstanding in its importance as the record of a year of war. And in this volume, as in its predecessors, clear and unbiased interpretation shares place with succinct chronology. As the year opens—this 'overwhelming year,' the editors call it—the section of Commentary, marks, for example, the complacent French and British overconfidence which now seems so incredible and which was in itself so ominous . . . not judgment or opinion or persuasion, this, but real interpretation in narrative. The volume as a whole is a unique and invaluable work for contemporary reference. . . . Needless to say, the Presidential campaign and other important events in the United States are followed in careful progress, and developments in Far Eastern affairs receive proper emphasis, as do the happenings of the year in Latin America and other peaceful regions of the globe."

The third volume—**THE WORLD OVER IN 1940**—contains more than 900 pages with index. Handsomely printed in compact form for permanent reference use, it costs only \$4 a copy, postpaid. *By mailing the appended coupon, you can obtain a copy with special return privilege—that is, if you decide not to keep the book, you may return it in five days and obtain refund in full.*

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THE GUIDE POST

MARIO APPELIUS is the star foreign correspondent and "expert" on international affairs of the Fascist press. *Italy Salutes the Japanese* (p. 407).

BEN LUCIEN BURMAN, author of *Mississippi* and *Steamboat Round the Bend*, was severely wounded at Soissons during active service in the first World War. This time he is serving as a special correspondent on the Free French front in Africa. *Paris Moves to the Congo* (p. 409) was radioed from the Congo.

HUGH CLEGG is an English doctor who has been directly concerned with *British Medicine Under Luftwaffe* (p. 416).

WALKER MATHESON—*War in the Pacific Unlikely* (p. 432)—is a newspaper and magazine writer who has recently returned from an extensive tour of the Far East.

DOROTHY L. SAYERS, best known to her wide American public as a top-ranking detective novelist, since the War—as in *Begin Here*, recently published in the United States—has concerned herself with more serious subjects. *The Church in War's Aftermath* (p. 441).

JAMES A. GRAY was for a number of years the editor of the *Pretoria News* of South Africa. *The Return of General Smuts* (p. 448).

FLORA BELLE JAN is a California-born Chinese woman who has had newspaper experience in Illinois and on the West Coast. She is now the wife of a professor at Fu Jen University in Peking and a reporter on the *Peking Chronicle*, in which *Chinese Prince and Catholic Painter* (p. 452) was first published.